Part 2: case summaries by major topic section.

• Position: Case overview

1. ACCESS TO COURT U.S. District Court Evans v. Vare, 402 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Nev. 2005). A PRIVILEGED state prisoner and his attorney-friend brought a CORRESPONDENCE civil rights action against prison officials alleging violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted. The court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable injury to their rights from the officials' blanket prohibition of all legal mail perceived by the officials to not directly pertain to the prisoner's cases. The court found the ban to be more restrictive than was necessary. The officials suspected that the prisoner was providing paralegal services for cases not related to his own. (Nevada) U.S. Appeals Court Acosta v. U.S. Marshals Service, 445 F.3d 509 (1st PLRA- Prisoner Cir. 2006). A detainee brought an action against Litigation Reform the United States Marshals Service, various county Act jails where he was detained, doctors in a federal EXHAUSTION prison, a private medical center, a private doctor, and others, alleging claims under [section] 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and alleging negligence under state law. The district court dismissed the action and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that filing of an administrative claim with the United States Marshals Service was insufficient to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), for the purpose of [section] 1983 claims against county jails and a federal prison doctor. The court noted that administrative claims against the county jails had to be directed to those facilities, and claims alleging wrongdoing by a doctor at a federal prison had to be filed with the federal Bureau of Prisons. The court ruled that FTCA claims against county facilities were barred by the independent contractor exemption of the FTCA. According to the court, allegations did not state deliberate indifference claims against a private medical center or a private doctor with allegations that someone at a private medical center overmedicated him, and that a private doctor failed to properly diagnose the severity of his foot injury. The detainee had been arrested on federal drug and firearm charges and he was held without bail. During his pretrial detention, the United States Marshals Service lodged him in several county jail facilities with which it contracts, and he also spent time in two federal facilities. (Hillsborough County Department of Corrections, NH; Cumberland County Jail, Maine; Merrimack County House of Corrections, NH; FMC Rochester, MN; Strafford County House of Corrections, NH: FCI Raybrook, NY) U.S. District Court Adem v. Bush, 425 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2006). In a ACCESS TO COUNSEL habeas case, the petitioner, who was detained at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed a motion to hold federal respondents in contempt of a protective order governing access to counsel for Guantanamo detainees and a motion to expedite his access to counsel. The district court held that the protective order did not require evidence of authority to represent a detainee as a prerequisite to counsel meeting with a detainee, but rather, the protective order provided that counsel who purportedly represented a particular detainee provide evidence of their authority to represent that detainee within 10 days of counsel's second visit with the detainee. (United States at the Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) U.S. District Court Figueroa v. Dean, 425 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. PLRA- Prisoner 2006). A state prisoner who was born deaf brought Litigation Reform an action against a superintendent of programs at Act a prison, alleging failure to provide interpreters, visual fire alarms, access to text telephone, and a television with closed-captioned device in contempt of a consent order in class action in which the court entered a decree awarding declaratory relief to prohibit disability discrimination against hearing impaired prisoners by state prison officials. The superintendent moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the exhaustion requirement of Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not apply to an action seeking exclusively to enforce a consent order. The court found that the superintendent was not in contempt of the consent order, noting that sign language interpreters were provided at educational and vocational programs and at medical and counseling appointments for hearing-impaired inmates as required by consent decree, the prison was equipped with visual fire alarms that met the requirements of the decree, and diligent efforts were being made to comply with the consent decree regarding access to text telephones. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York) U.S. Appeals Court Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2006). LAW LIBRARY A pro se state prisoner brought a [section] 1983 action against a prison superintendent and other unnamed prison employees, alleging that they unconstitutionally deprived him of access to the courts by impeded his access to the prison law library. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the prisoner's allegations stated a [section] 1983 claim for unconstitutional denial of the prisoner's right of access to the courts. The prisoner alleged that a prison superintendent and other unnamed prison employees enforced policies that diminished his access to the prison law library to the point of being non-existent, and that his lack of library access adversely affected his attempt to challenge the length of his incarceration. The appeals court found that these allegations were sufficient, when liberally construed, to state a [section] 1983 claim for unconstitutional denial of the prisoner's right of access to the courts. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana) U.S. District Court Pepper v. Carroll, 423 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Del. LAW LIBRARY 2006). A state inmate filed a [section] 1983 ACCESS TO COUNSEL action alleging that prison officials violated his SEARCHES constitutional rights. The court granted the RETALIATION officials' motion for summary judgment. The court held that the officials did not deny the inmate's request to call an attorney, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right to access courts, where the officials made several attempts to contact the inmate's attorney but were told that she was too busy or did not want to speak to the inmate, the attorney had filed a motion to withdraw as the inmate's counsel, and the public defender's office informed the officials that the inmate was not a client. According to the court, the officials gave the inmate adequate law library time and legal assistance, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right to access courts, even though the inmate did not have access to the prison's legal resources 24 hours per day. The court noted that during a two-and-a-half month period, the inmate requested and received law library services 23 times, and had access to the law library 77 times. The court found that the officials' decision to "shake down" the inmate's cell was not in retaliation for his having filed a civil rights action, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right to access courts, where shakedowns were routine, and the inmate was thought to have prohibited materials in his cell. The court found that the inmate had no constitutionally protected right to purchase food or other items as cheaply as possible through the prison commissary, and therefore prison officials did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by allegedly overcharging for commissary products. (Delaware Correctional Center) U.S. District Court Price v. Wall, 428 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I. 2006). An RETALIATION FOR inmate brought a [section] 1983 suit against LEGAL ACTION corrections officials, alleging that he was intentionally transferred him to the facility where he was confined in an effort to frustrate his rehabilitation, in retaliation for his filing of a motion to compel compliance with a state court order, in violation the First Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court held that the inmate stated a First Amendment retaliation claim where he alleged that corrections officials intentionally transferred him to the facility in retaliation for his court action. According to the court, the question was not whether the defendants had a right to transfer the inmate, but whether such action was accomplished for an unlawful purpose. The inmate had been required, as a condition of his sentence, to complete certain rehabilitative programs, including psychological and psychiatric treatment while incarcerated. After not receiving any of the court-mandated treatment, the inmate filed a motion in the state courts seeking to compel the Department of Corrections to comply with the state court order. After several skirmishes, the Department of Corrections agreed to provide the inmate with the court-mandated treatment. The parties further agreed that if the inmate successfully completed the first round of treatment, the Department of Corrections would upgrade his classification status, permitting him to participate in further rehabilitative treatment as mandated by the state court. The inmate successfully completed his first round of treatment and appeared before a classification board for review of his classification status. Based on his successful completion of the Initial round of treatment and pursuant to the agreement between the inmate and the Department, the board recommended that the inmate's classification be upgraded. But the defendants refused to permit an upgrade and instead launched no less than three separate, unrelated investigations into various matters, delaying the inmate's...