OUTSOURCING AND MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM: TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL

Published date01 January 2014
AuthorKalle Lyytinen,Andreas I. Nicolaou,Pankaj Nagpal
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/isaf.1350
Date01 January 2014
OUTSOURCING AND MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM: TOWARD
A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL
PANKAJ NAGPAL
a
*, ANDREAS I. NICOLAOU
b
AND KALLE LYYTINEN
c
a
Department of Accounting, School of Business, Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, CT, USA
b
Department of Accounting & MIS, College of Business, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, USA
c
Weatherhead Schoolof Management, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA
SUMMARY
We analyze the effect of buyer, contract, and vendor characteristicson abnormal stock returns among rms that have
announcedlarge scale Information Technology(IT) and Business Process outsourcing(BPO) contracts. Wedraw upon
a comprehensive dataset on outsourcing announcements, augmented with data from public sources. Salient buyer
factors examined include use of a widerange of organizational controls. On the vendor side, we examine the impact
of vendorsize, contract sizeand reputation. Our studyshows that use of behaviorcontrols, outcomecontrols (negative),
vendor reputation, and industry of buyerrm affect market value.When limited to buyer relatedfactors, use of behav-
ior and clan controls is positively related to abnormal returns around IT outsourcing announcements. An interesting
nding is that ITand BPO success requiredifferent sets of controls. Copyright © 2014 JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: IToutsourcing; business process outsourcing; event study; organizational controls; median regression
1. INTRODUCTION
Information technology (IT) accounts for a quarter of non-residential xed investment. Whilst the link
between overall IT investment and productivity is now well known (Stiroh, 2002), it is less known that
asignicant and increasing share of IT investments is outsourced and mediated through markets. IT
outsourcing has been dened as the delegation, through a contractual arrangement, of all or any part of
the technical resources, human resources, and the management responsibilities associated with providing
IT services to an external vendorby a buyer or client rm (Clark et al., 1995). Here, the buyer or client
rm
1
is dened as the contract granting rm, also sometimes called the focal rm. As a conservative
estimate, this share reached 20% of IT budgets among InformationWeek 500 rms (Vallis and Murphy,
2008). It has continuedto rise during this decade, reaching $314.7billion in 2011 with an estimated com-
pound annual growth of 4.4% through the nextfew years (Britz et al., 2011). Outsourcinghas also gained
wider adoption among rms of all sizes. Given that outsourcing is increasingly a direct proxy for a large
portion of ITexpenditure, success of the rms outsourcing initiatives should play a signicant role in af-
fecting the rms productivity increases. Yet the impact of the outsourced ITelement in affecting produc-
tivity withinthe rms IT function,and more broadly within the buyeror client rm, is less understood. At
thesametime,asignicant share of rms are not satised with their outsourcing outcomes (Cohen and
Young, 2006). About half of large outsourcing contracts have been discontinued, or subjected to major
* Correspondence to: Pankaj Nagpal, Department of Accounting, School of Business, Central Connecticut State University,1615
Stanley Street, New Britain, CT 06050, USA. E-mail: nagpalp@ccsu.edu
1
Buyer, client, controller and focal rm are used synonymously in the literature.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT
Intell. Sys. Acc. Fin. Mgmt. 21, 1938 (2014)
Published online 26 January 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/isaf.1350
changes (CIO.com, 2003). In addition, outsourcing of highly specic and customized functions, such as
application development, is even riskier (Cohen and Young, 2006).
Recently, outsourcing aims have moved away from simple cost containment (Linder, 2004). For
example, Linder, (2004: 1) argues that outsourcing can be more than a tool for cutting costs and
improving organizational focus. Increasingly, it is a means of acquiring new capabilities and bringing
about fundamental strategic and structural change. Thus, more successful rms can be expected to
differ in how they identify, select and combine IT resources (namely, vendors), and how they control
their outsourcing performance through contracts and non-contractmeans of control. As the IT
services markethas become increasingly a common global resource, with a large number of standard
(and even customized) contracts and service-level agreements (SLAs) available for buyers, it is the
distinct buyer-side capabilities related to outsourcing that appear to affect signicantly a rms value
adding capability (Nagpal, 2009). At the same time, there is a paucity of research that has sought to
identify and systematically understand factors that affect success of such large-scale IT outsourcing.
The signicant variance in outsourcing success rates and their nexus to rm-level impact suggest that
stock markets are cognizant of contextual information that affects IT outsourcing impacts. Thus,
abnormal returns related to outsourcing announcemen ts would signal rational investorsbelief in the
success of outsourcing initiatives, and its positive impact on the rms market value. Hence, we can
use abnormal returns related to announcements as a proxy for success of outsourcing , and factors that
are included in those success calculations with the inherent assumption of rational and knowledgeable
investors. Earlier research also testies to this: on average, outsourcing announcements have been
accompanied by positive abnormal returns (Hayes et al., 2000). Consequently, a small stream of
accounting information systems (AIS) literature has delved into factors that enter into investors
calculations and what can be expected to affect abnormal returns. For example, Hayes et al. (2000)
found signicant differences in the industry and size of the rm. Likewise, Oh et al. (2006) found
differences in contract and vendor size, and asset specicity related to contracts.
Surprisingly, buyer factors have received scant attention, compared with contract and vendor
characteristics. Yet, the capabilities of the client rm are instrumental in outsourcing success: in the end
it is the buyersunderstanding of the goals and targets of outsourcing and its capabilities to orchestrate
outsourcing arrangements as controller that creates value. Therefore, it is instrumental to identify and
understand differences among buyerscapabilities in order to explain their level of success. A study of
senior executives, such as chief information ofcers (CIOs), of focal rms successful in outsourcing
demonstrated that successful outsourcers had several distinct capabilities (Nagpal, 2009). These distinct
capabilities and their impact on market value are the primary focus of the paper. We also seek to corrob-
orate the presence of vendor and contract impacts (Oh et al., 2006). To test for the presence of these
impacts we conduct an event study. The study draws upon a comprehensive dataset of recent outsourcing
announcements, to probe the inuence of buyer-, vendor- and contract-related factors. In addition, we
integrate the ndings with salient results from previous research (Oh et al., 2006); the latter are used as
controls to strengthen the validity of our results. In this context, we also distinguish between the impacts
of IT andbusiness process outsourcing (BPO).The former are often customized to the needsof the buyer
or focal rm, while the latterare more generic, involving standardized business process solutions that are
used to drive down cost. Finally, the paper adds to the literature in AIS thathas applied novel quantitative
methods to nancial research (Biscontri, 2012; Miller, 2012).
The remainder ofthe paper is organized as follows.In Section 2 we review theliterature on outsourcing
and event studies. The research model, hypotheses, data collection and analysis methods are reported in
Sections 3 and 4. In Section 5 we will report the main ndings. We conclude by discussing the ndings
(Section 6), highlighting their implications (Section 7) and noting limitations (Section 8).
20 P. NAGPAL ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Intell. Sys. Acc. Fin. Mgmt., 21,1938 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/isaf

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT