Palestine under Assyrian rule a new look at the Assyrian imperial policy in the West.

• Author: Bagg, Ariel M.

INTRODUCTION

The Assyrian conquest of the Levant was neither a linear nor an easy enterprise. The image of an unstoppable military power that systematically defeated all foreign countries and integrated them into the empire is only partially correct, particularly if the western expansion is looked at from an historical perspective (the longue duree). The number of the campaigns in the region (67) (1) and of military operations during these campaigns, as well as the fact that in some cases provinces were lost and in other cases certain areas remained inaccessible, show the complexity of the subject. To construct a world empire and to hold it is not easy even with absolute military superiority: world empires cannot be planned, but originate on the basis of certain objectives and are influenced by many internal and external, unpredictable factors.

Much more difficult than being a world empire is facing one as an independent state. The number and repetition of uprisings by relatively small political units is a noteworthy phenomenon. As a world empire which claimed to have the Levant under control, Assyria could not allow herself to remain passive in the event of rebellion. At most, there might be a temporal delay in reacting--a possibility with which the rebels might indeed have reckoned--but not to react at all was not possible without endangering Assyria's own position. In the long term Assyria's aims were attained: almost the entire region was brought under Assyrian rule, and raw materials, luxury goods, people, and animals poured in as tribute or were otherwise available for exploitation after annexation. Although a complete loss of sovereignty did not occur at any time, the rhythm of expansion was decisively influenced by local conditions.

In the Levant the Assyrian kings met with a complicated geo-political situation, and a look at the political map at the end of the process of conquest reveals that they dealt with it in various ways. (2) Although not every state lost its independence, twenty-one provinces were created in the Levant, (3) based on the principle of territorial contiguity, so that new provinces were established only when their territory bordered on already existing provinces. Three of these (Hilakku/Bit-Purutas, Til-garimmu, and Asdulu) were soon lost. Tabalu, a number of Phoenician cities (Arwada, Gubla, Samsimurruna, and Surru), Philistia (Asdudu, Isqaluna, Amqarruna, Hazzat), Judah (Jaudu) and the Transjordanian states (Bit-Amman. Ma'ab, and Udumu), as well as some princedoms in Cyprus (Jadnana) remained Assyrian vassals. (4)

I will present here some of the results of my study of the historical geography and of the Assyrian exercise of imperial power in the Levant. I will begin with some considerations about imperial power and practice, then deal with the assumed "Assyrianization" of Palestine, and finally consider the type of empire to which the Assyrian realm should be assigned and the role it played in the history of world empires.

IMPERIAL POWER AND PRACTICE

In his book on empires (2005), political scientist Herfried Munkler examines the logic of world domination from ancient Rome up to the United States and suggests a typology of imperial rule based on different forms of expansion and their consolidation as well as on the instruments of empire formation. I present a brief summary of the features which allow us to define a world empire and to distinguish it from other political structures such as ephemeral empires. Empires do not originate according to a thought-out plan: in fact, chance and personal decisions play an essential role. In the case of world empires, it is also indispensable to consider the role of the periphery, which can be a weighty factor in their origin or expansion. Furthermore, the temporal sovereignty of an empire, that is, its ability to determine the rhythms of expansion and consolidation, can be influenced and even restricted not only by internal (center), but also by external (periphery) factors.

The two decisive parameters which allow the characterization of a world empire are 1) temporal duration and 2) spatial extension. According to Munkler, world empires are characterized by the fact that they have experienced at least one cycle of rise and decline and have begun a new one. Decisive for the longer existence of world empires is their susceptibility to reform and regeneration. In this regard, neither Alexander's empire nor that of Napoleon were world empires, because they did not survive their charismatic founders.

World empires dominate a substantial territory, which does not, however, necessarily have to do with the number of square kilometers, but rather with the meaning of "world" in the respective historical context. What a certain culture understands by "world" depends more on cultural and technological than on geographic factors. Therefore, world empires can co-exist, as long as their "worlds" do not touch, as in the case of the Roman and Chinese empires. Multiethnicity or multinationality is no defining feature for world empires, because it is present in all cases, and because very different combinations are attested. In contrast, empires are under "intervention constraint," which is an important factor for understanding imperial action as well as for the creation of world empires. An empire cannot simply remain neutral in conflicts within its territory or on its periphery; otherwise it risks its imperial authority, which may be questioned and no longer respected or feared. The compulsion to political and military intervention applies to the expansion phase as well as the consolidation phase of a world empire. Intervention constraint represents a serious threat, as temporal sovereignty can be seriously limited by external factors.

The British sociologist Michael Mann distinguishes among four kinds of power taken up by Munkler: (5) military, economic, political, and ideological power. During the expansion phase of an empire, military and economic power play a determining role. The two remaining types of power gain in importance following the expansion phase, namely during the consolidation phase. The passage from expansion to consolidation is a critical point in the history of an empire, and some polities have failed at this point. M. Doyle calls this sensitive point the "Augustan threshold," referring to the deep and momentous reforms that emperor Augustus undertook, paving the way from the Roman Republic to the Principate. (6) The empires which manage to bring these four sources of power into balance are better prepared to cross the Augustan threshold successfully and to enjoy a long consolidation phase. Examples of long-lasting world empires are the Chinese, the Roman, and the British.

Empires originate through violent conquest or economic penetration. Military surplus value absorption distinguishes itself by the fact that the costs of the necessary military apparatus are borne by tribute or booty, which also serves to finance extensive construction projects in the metropolis. The Assyrian empire is considered by Munkler as a pure form of military surplus value absorption and a paradigmatic case of this kind of empire. He judges that the Assyrians created their empire by a policy of systematic devastations, using their army as an instrument of threat and domination. Furthermore, according to Munkler's interpretation, empires based on a policy of military exploitation seem unable to cross the Augustan threshold. This simplistic and erroneous view of Assyrian imperial policy degrades the Assyrian empire to a footnote in the history of empires, while an analysis of the sources reveals a special and interesting case standing at the beginning of a long tradition.

World empires, like the Roman or Chinese, are characterized by a civilizing compulsion. They integrate newly conquered areas administratively and try to set up their own culture, taking various measures to generate a stabilizing sense of belonging. Peripheral regions can be persuaded of the advantages of the imperial affiliation by the exercise of ideological power and infrastructural investments. The stability and durability of such civilizing empires are substantially greater than those of the steppe empires, which are based only on exploitation, and disappear quickly and almost without trace. The crossing of the Augustan threshold signifies that an empire has decided on an alternative to the military form of exploitation. This does not necessarily mean a reduction of exploitation, but rather of the level of use of violence.

Munkler's criteria for world empires are very restrictive. Durability is one of the determining factors, closely bound up with the regenerative ability of an empire. Because world empires must go through at least two cycles of rise and decline, all short-lived empires are excluded. Durability is strongly connected with the passage from an expansion phase, during which primarily military or economic power is exercised, to a consolidation phase, in which the empire is stabilized through the integration of the periphery. Even if Munkler's interpretation of the Assyrian empire, based mainly on secondary literature, is wrong, his typology allows us to compare different kinds of empires. The Assyrian empire cannot be reduced to a mere forerunner of violent steppe empires like the Mongolian. But was the Assyrian empire a world empire? Did it cross the Augustan threshold?

Based on the historic-geographical study of the Assyrian conquest of the Levant and its imperial policy in this region, it is possible to explain the respective type of empire and the role it played within the historical development of imperial power structures. The Assyrian empire did not, of course, comprise only the Levant. That region is, however, particularly well suited for such an investigation, since it is well documented in both Assyrian and West Semitic sources. The western regions were...