Party Splits, Not Progressives

• Author: Jack Santucci
• Published date: 01 May 2017
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X16674774
• Date: 01 May 2017
• Subject Matter: Articles

American Politics Research

2017, Vol. 45(3) 494 –526

© The Author(s) 2016

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X16674774

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Article

Party Splits, Not

Progressives: The

Origins of Proportional

Representation in

American Local

Government

Jack Santucci1

Abstract

The choice of proportional representation (PR) is rarely included in work

on American local politics. Yet we have long known that 24 cities adopted

the single transferable vote form of PR from 1915 to 1948. Breaking with a

machine–reform dichotomy that dominates the PR historiography, I investigate

two partisan hypotheses about PR’s origins. One concerns the emergence of

third parties. A second involves splits in ruling parties. In at least 15 cases,

PR choice involved an alliance of convenience between ruling-party defectors

and local minority parties. Evidence includes narratives on the partisanship of

elite PR backers, comparison of case history and precinct-level referendum

outcomes for three similar cities, and aggregate data on big-city charter

change referenda from 1900 to 1950. New in this article is comparison of

PR adopters with non-adopters. Party splits in places with sizable out-parties

emerge as a distinctly American path to proportional electoral rules.1

Keywords

party splits, proportional representation, single transferable vote, ranked

choice voting, local government

1Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jack Santucci, Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets NW, ICC 681, Washington, DC

20057-0004, USA.

Email: jms346@georgetown.edu

674774APRXXX10.1177/1532673X16674774American Politics ResearchSantucci

research-article2016

Santucci 495

Introduction

Everyone knows that local elections happen at-large, in single-member

districts, or some combination of the two. In the prevailing account, dis-

tricts foster patronage, at-large represents middle-class reaction, and

mixed systems exist for descriptive minority representation. A long line of

work probes the consequences of these three basic formats.2 A parallel line

looks at choice among these rules, often in the context of municipal gov-

ernment form.3 Yet these studies rarely if ever mention proportional repre-

sentation (PR). Twenty-four cities had the single transferable vote (STV)

form of PR between 1915 and 1961 (Figure 1).4 This article aims to under-

stand why.

Existing work on American PR cannot say how its causes were different

from those of other reforms. Because that work is descriptive and histori-

cal, it does not look at non-PR cases. The goal was to document PR’s use,

debunk blanket criticism thereof (Hermens, 1941), and identify whatever

patterns were resonant at the time of writing. For example, voting rights

struggles surrounding Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 US 30 (1986) and the

1993 nomination of a PR advocate as assistant attorney general coincided

with the most recent spate of interest. Yet the literature’s main point is that

PR simply existed.5

To the extent that historical studies offer explanations, they tend to use a

machine–reformer paradigm (Amy, 1993, 1996, 2002; Banfield & Wilson,

1966; Barber, 1995b; Childs, 1965; L. Weaver, 1986).6 In practice, machine–

reform poorly predicts both organizational behavior and institutional prefer-

ences. Machines practice favoritism, but so do many politicians. Machines

are hierarchical, but so are many parties (Wolfinger, 1972). Hierarchy and

favoritism have existed under many types of local government (Trounstine,

2006, 2008). Organizational interests clearly matter for institutional choice,

but are machine and reform the right ones to trace?

This article breaks with PR historiography in two ways. First, I build on

partisan motive, not a machine–reform distinction. The presence of anti-party

institutions does not imply parties are dead. We have ample evidence that

they survive reform of many kinds (Cohen, Karol, Noel, & Zaller, 2008;

Masket, 2009, 2013; Masket & Shor, 2015; McGhee, Masket, Shor, Rogers,

& McCarty, 2014). We also have evidence that reform itself can be a partisan

project (Anzia, 2012).

Second, I take selection bias seriously. This is the first study of local PR

choice to compare adoptions with negative cases: failed attempts to impose

PR, and then successful attempts to impose at-large plurality. The idea is to

isolate a logic that classifies reform episodes.

496 American Politics Research 45(3)

I argue that PR emerged where the coalition for charter change was multi-

party. I call this grouping a fragmented majority. Its goal is a voting rule

promoting post-election coalition government. Fragmented majorities stand

in contrast to cohesive majorities, which approximate pre-election legislative

coalitions. All partners in a fragmented majority want to weaken the ruling

party, but they opt for PR because none can dominate post-reform govern-

ment alone.

With fragmented majorities in mind, the article turns to theory and evi-

dence. Section “Partisan Paths to Anti-Party Reform” considers the menu of

Figure 1. Spells of PR-STV use.

Source. Data are from Childs (1965) and L. Weaver (1986); quarterly issues of the Proportional

Representation Review, 1893 to 1932; and then monthly issues of the National Municipal Review,

1932 to 1958.

Note. Solid, upward triangles denote successful adoptions. Solid, downward triangles denote

successful repeals. Empty triangles denote unsuccessful adoptions or repeals. Bars denote

years in which PR was in effect. PR = proportional representation; STV = single transferable

vote.