Party, Policy, and the Ambition to Run for Higher Office
| Author | Danielle M. Thomsen,John H. Aldrich |
| Date | 01 May 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12161 |
| Published date | 01 May 2017 |
JOHN H. ALDRICH
Duke University
DANIELLE M. THOMSEN
Syracuse University
Party, Policy, and the Ambition to
Run for Higher Office
This article examines why some state legislators run for Congress and others do
not. Our main argument is that there are differences in the expected value of a state legis-
lative seat and the expected benefits of being a member of Congress. One key
component of this value is how closely the candidate fits with her party. We find that the
probability of seeking congressional office increases among state legislators who are dis-
tant from the state party and proximate to the congressional party and decreases among
those who are distant from the congressional party and proximate to the state party.
In October 2013, veteran Republican representative C. W. Bill
Young announced he would not seek re-election in Florida’s 13th con-
gressional district. National Republican leaders immediately began their
candidate quest. They reached out to Jack Latvala, a longtime state senator
who represents more than two-thirds of the US House district. Latvala had
no interest in running for Congress and, in fact, he did not even return
their call (Huey-Burns and Conroy 2013). RealClearPolitics asked Latvala
why he passed on the opportunity. He said, “I make an impact on things
in Tallahassee on a daily basis. I couldn’t make much of an impact in
Washington” (Huey-Burns and Conroy 2013). While it is difficult to say
exactly what Latvala means by impact, we believe there is more to this
story. What this simple comment does not reveal is the fact that Latvala’s
ideological preferences are well within the Republican Party mainstream
in the Florida state senate, but if he were elected to Congress, he would be
an ideological outsider in the congressional GOP delegation.
1
The case of current Republican Representative Patrick McHenry
(NC-10) illustrates how ideological conformity, or lack thereof, can also
work to spur congressional aspirations. McHenry was elected to the
North Carolina state legislature in 2002. A social and economic conser-
vative, he was significantly to the right of the bulk of the Republican
delegation in the state House at the time. He was, however, a nearly
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 42, 2, May 2017 321
DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12161
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C2016 Washington University in St. Louis
perfect ideological match with the Republican Party delegation in
Congress.
2
He served one term in the state legislature and then ran for
Congress. We think that McHenry’s self-described “pro-growth,
pro-life, pro-marriage, pro-gun, tax cut message” (quoted in Nowell
2004, 1) and his willingness to seek higher office is related to both his
own ideological leanings and those of the party delegations to which he
belonged and would ultimately belong.
The decision to run for political office is central to the study of
democratic politics and legislative representation. Fifty years ago, Schle-
singer claimed: “Ambition lies at the heart of politics” (1966, 1).
Representative government relies upon a supply of individuals who
wish to hold elective office. The election of candidates instills the demo-
cratic process with legitimacy, and it gives those who were elected the
authority to rule. Elections are the principal mechanism that voters use to
hold political leaders accountable and to evaluate government perfor-
mance. It therefore behooves political scientists to keep political
ambition and the decision to seek elective office at the center of theories
about legislative politics. The democratic ideal deeply depends on, and
indeed takes for granted, the existence of a vibrant and healthy pool of
candidates from which voters can choose. This article seeks to shed
theoretical and empirical light on why some individuals run for elective
office and others do not.
Theoretical Explanation
Our specific question is which state legislators run for the US
House. Choosing to do so is a rare event (in our data, 1.4% run), even
though those who do are among the most likely to win the seat. State
legislators make up the highest percentage of winners of those from any
office other than incumbent members of the House themselves. And,
indeed, former state legislators are a full 50% of sitting members of
Congress (NCSL 2013).
3
We believe that career ambition is necessary but insufficient to
explain who runs for higher office. It is necessary to explain who does
run, as the decision to run for the US House reflects a commitment to a
truly intensive job and lifestyle, so one does not choose that option light-
ly. It is insufficient, we believe, because while many politicians have the
ambition to hold high office, few actually choose to run. Our problem,
then, is how to move toward a sufficient explanation. Part of the explana-
tion, of course, is the set of costs and benefits associated with the run and
the (ordinarily long) odds of winning (e.g., Maestas et al. 2006; Maisel
and Stone 2014; Stone and Maisel 2003). Only a few of the otherwise
322 John H. Aldrich and Danielle M. Thomsen
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