Party System Institutionalization and Pernicious Polarization in Bangladesh

• Author: Tahmina Rahman
• DOI: 10.1177/0002716218817280
• Published date: 01 January 2019
• Date: 01 January 2019
• Subject Matter: III. Democratic Careening and Gridlock

817280ANN
The Annals Of The American AcademyParty System Institutionalization and Pernicious Polarization in Bangladesh
research-article2018
This article traces the development of political polariza
tion in Bangladesh since its 1971 war of independence.
I show how polarization is elitedriven, hinging mostly
on competing views of the foundation myth of the
nation. One major political bloc has emerged that ties
national identity tightly to religion (Islam), where the
other bloc prefers a national identity tied to ethnicity
and use of the Bengali language. I show how an under
developed party system has contributed to the resulting
Party System political and societal polarization that stems from this
ideological divide, which was created by elites as they
Institutionali attempted to consolidate party power. Further, I make
a case that the activities of the International Crimes
Tribunal (ICT)—established in 2010 to prosecute those
zation and
who aided the Pakistani army in committing war crimes
during the 1971 war—actually increased polarization
Pernicious
and made it pernicious. Instead of healing the nation,
the ICT exacerbated old political cleavages and

instigated violence and social tension, making
Polarization in Bangladesh’s young democracy more unstable and
careening.
Bangladesh
Keywords: polarization; Bangladesh; party system
institutionalization; democratic careening
Bangladesh, a country where most people
speak Bengali and practice Sunni Islam,
By
presents a curious case of pernicious polariza
TAhmINA RAhmAN
tion. Political polarization there involves com
peting definitions of national identity, rather
than divergent economic ideologies or class
based social cleavages. It takes the form of an
Islamist/secular divide among the country’s
major political parties, where the Islamist par
ties focus on the religious element of national
identity and the secular parties focus on
language
based ethnic identity. This debate
about national identity has spilled over into
Tahmina Rahman is a PhD candidate in political sci-
ence at Georgia State University and an assistant pro-
fessor of international relations at the University of
Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Correspondence: trahman1@gsu.edu
DOI: 10.1177/0002716218817280
ANNALS, AAPSS, 681, January 2019 173

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ThE ANNALS OF ThE AmERICAN ACADEmY
other areas of politics and society, creating long, protracted, and often violent
disagreement over policy issues, producing poor policy decisions. It has also fos
tered social intolerance and often instigated violence. Since 2010, polarization
has taken a particularly intense form over the issue of trial and punishment of
people who committed crimes against humanity during the 1971 Liberation
War.1 This phase of polarization started over the legitimacy, transparency, and
effectiveness of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), set up in 2010 to pros
ecute the war criminals, but it soon turned into a battle over a monopoly on the
“true nationalist narrative.”2 The proTribunal forces came to view and depict
anyone opposing the Tribunal as Islamists who were trying to destroy the secular
nature of the state. The antiTribunal forces saw an antiIslamist and immoral
social movement in the group that supported the Tribunal.
Bangladesh does not fit in the category of crisisofrepresentationinduced
polarization, as do Thailand or the Philippines (discussed elsewhere in this vol
ume). As mcCoy, Rahman, and Somer (2018) discuss, polarization is often a
result of previously disenfranchised or underrepresented groups’ gaining politi
cal power and then alienating the opponent. This creates a backlash and divides
society. But Bangladesh, one of the most stable democracies in South Asia, is a
different story. The major parties here are quite broadbased and represent dif
ferent groups/classes of people. The country has seen regular transfer of power
between these parties through elections since 1991. Voter turnout is high, and
people seem to be content with choosing their representatives from the existing
parties. most people still think democracy is the best method of governance
(International Republican Institute 2017). Therefore, this is not a case of populist
polarization caused by the political mobilization and empowerment of a previ
ously unempowered or underrepresented group.
Neither has Bangladesh experienced any big exogenous shock such as an eco
nomic meltdown. In fact, the global financial crisis of 2008–09 did not greatly
affect it, due to its relative insularity from the global economy. If anything,
Bangladesh graduated from the category of “least developed” to the category of
“developing countries” in 2017 (United Nations Department of Social and
Economic Affairs 2018). A 2017 Asia Foundation survey found that, despite a
large income gap, citizens are generally hopeful about where the country is head
ing (Rieger, Taylor, and Tweedie 2017).
Bangladesh has also consistently scored high on the global happiness index in
2009, 2012, and 2016.3 So, there is little reason to conclude that economic dis
content or lack of political enfranchisement is driving polarization in the country.
In fact, major political parties in the country have a broad constituency base that
cuts across social classes. Instead, polarization in Bangladesh is caused by com
petition over a monopoly on what LeBas and munemo, in another contribution
to this volume, call the “foundational myth” of a nation. The conflict is about what
Bangladesh stands for, what its founding goals are, and what defines and
distinguishes its people from other nationalities. It is about embracing either
religion (Islam) or ethnicity (Bengali language) as the core component of national
identity of its people—an unfinished project of nationbuilding that has been
ongoing since Bangladeshi independence in 1971.

