Outside of the Old Boys Club? Gender Differences in Outside Groups’ Advertising Support for U.S. Senate Candidates

• Published date: 01 March 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231208710
• Author: Ashley English,Regina Branton,Amy Friesenhahn
• Date: 01 March 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Political Research Quarterly

2024, Vol. 77(1) 328–343

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129231208710

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Outside of the Old Boys Club? Gender

Differences in Outside Groups’Advertising

Support for U.S. Senate Candidates

Ashley English

1

, Regina Branton

2

, and Amy Friesenhahn

3



Abstract

Since 2010, televised campaign ads have proliferated, raising questions about gender differences in the number of ads

outside groups air. Assuming incumbent Democratic women and Democratic women with prior off‌ice-holding ex-

perience run with support from their party and interest groups, we expect Democratic-leaning groups air more fa-

vorable ads supporting Democrats in races that include experienced or incumbent Democratic women than they do in

races that include experienced or incumbent Democratic men. Conversely, we assume Republican women receive less

support from their party and interest groups. We expect outside groups air more favorable ads supporting Republicans

in races featuring experienced or incumbent Republican men than races including experienced or incumbent Republican

women. Given the potential for backlash to attack ads, we expect Democratic- and Republican-leaning groups air more

ads in races including experienced or incumbent male opponents than in races that include experienced or incumbent

female opponents. We test these hypotheses by focusing on 2010–2018 U.S. Senate races and combining original data

with data from the Wesleyan Media Project, the U.S. Census, and the Cook Political Report. Democratic- and

Republican-leaning groups both sponsor signif‌icantly fewer ads in races featuring experienced female Democratic

candidates compared to races including experienced male Democratic candidates.

Keywords

super PACs, 527s, 501cs/dark money, PACs, female Senate candidates, campaign advertising

Since EMILY’s List was established in 1985, it has helped

Democratic women win elections (Burrell, 2018;Carroll

and Sanbonmatsu, 2013;Crespin and Deitz, 2010;Day

and Hadley, 2005;Dittmar, 2015;Kitchens and Swers,

2016;Thomsen and Swers, 2017). Today, EMILY’s List

(2023) claims their SuperPAC created 49 unique televi-

sion ads during the 2020 elections, helping them mobilize

“millions of voters in 48 states.”More broadly outside

interest groups aired 1.5 million ads during the 2020

election (Wesleyan Media Project [WMP] 2021). These

data reveal outside groups’television ads are critical

components of American elections raising questions

about how outside groups’decisions about how many

television ads to air help or hurt female candidates. We

ask: do Democratic- and Republican-leaning outside

groups air more ads on behalf of female or male candi-

dates during U.S. Senate races?

Outside groups include four types of campaign f‌inance

organizations American interest groups establish to inf‌luence

elections: traditional political action committees (PACs),

SuperPACs, 527s, and 501c “dark money”groups. All four

types help groups elect their preferred candidates to off‌ice, and

most have clear partisan or ideological leanings (Boatright,

2007;CRP, 2023a;Dwyre and Braz, 2014;Herrnson, 2017;

Sides et al., 2019). Though the Senate is becoming less male-

dominated (Center for American Women and Politics

[CAWP] 2023a;2023b), women continue to face unique

opportunities and challenges when they run for the Senate.

Incumbent Democratic women and Democratic women with

prior off‌ice-holding experience often run with the enthusiastic

support of their party establishment and allied interest groups.

1

University of North Texas, Denton, TX, USA

2

University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA

3

Centenary College of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Regina Branton, Department of Political Science and Public

Administration, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte,

Charlotte, NC 28223-0001, USA.

Email: rbranton@uncc.edu

Meanwhile, incumbent Republican women and Republican

women with prior experience in elected off‌icerunwithless

support from party elites and allied interest groups. Bringing

these insights together, we expect Democratic-leaning groups

should run more favorable ads when their preferred Demo-

cratic candidate is a female incumbent Senator rather than a

male incumbent Senator,or an experienced female challenger

(i.e., one who has held prior elected off‌ice, but is not a sitting

Senator) rather than an experienced male challenger. Con-

versely, Republican-leaning groups should run more favor-

able ads when their preferred Republican candidate is a male

incumbent Senator rather than a female incumbent Senator,

or an experienced male challenger rather than an experi-

enced female challenger. We also expect both Democratic-

and Republican-leaning groups should run more attack ads

when the opposition party candidate is a male incumbent

rather than a female incumbent or an experienced male

challenger rather than a female experienced challenger.Fi-

nally, we expect there will be few gender differences in the

number of ads that both Democratic- and Republican-leaning

groups air in races that include inexperienced challengers who

do not have prior off‌ice-holding experience.

