Palestinian Autonomy, Self-Government, and Peace.

• Author: Aoude, Ibrahim G.

This book is an uncritical account of the diplomatic history of Palestinian autonomy negotiations.

Chapter One, "An Introduction to the Arab-Israeli Conflict," divides pre-Camp David history into three stages. Stage one sketches the history of Zionism until the end of the British Mandate in Palestine.

Sicherman portrays stage two as regional competition between the two superpowers. Nasser's anti-Western activity resulted in the 1956 war which Israel joined to defeat the Egyptian threat to its survival. The War of Attrition that followed the 1967 war and Arafat's takeover of the PLO created a more dangerous situation.

Stage three deals with events after the PLO defeat in Jordan and Sadat's launching of the 1973 war "when most Israelis were at prayer". Two political shifts occurred after the war: 1) Sadat's leaning toward Washington; and 2) the PLO's international ascendance. U.S. peacemaking was both a way to prevent another war and "a diplomatic tool to limit . . . Soviet influence". Carter was the first President to include Palestinian political rights to a "homeland" in a comprehensive U.S. peace plan. Sicherman posits that the Camp David Accords had demonstrated that: 1) peace required full U.S. backing; and 2) either Arabs and Israelis continue in conflict until one of them wins or come to see that peace is in the interest of both parties.

Chapter Two, "Origins of Autonomy," revolves around the notion that this concept was "fathered by Menachem Begin" under pressure from a changed U.S. policy. After 1973, the PLO called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Carter declared that the U.S. would open discussions to make the PLO a partner to a negotiation if the PLO accepted Resolution 242. On 10 August 1977 Begin told Cyrus Vance that Israel would give "'our Arab neighbors in Judea, Samaria and Gaza full cultural autonomy' and a choice of Israeli citizenship". That was essentially Jabotinski's concept of "personal autonomy."

Chapter Three, "'A Little Air': Autonomy and Camp David," recounts the maneuvering of Israel, Egypt and the U.S. to bring about the Camp David Accords with Palestinian autonomy built into them. Autonomy was crucial to "justify separate peace as not separate at all". Neither Begin and Sadat wanted the Palestinian issue to stand in the way of a peace treaty between them. Consequently, the issue of autonomy was set aside to sign the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

Chapter Four, "The 'Good Faith'...