Partisan Policymaking in the Extended Party Network: The Case of Cap-and-Trade Regulations
| Date | 01 June 2020 |
| Published date | 01 June 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912919838326 |
| Author | Zachary Albert |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2019
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2020, Vol. 73(2) 476 –491
Partisan Policymaking in the
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Extended Party Network: The Case
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919838326
DOI: 10.1177/1065912919838326
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of Cap-and-Trade Regulations
Zachary Albert1
Abstract
American political parties frequently advance contradictory arguments in policy debates, but scholars know relatively
little about where these arguments originate. Outside research-producing institutions are likely culprits. Have
the research and advocacy efforts of these groups helped structure policy discussions along party lines, thereby
contributing to partisan polarization? I answer this question by tracing the diffusion of policy language related to cap-
and-trade regulations across actors and over time. Utilizing quantitative network and text analysis techniques, as well
as qualitative textual analysis, I find that outside groups inform policy discussions through their early research. First,
prominent organizations develop ideas and talking points that then spread to other groups. Second, members of
Congress adopt these talking points and use them to justify their views to their constituents. Importantly, the diffusion
of arguments is most likely among actors with shared partisan commitments, resulting in two relatively cohesive
and distinct partisan communities that advance partisan policy narratives. These findings have important implications
for our understanding of partisan polarization, outside group influence, and the capacity for Congress to address
meaningful public problems.
Keywords
policy process, partisan polarization, interest groups, think tanks, extended party networks
In recent decades, the two major American political par-
hypothesize that members of each party are embedded
ties have adopted increasingly polarized policy positions
within distinct networks of partisan allies and draw on the
across a wide range of issue areas (Layman et al. 2010).
divergent ideas and rationales they advance when dis-
This polarization is not only present in Congressional
cussing policy. Because modern politicians lack the skills
voting—oftentimes, it extends to the policy arguments,
and resources to craft policy proposals (Curry 2015;
justifications, and even underlying research that politi-
Ehrenhalt 1991), they are highly reliant on outside groups
cians reference. In other words, members of opposing
and experts for policy ideas, information, and talking
parties frequently draw on contradictory policy ideas, so
points (Skogstad 2008). Polarized political conditions,
that it often appears as though they are talking past one
however, should mean that politicians screen such infor-
another in policy debates. How do these divergent posi-
mation for its adherence to their particular ideological
tions arise, and what effects do they have on policy dis-
and partisan commitments. Trusted outside groups can
course and outcomes?
thus benefit by investing in a party over time and devel-
Although most scholarship on the topic of partisan
oping reputations as producers of partisan policy
polarization has focused on Congressional roll call votes,
information.
I investigate an alternative and understudied factor impli-
Ideas and discourses developed by trusted partisan
cated in polarized policymaking: the outside groups that
allies should be more likely to diffuse across copartisan
provide talking points and ideas—often supported by
actors and be reflected in formal party rhetoric, revealing
empirical research—to members of Congress. I ask
whether research-producing organizations help define the
1University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA
terms of policy discussion along partisan lines as they
disseminate their ideas and attempt to further their policy
Corresponding Author:
preferences. Operationalizing parties as extended party
Zachary Albert, Department of Political Science, University of
Massachusetts Amherst, Thompson Hall, 400 Hicks Way, Amherst,
networks (EPNs) comprised of formal members and affil-
MA 01003, USA.
iated interest groups and think tanks (Bawn et al. 2012), I
Email: zalbert@umass.edu
Albert
477
the influence of particular outside groups over the parties.
then they have substantial and underappreciated power
I focus on the issue of cap-and-trade regulations as a test
over policymaking, public opinion, and perhaps electoral
of this theory of partisan policymaking. The discourse
outcomes.
surrounding this issue is especially perplexing: despite
The fact that many research-producing organizations
majority approval for federal cap-and-trade legislation
have partisan preferences also has implications for our
and the fact that Republican Party actors previously sup-
understanding of partisan polarization. Outside groups
ported this market-based solution, the two parties never-
have long worked to frame issues in an attempt to institu-
theless vehemently opposed the ideas advocated by their
tionalize their preferences in public policy. In the modern
opponents.
era, however, it seems that the acceptance of these ideas
In the theory advanced here, polarization on this issue
is conditional, at least in part, on the demonstrated parti-
should be reflected in the presence of a Republican Party
san and ideological commitments of the groups that
network—unified in opposition to cap-and-trade mea-
develop and advocate them. To the degree that these
sures—that collectively developed convincing narratives
political factors have displaced institutional credibility as
about the drawbacks of such a policy to further its inter-
the main factor in evaluating policy ideas, the policymak-
ests. If Republican members of Congress adopted this
ing process is subject to the same polarizing forces as
rhetoric in their public statements—and if Democratic
other aspects of American politics. Furthermore, if the
groups similarly informed the policy discourse of members of opposing political parties draw on different
Democratic Party members—then outside groups likely
ideas, research, and evidence, then it is no wonder that
enabled polarization in this policy debate. These results
bipartisan compromise is a rare phenomenon, as oppos-
would highlight the influence of informal partisan ing party members “talk past” one another—and directly
groups—through the provision of information and to the distinct groups that support them. If extended party
ideas—in the policy process.
groups are able to influence party policy positions in this
Indeed, I find that narratives surrounding this policy
way, then these groups are in a privileged position to bias
issue diffused across copartisan groups and to formal
policy outcomes toward their preferences, with members
party members. Utilizing a comprehensive data set of
of Congress and even average citizens adopting these
published statements about cap-and-trade between 2001
preferences as their own. In other words, these outside
and 2011, I trace the flow of phrases across groups and
groups, through their research and ideas, help to organize
formal party members and construct a policy idea diffu-
the partisan conflicts (Schattschneider 1960) that define
sion network with influence ties that represent frequent,
modern American politics.
ordered usage of the same language. I employ an expo-
nential random graph model (ERGM) to empirically test
Policymaking in a Polarized Era
alternative theories of tie formation and find that—while
influence does sometimes cross party lines—common
One of the defining features of contemporary policymak-
partisanship is a strong predictor of interactor influence.
ing is the fact that policy processes—especially final roll
Qualitative analysis reveals that cross-party similarities
call votes—are increasingly polarized along party lines
in discourse most often represent groups using the same
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Sinclair 2006).
language to argue against each other, whereas influence
This trend toward divisiveness occurs in many different
ties within each party network indicate common narra-
issue areas (Layman and Carsey 2002) and is especially
tives that disseminated across copartisans.
notable when compared with American policymaking
Importantly, formal party members adopt these narra-
throughout much of the twentieth century. Matt
tives when communicating with their constituents, often-
Grossmann (2014, 103), for instance, describes the period
times tailoring the message to fit the particular from 1961 to 1976 as a “uniquely activist period” of poli-
socioeconomic or demographic characteristics of their
cymaking sustained by a fairly bipartisan core of actors
district. In other words, the ideas and narratives that
operating despite changes in control of government.
groups disseminate to members of Congress are then
Today, this type of bipartisanship is quite rare.
used by these members to justify (or oppose) policies to
Scholars have posited a variety of reasons for the often
their constituents. Given that the average voter typically
intense partisan polarization that defines modern policy-
has shallow or nonexistent preferences on most policy
making. External explanations mainly highlight the
issues (e.g., Delli...
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