We test these hypotheses using WMP data on 135,115

favorable and attack ads that 304 outside groups aired on

television during Senate general elections from 2010 to 2018;

an original dataset on U.S. Senate candidates’gender, in-

cumbency status, prior off‌ice-holding experience, and parti-

sanship; state-level Census data; and the 2010–2018 Cook

Political Reports. We f‌ind Republican-and Democratic-

leaning groups air more favorable ads for their party’s

preferred candidate in races that include experienced male

Democratic challengers as one of the two contenders

compared to races that include experienced female Demo-

cratic challengers as one of the two contenders. Republican-

leaning outside groups also air signif‌icantly more attack ads

in races that include experienced male Democratic chal-

lengers than races that include experienced female Demo-

cratic challengers.Democratic-leaning outside groups run

signif‌icantly more favorable ads in races that include inex-

perienced female Democratic challengers compared to races

that include inexperienced male Democratic challengers. At

all levels of experience, there are no differences in the number

of favorable or attack ads that Democratic- or Republican-

leaning groups air based on whether the Republican candidate

is a man or a woman.

Outside Groups and Senate

Campaign Ads

Outside groups change election outcomes by supporting

their preferred candidates’campaigns. The term “outside

group”distinguishes campaign f‌inance organizations

associated with interest groups from campaign f‌inance

organizations associated with the political parties or the

candidates themselves. Typically,outside groups establish

one (or more) of four types of campaign f‌inance orga-

nizations: a traditional PAC, a SuperPAC, a 527, or a

501c. Traditional PACs are “groups that work toward the

election of candidates, to pass or defeat legislation, or to

advance a political agenda”(Sides et al., 2019). Tradi-

tional PACs primarily contribute funds to candidates they

endorse. They face the largest number of campaign f‌i-

nance restrictions. Donations to traditional PACs are le-

gally capped; in the 2023–2024 cycle, the maximum

donation an individual can make to a PAC is $3,300

(Federal Election Commission [FEC], 2023). Traditional

PACs are also required to publicly identify donors who

have contributed at least $200 (Sides et al., 2019).

SuperPACs make “independent expenditures”which

primarily fund communications, such as television ads,

that explicitly advocate “for the election or defeat of a

clearly identif‌ied candidate”and “that are not made in

cooperation with, consultation or concert with, or at the

request or suggestion of any candidate”(FEC, 2019).

SuperPACs are allowed to “solicit and accept unlimited

contributions from individuals, corporations, labor or-

ganizations, and other political committees,”which means

they can raise and spend far more money airing ads than

traditional PACs (FEC, 2019).

527s primarily support candidates by using indepen-

dent expenditures to fund political communications. They

are “organized and operated primarily for the purpose of

directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making

expenditures or both”for voter mobilization campaigns

and issue advocacy (FEC, 2019). Unlike SuperPACs,

527s are not allowed to explicitly advocate for or against

specif‌ic candidates, but their ads can focus on candidates’

issue positions (Meier, 1999). Consequently, 527s were

largely replaced by SuperPACs.

501c “dark money”groups are three types of tax-

exempt non-prof‌its: 501c4s, 501c5s, and 501c6s.

501c4s are “social welfare organizations”which “must

not be organized for prof‌it and must be operated exclu-

sively to promote social welfare”(IRS, 2019c). 501c5s

promote “the betterment of conditions of those engaged in

the pursuits of labor, agriculture, or horticulture”(IRS,

2019b;Sides et al., 2019). 501c6s are “business leagues,

chambers of commerce, real estate boards, boards of trade,

and professional football leagues”which do not provide

earnings to shareholders or individuals (IRS, 2019a).

501cs are not allowed to endorse candidates or tell voters

which candidates to support and participating in politics

cannot be their “primary”purpose (Meier,1999;Potter and

Morgan, 2013). 501c groups are appealing to political

donors because three important legal loopholes allow them

to air campaign ads.First, the IRS weakly enforces primary

purpose requirements, allowing 501cs to air large numbers

of ads (Potter and Morgan, 2013;Sides et al., 2019).

English et al. 329