Pakistan: militancy, the transition to democracy and future relations with the United States.

AuthorShafqat, Saeed

Pakistan's geostrategic location has made it a country of pivotal importance from the Cold War to the present day. Geography not only shapes Pakistan's foreign policy, but also its defense considerations and strategic outlook. Its crucial position in South Asia, with its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and access to the Horn of Africa and Central Asia, make it a strategically attractive and unavoidable state for global and regional powers. China continues to be a reliable friend and considers Pakistan a window of strategic opportunity. (1) For Russia, Pakistan could offer access to "warm waters" if Afghanistan were to gain stability, thus improving the level of trust between the two nations. India's imminent emergence as a regional power will likely be contested by Pakistan, and the peace process between the two rivals will continue at a snail's pace.

Pakistan continues to have strong cultural and strategic partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia. (2) Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the growing consensus among the Great Powers to curb these, may boost the geostrategic value of Pakistan in the region. With the recent construction of the Gwadar Port, which now serves as a gateway to the Gulf States, Pakistan's importance will only increase in the region. In the coming decades, as the rivalry among global powers to dominate the Indian Ocean intensifies, it becomes likely that whichever power influences the Persian Gulf will control not only the Arabian Sea but also the Indian Ocean. (3) In addition to its strategic geopolitical significance, the global war on terrorism has enhanced Pakistan's significance as a regional hub of terrorism. Pakistan is all at once a country of origin, a destination, a conduit and a victim of global jihad. According to Bruce Riedel's characterization, Pakistan has emerged as the "critical battlefield" in the war against global jihad. (4)

In the post-9/11 world, U.S. policy toward Pakistan has undergone a paradigm shift. In less than a decade, Pakistan has graduated from being a frontline state to being a NATO ally and strategic partner. Since 2002, Pakistan has been the recipient of over $10.5 billion in U.S. military and economic assistance; and more than $1.5 billion in non-military aid is pledged annually for the next five years. (5) From an American military perspective, this region is crucial for global stability and American security as it is home to numerous countries that have supported, funded or politically backed global terrorist groups. The list includes Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel and India. With the exception of Israel and India, this geographical area is under the responsibility of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), currently the U.S. military's most important regional command.

American-Pakistani relations are affected by several dynamics. First, it is clear that this shift in U.S.-Pakistan relations is driven primarily by a regional security imperative of which considerations of oil flow, energy needs, regional stability and the global war on terrorism are contributing factors. It is thus vital for the United States to build a strategic partnership with Pakistan. Pakistan has provided the United States with logistical support, airspace and intelligence in the 1950-60s, 1980s and today. From 1979 to 1989, Pakistan played a key role in organizing and supporting the U.S.-led Afghan resistance movement against Soviet occupation. From this period emerges many of today's global terrorism challenges. Second, the U.S. has had an abiding interest specifically in Pakistan because of Pakistan's role in Cold War policies of containment, present-day concerns over Iran, the global war on terror, a Central Asian energy corridor and Pakistan's nuclear assets. There have been "low" and "high" periods in this relationship however, depending on the size and scale of perceived threats to U.S. security interests in a given period. (6)

Third, the U.S. has distanced itself from Pakistan and resorted to coercive diplomacy on occasion (e.g., withholding nuclear-free certification and imposing economic sanctions in 1990), but it never disengages completely. Fourth, U.S.-Pakistan relations are defined and driven by geostrategic considerations in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean that help keep the United States involved in the region. Finally, Pakistan's nuclear capability, particularly considering the revelations of proliferation and the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of religious militants, is a source of anxiety for the U.S. In the eyes of many Western observers, Pakistan's religious militancy and elite conflicts could rupture its very existence; it is becoming ungovernable and thus on the brink of collapse. Despite recent elections and an ongoing transition process from a military regime to a civilian-led multi-party coalition, these Western observers remain skeptical, questioning how the transition has impacted civil-military relations and the consolidation of the democratic party system.

This essay will first provide an overview of Pakistan's recent tumultuous political history, including the revolt of urban professionals, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the elections on 18 February 2008 which led to the subsequent installation of a civilian-led party government. Pakistan's return to civilian rule intensified the power struggle among the political parties to recast alliances, redefine opposition-government relationships, develop rules of power-sharing with the military and, most importantly, envision building a sustainable strategic partnership with the United States. The paper then analyzes how the U.S. has begun to reassess the substance and meaning of this relationship from a narrowly focused military-to-military relationship to a more comprehensive partnership, deepening its scope and scale with the goal of supporting the democratic transition in Pakistan. Yousaf Raza Gilani assumed the office of prime minister on 23 March 2008 and Asif Ali Zardari the presidency on 9 September 2008, and both have been striving to assure the skeptical international community that Pakistan can be trusted to ensure the safety of its nuclear weapons, curb religious extremism and put Pakistan on a path to democracy. (7)

Since late 2007, and particularly since Barack Obama assumed the American presidency, the U.S. State Department and congressional leaders have become more explicit in declaring the United States' intention to build a long-term partnership with Pakistan, support Pakistan's pluralism, democracy and the civilian government's aim to strengthen people-to-people relationships. The United States also has stated its desire to help Pakistan dismantle, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks. (8) A shift of emphasis from strategic imperatives to shared values, socioeconomic development and support for democratic Pakistan augurs well and could energize and redefine the parameters of long-term, sustainable relations between Pakistan and the U.S. The critical question is: how ready and responsive are the military and civilian leaders in Pakistan to discern and adopt to this change in U.S. policy?

MILITARY HEGEMONY OR PARTY DOMINANCE?

For over sixty years, Pakistan has oscillated between military-hegemonic and dominant party political systems. Persistent and prolonged military rule has entrenched the military in politics, business and even in the social sphere (i.e., the militarization of Pakistani society). Despite this entrenchment, military rule has never gained legitimacy among Pakistani citizens. In a military-hegemonic system, the military has a monopoly over strategic policy issues and the state's decision-making institutions. The military hegemonic system functions via three identifiable processes: first, political control through executive orders/ordinances; second, political exclusion through the deactivation of political parties and the active groups, restriction on participation of urban professional groups; and third, the building of a strategic partnership with the United States. Pakistani history shows that military hegemony evokes resistance: the longer the period of military rule, the stronger the resistance movements become in their push for free and fair elections. Upsurges of resistance and demands for the restoration of democracy by civil society groups and political parties have followed each period of military rule (General Ayub Khan, 1958-69; General Yahya Khan, 1969-71; General Zia ul-Haq, 1977-88; and General Pervez Musharraf, 1999-2008). The recurring pattern has been that the collapse or weakening of the military regime paves the way for elections which then facilitate a transition to civilian-led party governments.

It is distressing to note, however, that with each election, opportunities for consolidating civilian-led party governments have been misspent by Pakistan's political parties. Political leaders and parties have not been successful in constructing a party system nor in promoting democratic values. A culture of respect for dissent, necessary for facilitating a representative form of government, has yet to be developed. The tendency has been for political parties in power to establish their dominance. In particular, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from 1971 to 1977; the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), led by Muhammad Khan Junejo from 1985 to 1988; and both the Bhutto-led PPP and Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N), led by Nawaz Sharif from 1988 to 1999, all attempted to establish political dominance without opposition. (9) As a result, credible government opposition has not evolved.

The lack of civilian-led party rule does not raise confidence that rule of law, good governance and the values of constitutional liberalism will be promoted. Since the first general elections in 1970, the winning political party has adopted a post-election policy of...

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