Outside the Battlefield
| Author | Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912916648010 |
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2016
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2016, Vol. 69(3) 403 –417
Outside the Battlefield: In-Group
© 2016 University of Utah
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Political Dynamics of Civil Conflict
DOI: 10.1177/1065912916648010
prq.sagepub.com
Negotiations and Settlements
Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu1
Abstract
What increases warring parties’ ability to reach a negotiated settlement? In this study, I answer this question by
examining the political environment a government and rebel group leadership internally encounter during a peace
process. I disaggregate in-group dynamics of governments and rebels into their respective political elements that
either grant autonomy or create constraints for resolution, namely, their constituencies and elites. I argue that
willingness to end fighting does not always translate into the ability to make concessions. Although battlefield-related
indicators may increase the likelihood of negotiations, it is internal cohesion that increases combatants’ credibility
as bargaining partners and improves the likelihood of settlement. To test these arguments, I introduce original data
on negotiations for internal conflict-dyad-years between 1980 and 2005. Findings using two-stage censored probit
models demonstrate that war-weariness increases willingness for negotiations whereas internal consensus creates
opportunity for settlement.
Keywords
civil conflict, negotiated settlement, negotiations, peace agreement, rebel group
Peace comes when you talk to the guy you most hate. And
in two major ways. First, internal cohesion is what gives
that’s where the courage of a leader comes, because when you
both sides’ leadership the opportunity to ratify the peace
sit down with your enemy, you as a leader must already have
agreement without obstruction. Second, leaders who can
very considerable confidence from your own constituency.
unite their in-group coalition can credibly signal their
—Desmond Tutu
party’s compliance to the agreement, mitigating commit-
ment problems between their party and their opponent. I
The peace agreement between the African National
disaggregate in-group dynamics of governments and reb-
Congress (ANC) and the last Apartheid government of
els into their respective political actors that alleviate or
South Africa is considered one of the most successful for
aggravate commitment problems during negotiations,
ending a protracted conflict.1 As the above passage indi-
namely, their constituencies and institutional elites.
cates, Mandela’s ability to achieve internal consensus
Conditions that impel combatants to initiate negotia-
among the black opposition was a defining factor in
tions and conditions that facilitate successful settlement
peacefully resolving the conflict. Although military are not always fully aligned (Findley 2013). Although
issues are at the forefront of conflict resolution research
internal cohesion is necessary for agreements to be rati-
(Gent 2011; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999), in-group
fied, it is not required for initiation of negotiations.
political support plays a pivotal role in successful settle-
Settlement is when binding commitment takes place.
ment of civil conflict. Neither governments nor rebel
Examining negotiation initiation as well as success, I also
groups are unitary actors. To understand how civil con-
argue that negotiations initiated only with short-term con-
flict adversaries negotiate a settlement, it is necessary to
siderations such as war-weariness are likely to break
examine how they converge on a point acceptable to their
internal actors while trying to reconcile these preferences
1Binghamton University, NY, USA
with their adversary.
In this paper, I argue that negotiations are more likely
Corresponding Author:
Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu, Center on Democratic Performance,
to settle civil conflicts if warring party leadership have
Binghamton University, State University of New York, Binghamton,
greater in-group cohesion and autonomy in decision mak-
NY 13902 USA.
ing. In-group cohesion contributes to negotiation success
Email: hogutcu1@binghamton.edu
404
Political Research Quarterly 69(3)
down in the absence of in-group political support. I use
credibly convince one another that their intentions of
original data on civil conflict negotiations for all internal
resolution are genuine (Walter 2002).
conflict-dyad-years between 1980 and 2005, and employ
Various studies emphasize the role of third-party guar-
a two-stage analysis of negotiations to test these antors in helping combatants overcome their commit-
arguments.
ment problems during the peace process (Fortna 2008;
This study contributes to the civil conflict resolution
Stedman 1997; Walter 2002). Others argue that the design
literature on several fronts. First, moving beyond the uni-
of power-sharing agreements is pivotal in ameliorating
tary actor assumption, I examine the mechanisms through
commitment problems (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).
which in-group political dynamics affect major stages of
Although third-party enforcement or effective agreement
a peace process. Second, emphasizing the dyadic nature
design may strengthen existing efforts for peace, it cannot
of peace agreements, I disaggregate all warring parties
transform warring parties’ decisions to take the necessary
into their respective internal actors and exhibit the pivotal
steps toward peace. What ultimately minimizes commit-
role they play in demonstrating credible commitment to
ment problems is combatants’ perception of one another
settlement. Finally, I introduce an original universal data
as credible negotiation partners (Pruitt 2005). In this
set on civil conflict negotiations. In doing so, I study suc-
paper, I argue that negotiating parties can induce this per-
cessful negotiations along with the complete pool of
ception by signaling their ability to deliver their group’s
negotiations, thereby looking at what makes certain
political compliance to the agreement.
negotiations successful in settling conflict. Empirical
Another significant body of literature on negotiated
findings demonstrate that although battlefield weariness
settlements is framed around ripeness theory (Pruitt 2005;
may impel negotiation initiation, internal consonance is
Zartman 2003). Zartman (2003) argues that adversaries
the leading force behind successful settlement. Therefore,
will settle when they are in a “mutually hurting stale-
the article also clarifies the mixed evidence regarding the
mate” that is costly for both parties—only then will they
conditions that facilitate ripeness for resolution (Findley
be “ripe for resolution.” Previous attempts at operational-
2013; Hultquist 2013). Combatants can initiate negotia-
izing these concepts have been limited to examining con-
tions due to the pressure they face on the battlefield, yet
ditions that wear out belligerents in the battlefield.
negotiations will be concluded when they reach internal
Ripeness embodies a time component. Some scholars
consensus.
have therefore captured the notion using duration of con-
The article will proceed as follows. It begins by
flict (Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999). Other studies
reviewing essential studies on negotiated settlements and
focus on “stalemates” and look at how distribution of
negotiators to situate the forthcoming argument. I then
power between combatants affects civil war outcomes
develop my theoretical argument regarding the effect of
(Gent 2011; Hultquist 2013). Yet the evidence on the rela-
internal political consensus on settlement and negotiation
tionship between a stalemate and the likelihood of settle-
stages. I describe my variables and the data collection
ment is mixed. Findley (2013) finds that power parity
process, and present my empirical findings. The article is
between the strongest armed group and the government
concluded with some theoretical and practical implica-
positively affects the first stage but negatively affects
tions of the findings.
later stages of a peace process. Building on this premise,
I use a two-stage model to determine whether different
Negotiated Settlements and
factors influence negotiation initiation and settlement
Negotiators’ Internal Dynamics: A
stages differently.
Review
Although war-weariness is likely to induce a hurting
stalemate and increase willingness to negotiate, I argue
Negotiated settlements promise peaceful and institution-
that in-group politics are superior determinants of suc-
alized solutions to main causes of civil conflict. Numerous
cessful settlement. If the internal environment does not
studies emerged on the topic in recent years (Findley
produce opportunities for combatant leaders to settle,
2013; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Walter 2002; Zartman
then willingness of either side’s leadership to settle is not
2003). One popular line of work on the subject explores
sufficient for peace (Most and Starr 1989). Putnam (1988)
commitment problems among civil conflict combatants
with his “two-level-games” metaphor was the first to sug-
(Walter 2002). Following bargaining models of war
gest that internal dynamics of negotiating parties provide
(Fearon 1995), proponents of this approach argue that
opportunities for or pose constraints on the negotiation
commitment problems are the...
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