Pass the SIGAR: Cutting Through the Smoke of Lessons Learned in Simplified Contingency Contracting Operations

• Author: Major Justin M. Marchesi
• Pages: 53-82

2014] SIMPLIFIED CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OPS 53

PASS THE SIGAR: CUTTING THROUGH THE SMOKE OF

LESSONS LEARNED IN SIMPLIFIED CONTINGENCY

CONTRACTING OPERATIONS

MAJOR JUSTIN M. MARCHESI*

Applying a force’s full combat power requires unity of command. Unity

of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the

actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may

produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required

authority is the most effective way to achieve unity of effort.1

I. Introduction

For over ten years, the Armed Forces of the United States have been

decisively engaged in combat contingency operations across the globe.2

While the bulk of these operations have focused on Iraq and Afghanistan,

the scope of this world-wide mission is without precedent. Never before,

in the history of the U.S. military, have so few uniformed

Servicemembers been tasked to successfully topple two regimes,

stabilize an unprecedented amount of territory, and reconstruct a vast

network of infrastructure that had either never existed or had been

ravaged by years of neglect, conflict, and economic sanctions.3 In fact,

* Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. Presently assigned as Brigade Judge Advocate, 2d

Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York.

LL.M., 2013, The Judge Advocate General’s School; J.D., 2011, William & Mary Law

School; B.A., 2003, University of Southern California. Previous assignments include

Brigade Judge Advocate, 2d Security Forces Assistance Brigade, Regional Command -

East, International Security Assistance Force, Paktika Province, Afghanistan, 2013; Trial

Counsel and Administrative Law Attorney, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, 2011–2012; Commander, Bravo Company, Allied Forces Southern Europe,

USAE-NATO, Madrid, Spain, 2007–2008; Adjutant, V Corps Special Troops Battalion,

Heidelberg, Germany, 2004–2007; Adjutant, Task Force Victory, Multi-National Corps -

Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq, 2006; Adjutant, 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment, Fort Benning,

Georgia, 2003–2004. Member of the bars of California and the District of Columbia.

This article was submitted in partial completion of the Master of Laws requirements of

the 61st Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course.

1 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-0, OPERATIONS, at A3 (27 Feb. 2008)

(describing the Unity of Command principle of war and operations).

2 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L.

No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498; Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-

40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).

3 See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFG., TRANSFORMING WARTIME

CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS 17 (2011) [hereinafter CWC FINAL

REPORT] (citing CONG. RESEARCH SVC., REPORT NO. R41677, INSTANCES OF USE OF

54 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 219

the size of the force performing these missions, and its supporting

uniformed logistical force structure, is dramatically smaller than that of

any modern wartime force of the United States.4

The stage was set for this situation when active duty forces were

reduced by thirty-one percent following the end of the Cold War and the

successful liberation of Kuwait in the Persian Gulf War.5 This spurred a

reevaluation of core military competency priorities where a focus on the

maintenance of offensive combat capabilities was of paramount concern.

This preservation of combat power, however, came at the expense of a

litany of organic sustainment capabilities necessary for the extended

combat, stability, and support operations the U.S. military has

encountered since 9/11.6

As a result, the herculean missions of the past decade relied heavily

upon privately contracted security, logistics, and construction services.7

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2010 (2011)), available at

http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf.

4 See Lance M. Bacon, Cutting Half an Army: End Strength in the Cross Hairs, ARMY

TIMES, Mar. 11, 2013, at 20 (noting the Army’s end strength in the following years: 1945

(8,266,373); 1955 (1,109,296); 1970 (1,322,548); 1990 (732,403); and 2012 (551,000)).

5 ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD., TRENDS IN US

MILITARY FORCES AND DEFENSE SPENDING 11 (1999) (noting that the active duty U.S.

military manpower levels of all services combined dropped from approximately 2 million

in 1991 to approximately 1.39 million in 1999).

6 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 2012-134, CONTINGENCY

CONTRACTING: A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM 2012 UPDATE 1 (2012) [hereinafter DOD IG

2012 UPDATE] (“These contractors perform vital tasks in support of U.S. defense and

development objectives, including logistics support, equipment maintenance, fuel

delivery, base operations support, and security.”), available at http://www.dodig

.mil/audit/reports/fy12/dodig-2012-134.pdf; CWC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 28

(“There are several reasons agencies rely on contractors for contingency-support services:

. . . military services’ having concentrated limited resources on combat functions, which

led to a degradation of organic capability.”).

7 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-212, WARFIGHTER SUPPORT: DOD

NEEDS ADDITIONAL STEPS TO FULLY INTEGRATE OPERATIONA L CONTRACT SUPPORT INTO

CONTINGENCY PLANNING 6 (2013) [hereinafter GAO WARFIGHTER SUPPORT REPORT

2013] (“The U.S. military routinely uses contracted support in contingency operations.

Military forces will often be significantly augmented with contracted support because of

the continual introduction of high-technology equipment, coupled with force structure

and manning limitations, and the high pace of operations.”); CWC FINAL REPORT, supra

note 3, at 28 (noting that contracts are used extensively because of: (1) statutory limits on

the end strength of military and civilian personnel; (2) a concentration on combat

functions that has degraded organizational logistical capabilities; (3) long recruitment and

training lead times; (4) voluntary nature of deployments for civilian employees; and (5) a

presumption of cost effectiveness for contracts).