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PARTY SYSTEm INSTITUTIONALIzATION AND PERNICIOUS POLARIzATION IN BANgLADESh
175
Although polarization in Bangladesh does not originate from either crisisof
representation or classbased social cleavages, it is no less pernicious than other
cases of severe polarization discussed in this volume of The ANNALS. Polarization
at the political elite level has locked Bangladesh in what Somer and mcCoy, in
the introduction to this volume, refer to as careening, with an increasingly
authoritarian turn. Although power regularly alternates between the two major
parties through elections, policymaking is a contentious process, as policy issues
are subsumed in the polarized divide over national identity. The polarized con
text impedes negotiation and consultation, and the governing party frequently
makes unilateral decisions about nationally important issues. On the societal
level, such polarization generates social distance between supporters of opposing
political parties, where each group views the other as an existential threat to the
identity and way of life of the Bangladeshi people.
This article demonstrates how an underdeveloped party system is a major
contributor to the pernicious political and societal polarization in Bangladesh,
arguing that polarization in Bangladesh is an elitedriven phenomenon. Although
polarization over the Tribunal started at the civilsociety level, the ingredients for
such polarization are found in the major political parties. Their polarizing narra
tives since the authoritarian era (1976–1990)4 prepared the ground for polarized
civil society movements that feed on divisive nationalist narratives. Thus, polari
zation in Bangladesh has a cyclical nature, where unresolved debates over
national identity are harnessed by the political parties to advance their agendas
through their respective brands of civil society. These civil societies in turn exac
erbate and sharpen the existing divide with the help of the political parties.
I trace the development of polarization in Bangladesh in three distinctive
periods: elevation of social cleavages during the authoritarian period (1976–1990)
as a way to solve the regime’s legitimacy crisis; harnessing polarizing narratives
during the first two decades of the postauthoritarian era to control electoral vola
tility (1991–2008); and crystallization of pernicious polarization over the Tribunal
issue between 2010 and 2013.
Polarization as a Tool for Party System Institutionalization
Party system institutionalization refers to predictable patterns of intraparty com
petition. A highly institutionalized party system would exhibit a higher level of
stability in terms of parties’ maintaining strong bonds with the grassroots and
retaining their core constituencies. A poorly institutionalized party system would
be more chaotic in the sense that the parties might not have an adequate social
bond with the grassroots level and, therefore, voters might switch parties more
frequently, jeopardizing the electoral fortune of the parties.
Although scholars have identified many dimensions of party system institu
tionalization, the most relevant ones here are stability in party competition, lack
of electoral volatility, and strong roots in society (mainwaring and Trocal 2006,
206–27). In many emerging democracies, party system institutionalization, in

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terms of establishing a strong bond with the voters and stabilizing their electoral
behavior, is a tricky business (mainwaring and zoco 2007 ). Because they did not
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