Pakistan: strategic ally or unreliable client?

• Author: Hadar, Leon T.
• Position: Worldview

TWO MONTHS after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Pres. Bush praised Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for showing "ever greater courage, vision, and leadership" in supporting the U.S. war against terrorism, including the military campaign to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and capture the leaders of Al Qaeda. Musharraf's "efforts against terror are benefiting the entire world" Bush said at a Nov. 10 press conference with Musharraf at his side. His comment echoed a statement made by British Prime Minister Tony Blair on Oct. 5, during a visit to Islamabad, in which he thanked the Pakistani leader for his "courage and leadership" in committing his country to support the war on terrorism. In a joint statement issued during the Pakistani leader's visit to the U.S., Bush and Musharraf "reaffirmed the benefits of 50 years of friendship and close cooperation between Pakistan and the United States" and "welcomed the revival of this long-standing partnership" as a "vital element" in the construction of regional and global stability and peace.

The statements by Bush and other American officials that followed the start of the U.S.-led antiterrorism campaign and the indications that Pakistan was willing to join it marked a sharp shift in the relationship between Washington and Islamabad, which had experienced a steep decline during the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. The Cold War and the common struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan no longer cemented U.S.-Pakistani ties in the 1990s, leading veteran political analyst Dennis Kux to conclude that, in the absence of other "significant shared national interests," tensions between the two nations were becoming all too apparent.

In fact, the growing consensus among American policymakers and lawmakers was that Pakistan was not only losing its strategic importance to the U.S., it was becoming an unreliable "failed state." There were signs of the country's "Talibanization"--that is, the growing strength of radical Islam. Pakistan also appeared to be a source of instability in South Asia and to pose a challenge to America's nuclear nonproliferation policy. Worst of all, Islamabad seemed to be emerging as a promoter of terrorism, not unlike such "rogue states" as Iran and North Korea.

That perception was partly transformed after Sept. 11, when Pakistan became a critical theater in the U.S. effort to take the fight to the terrorists. Musharraf did an effective job of realigning Pakistan with Washington's policy. On the eve of the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, Islamabad offered intelligence, air space, and ground facilities for the U.S.-led operation to dislodge the Taliban regime and capture Osama bin Laden and his associates.

Pakistan not only allowed U.S. troops to be based in key airfields near the Afghan border, it agreed to freeze the bank accounts of four Islamist organizations with ties to Al Qaeda. Those moves were followed by the firing of Ahmed Mahmoud, director-general of the military-run Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); Muzaffer Usmani, deputy chief of the army staff; and other senior generals who had been key players in Musharraf's 1999 coup, but were known to have radical Islamic views and were reputed to be staunch supporters of the Taliban regime. They were replaced by military officers whose thinking was more in line with Musharraf's new policy toward Kabul. "The Taliban's days are numbered," he declared.

Indeed, in various statements, Musharraf accentuated Pakistan's role as an ally of the U.S. and pledged to Washington his nation's "fullest cooperation in the fight against terrorism." In an official statement issued on Sept. 13, he condemned the terrorist attacks, saying that the "carnage in New York and Washington has raised this straggle to a new level." In a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain, the self-appointed president (in June, 2001, Musharraf added the presidency to the list of military and civilian positions he held) committed his government to support the American-led antiterrorism campaign. In the Oct. 10 press conference with Bush, Musharraf stressed that his government had taken a decision "to be a part of the coalition, to be with the United States, to fight terrorism in all its forms wherever it exists." He expressed his confidence about the "dawn of a new era of a relationship between Pakistan and the United States."

Helping to advance the Musharraf is a courageous leader and Pakistan is our ally theses perpetuated by Islamabad and Washington was the domestic backdrop against which Musharraf adopted the new policy and made the statements advocating cooperation with the U.S. The conventional wisdom in Washington was that Pakistan's current government could find itself straggling for survival if it were' seen domestically as a lapdog of American infidels. Indeed, a Gallup poll of Pakistanis published in October, 2001, indicated that 83% of them sympathized with the Taliban rather than the U.S., while 82% considered bin Laden a holy warrior, not a terrorist.

The Pakistani press was saturated with conspiracy theories suggesting that Israel was behind the Sept. 11 attacks, while thousands of Pakistanis demonstrated against the U.S. in Islamabad, Karachi, and other major cities. U.S. media coverage during the first few days of the campaign against Al Qaeda depicted "rabid anti-Americanism in daily protests in Pakistan," contributing to the perception that Musharraf's pro-U.S. tilt might cost him his power, if not his life.

It was not surprising, therefore, that Musharraf's statements and actions were rewarded not only by Washington's official praise, but, more important, by concrete steps to demonstrate strengthening U.S. ties with Islamabad, including pledges of military and economic assistance. The Bush Administration and Congress moved to lift the sanctions that had been imposed after Pakistan (following in India's footsteps) detonated nuclear devices in 1998 and after Musharraf's 1999 coup suspended democracy. Washington also agreed to reschedule Pakistan's outstanding debt to the U.S. of about $400,000,000 and support loan rescheduling by various financial institutions, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Asian Development Bank, thus helping to alleviate Pakistan's $38,000,000,000 foreign debt.

Finally, Washington offered Musharraf an aid package of nearly $1,000,000,000 for border control, refugee assistance, and poverty alleviation. (Pakistan claimed that the war in Afghanistan was costing it more than $2,500,000,000 in lost trade, commerce, and tourism.) By the end of 2001, the IMF and the Paris Club of sovereign creditors pronounced themselves pleased with Pakistan's "economic progress," rescheduled much of the country's debt, and extended fresh credits.

To be sure, there were limits to U.S. concessions. The Bush Administration rejected Pakistan's request for delivery of 28 F-16s paid for in the 1980s, but never delivered because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The latter caused successive U.S. administrations to employ the Pressler Amendment (which required an annual certification by the White House that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons) and impose sanctions against Islamabad. Facing pressure from American textile and apparel manufacturers, the Administration was reluctant to support the request by Pakistan, which exported $1,900,000,000 in textile products to the U.S. in the year ending July, 2001, to suspend textile and apparel tariffs and quotas temporarily. Nevertheless, as journalist Evelyn Iritani noted in the Los Angeles Times, Nov. 10, 2001, "Pakistan has become the biggest beneficiary of economic aid in return for its support of the U.S. antiterrorism campaign in Afghanistan."

Pakistan's ambiguous view

While American officials were going out of their way to applaud the new, improved friendship with Pakistan and portray Musharraf as Pakistan's version of former French leader Charles de Gaulle, taking major...