Parliamentary Opposition Under Hybrid Regimes: Evidence from Egypt

• Author: Quinn Mecham,Bryce Loidolt
• Date: 01 November 2016
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12144
• Published date: 01 November 2016

BRYCE LOIDOLT

George Washington University

QUINN MECHAM

Brigham Young University

Parliamentary Opposition Under

Hybrid Regimes:

Evidence from Egypt

Why do opposition political parties choose to run for parliament in semiauthori-

tarian systems? Existing literature emphasizes the benefits that these parties derive from

campaigning and running for elections, while paying little attention to the politics that

occurs within legislative institutions under these regimes. Supplementing election-

centric theories, we argue that opposition actors in semiauthoritarian systems also benefit

directly from serving in weak parliaments and that this helps explain their participation

in biased elections. We demonstrate this by examining the Muslim Brotherhood’s legis-

lative performance in Mubarak’s Egypt, highlighting the mechanisms through which it

used its minority presence in parliament to its advantage.

Why do opposition parties run for off‌ice in semiauthoritarian

systems and participate in legislatures where they have almost no chance

of passing legislation? One of the puzzles of legislative behavior under

authoritarian rule is understanding the motives behind opposition partici-

pation in “rubber-stamp” parliaments that are either exceedingly weak in

comparison to the executive branch or are decisively dominated by the

ruling party. In such parliaments, opposition MPs have no realistic

expectation that they can sponsor and pass legislation that differs from

the preferences of the ruling party. Indeed, the expected legislative bene-

f‌its for opposition parties in such systems are clearly low while, at the

same time, the costs of participation in rubber-stamp legislatures could

be quite high. If opposition MPs openly challenge the ruling party, they

could subject themselves to further restrictions or political repression. On

the other hand, if they acquiesce to the ruling party’s agenda, they may

lose substantial support from the constituents who voted them in as a

challenge to the existing regime.

In seeking to understand why opposition parties compete when the

regime structure prevents their electoral success, recent scholarship

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 41, 4, November 2016 997

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12144

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C2016 Washington University in St. Louis

emphasizes electoral “moments.” By forcing the incumbent to rely on

electoral manipulation and repression to gain electora l victories, run-

ning for elections exposes w eaknesses in authoritaria n governments

(Schedler 2008). This becomes par ticularly useful in the context of

hybrid regimes, which seek to ma intain a semblance of democ ratic

procedure and electoral rul es. Elections further provid e opposition

groups an opportunity to con nect with constituents and pr opagate

their ideologies (Shehat a 2009).

Existing work has paid less attention, however, to how opposition

groups under hybrid regimes might in turn use positions in weak legisla-

tures to their advantage. Beyond the benef‌its provided by elections, the

possibility exists that opposition MPs under hybrid regimes can gain

both short- and long-term benef‌its from their minority positions in parlia-

ment. They may potentially do this through monitoring and publicizing

government missteps, gaining popular legitimacy as “normal” political

actors, remedying information asymmetries with the governing party,

building organizational knowledge regarding legislative practices,

receiving legal protection, advertising a political agenda, and contribut-

ing to the legislative process. We argue that the benef‌its that groups may

gain from legislative activism inf‌luence their decision to participate

in elections and supplement election-centric theories of political

participation under hybrid regimes.

There are many authoritarian or hybrid regimes around the world

in which tolerated minority parties or groups of independents have

participated in legislative politics and continue to do so. Usually these

regimes place signif‌icant constraints on the behavior of parliamentarians,

especially in contexts where all parliamentarians are members of the rul-

ing party. However, parliamentary rules and procedures in even the most

dominated assemblies can be turned to the advantage of minority posi-

tions. Some recent evidence from Latin America and Asia suggests that

in countries as diverse as Brazil, Burma, and Vietnam, the effective use

of parliamentary tools and mechanisms has benef‌ited minority legislative

positions despite the structural disadvantages that impede them

(Desposato 2001; Englehart 2012; Malesky and Schuler 2010).

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s role in the People’s Assem-

bly under the Mubarak regime provides an example of a hard case in

which to observe an opposition group benef‌iting from participation in a

weak parliament dominated by a long-standing ruling party. As an

overtly religious (and formally illegal) organization that challenged fun-

damental norms of state and society in Egypt, we would expect it both to

face large obstacles to participation in the legislative process as well as

high risks in attempting to do so. Drawing on an examination of the

998 Bryce Loidolt and Quinn Mecham