Path Dependence in European Development: Medieval Politics, Conflict, and State Building

• Author: Alexander Lee,Avidit Acharya
• Date: 01 November 2019
• Published date: 01 November 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0010414019830716
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019830716

Comparative Political Studies

2019, Vol. 52(13-14) 2171 –2206

© The Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0010414019830716

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Article

Path Dependence in

European Development:

Medieval Politics,

Conflict, and State

Building

Avidit Acharya1 and Alexander Lee2

Abstract

During the Middle Ages, most European polities operated under a norm that

gave only the close male relatives of a monarch a privileged place in the order

of succession. When no such heirs were available, succession disputes were

more likely, with distant relatives and female(-line) heirs laying competing

claims to the throne. These disputes often produced conflicts that destroyed

existing institutions and harmed subsequent economic development. A

shortage of male heirs to a European monarchy in the Middle Ages could

thus have harmful effects on the development trajectories of regions ruled

by that monarchy. We provide evidence for this by showing that regions that

were more likely to have a shortage of male heirs are today poorer than

other regions. Our finding highlights the importance of the medieval period in

European development and shows how small shocks can work in combination

with institutions and norms in shaping long-run development paths.

Keywords

political instability, conflict, state-building, economic development, gender

bias, political norms and institutions, European history

1Stanford University, CA, USA

2University of Rochester, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Avidit Acharya, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University,

Encina Hall West, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.

Email: avidit@stanford.edu

830716CPSXXX10.1177/0010414019830716Comparative Political StudiesAcharya and Lee

research-article2019

2172 Comparative Political Studies 52(13-14)

Introduction

A large body of scholarship argues that the process of political and eco-

nomic development is path dependent. Most works in this “historical insti-

tutionalism” literature focus on studying the consequences of large, often

deliberately initiated, macro-historical events that took place at certain

“critical junctures” in shaping long-run development trajectories.1 Some of

this work, however, also points to the possibility that even small contingent

events can produce path dependent outcomes. Paul Pierson, for example,

writes that “path dependent arguments based on positive feedback suggest

that not only ‘big’ events have big consequences; little ones that happen at

the right time can have major consequences as well” (Pierson, 2000, p.

263). Despite this, empirical studies of the large, long-term consequences

of such small contingent events have been relatively scarce. This article

contributes one such study.

Our focus in this article is on the development of state institutions in medi-

eval Europe, and how accidents of royal births—in particular, the availability

of male heirs to the monarchs of medieval Europe—contributed to producing

a variation in the success or failure of early state-building efforts. The effects

of this variation appear to have lasted and can be seen in contemporary dif-

ferences in development levels across Europe, overlaying other, better known

dimensions of economic variation within the continent.

The link between royal births and medieval state development emerges

from a simple theory connecting political gender bias and succession

norms to political conflict and its consequences for state-building. During

the medieval period, most polities operated under a norm that gave the

close male relatives of the ruling monarch a relatively clear place in the

line of succession, but often did not specify clear succession rules for

female (and female-line) heirs. A shortage of male heirs could, therefore,

destabilize the polity by creating conflict among the nobility, rival rela-

tives, and opportunistic foreigners. In many cases, more distant male rela-

tives would claim the throne over closer female or female-line relatives,

leading to a succession dispute. These disputes often turned into violent

wars. These wars in turn had harmful effects on the polity’s long-term

development, by destroying existing state institutions and reducing politi-

cal cohesion. It is also possible that ruling families and local elites in areas

ruled by monarchs with relatively few close male relatives anticipated

such conflict and became less willing to invest in building a strong and

cohesive state in the first place. Both this underinvestment, and the dam-

age caused by violent conflict, had a detrimental effect on contemporane-

ous and subsequent state development.

Acharya and Lee 2173

In areas with one or more potential male heirs, on the other hand, the high

level of political stability afforded by a series of unambiguous and uncon-

tested successions enabled certain polities to establish strong and lasting state

institutions, making them more resistant to internal conflict and foreign influ-

ence, and even enabling them to conquer and exploit other less politically

stable areas. Paris is one of Europe’s most prosperous metropolises today in

part because it enjoyed the uninterrupted reign of a single dynasty for more

than three centuries from 987 to 1316AD (Lewis, 1981). It was in this period

that Capetian monarchs laid the foundations of the modern French state with

their city as its capital. Naples, by contrast, was a more prosperous city than

Paris in the early Middle Ages, but lost ground due to a series of destructive

civil wars brought on by succession-related conflicts (Jones, 2000). Our the-

ory provides a new explanation for this reversal.

Our main empirical findings demonstrate the path-dependent effects of the

uneven nature of state-building in medieval Europe arising from the (un)

availability of male heirs. Regions of Europe that were ruled by medieval

monarchs who had an abundance of male heirs are today richer than other

regions. These effects can also be traced over time: Urban density in each

century between 1300 and 1800 was higher in regions that had an abundance

of male heirs. In addition, we find that an abundance of male heirs decreased

the frequency of internal wars and coups, and that contemporary economic

development is negatively correlated with the occurrence of these violent

medieval events, lending further support to our theory. To allay some con-

cerns about endogeneity, we also conduct a placebo test that shows that avail-

ability of illegitimate male children (those who did not have claims to succeed

the throne) does not predict prosperity today.

Authors such as Strayer (1970) and Tilly (1992) have argued that European

polities began to develop state institutions in the period between 1000 and

1500, but that some polities built stronger and more durable states than oth-

ers. Tilly (1992), in particular, highlights the destructive impact of internal

wars and political instability on medieval state-building in Europe. In addi-

tion, Migdal (1988), Herbst (2000), and Besley and Persson (2011) have

argued that strong state institutions, at both the local and central level, are

essential for economic development. Our article provides evidence for these

claims by identifying an aspect of medieval politics that is both readily mea-

surable and has direct theoretical links to medieval state-building efforts (the

availability of male heirs) and documenting its lasting effects on contempo-

rary development.

Our work also relates to a vast literature that argues that societal and eco-

nomic conditions preceding the period of Western industrialization played an

important role in shaping the development paths of European polities. By