An Outline of Soviet Military Law

• Author: By colonel G. I. A. D. Draper
• Pages: 01

The military law of progressive states shows an uneasy compromise between the needs of discipline and of justice. The efficiency of a fighting force renders both discipline and justice indispensable. Soviet military law refiects the dilemma of these two fundamental requirements. The Soviet military legal system is further complicated by the Communist system and by the historical fact that this system was forged on the anvil of revolution. Over the years these factors have left an indelible imprint upon Soviet military law.

It will be easier to gain an insight into Soviet military law if Ne consider quite shortly the pattern of Soviet military administration. This administration is part of the highly complex scheme of arrangement to be found in the Soviet state. Indeed, it is not easy to ascertain which organ of government established by the Soviet Constitution actually controls the armed forces of the state. The Supreme Soviet which, according to Article 30 of the Constitution of 1936, is "the highest organ of state authority" in the U.S.S.R., and is competent to deai with matters of war and peace, does not control the armed forces. This body, consisting of well over a thousand members, meets but infrequently and indeed during the war did not meet at all. It is, nevertheless, the supreme legislative body of the U.S.S.R. according to Article 32 of the Constitution.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which conducts the affaim of the Supreme Soviet between its sessions and has a power to issue regulations in the form of edicts, probably does not control the armed forces any more than the Supreme Soviet. Indeed, its functions are largely formal and often amount to no more than reducing to formal edicts the decisions already reached by the Council of Ministem.

It is probably this latter body, defined by the Constitution as "the highest executive and administrative organ of state authority," which exercises the day-to-day control over the Soviet armed forces. This body, conslsting of some 50 members, is drawn mainly from the upper hierarchy of the Communist Party. It is in fact the government of the U.S.S.R. It is entitled to enact, and does enact, decrees and regulations which we would call subordinate

~ * The writer wishes to express his acknowledgement b Professor Harold J. Berman's book Soviet Military Law and Administiation (Harvard University Preas. 1866) which must be considered B pioneey work on this subject. He ia aim mindful of the kind and valuable advice that he received from Profensor I.nr.n**This article was prepared from B lecture given at The Judge Advocate General's Conference held st The Judge Advocate General's School, U. S.Army. Charlottea~ile. Virpinis, in September-October, 1868.

legislation and has control over the military organization and mobilization plans. It can appoint officers up ta the rank of general. The actual work of this body is difficult to determine with precision.

This leads us to consider whether we have yet found the true focal paint of control. It will be noticed that we haie not yet mentioned that powerful organization of the Communist Party. Undoubtedly, the main political decisions are made within the Party organization, but the matter is rendered less straightforward by the fact that at the higher levels of the Saviet state there is a considerable blending of party and state functions because the same persons are frequently in positions of authority both in the state and in the Communist Party. At the lower and middle levels, these functions and those who exercise them tend to be sharply distinguished. It would, therefore, be advimble at this stage to deal with the place of the Communist Party in Soviet military administration, far this must always be borne in mind when anyone considers the nature and function of Soviet military law.

It is true to say that in the main the military organization has contrit7ed to secure a substantial amount of self-government and independence, although this matter cannot be considered as finally settled. The history of the control of the armed forces by the Communist Party reflects a typical pattern of Soriet development, namely, change and racillatian, according to the policies considered advantageous at various stages in the history and development of the Soviet state. The well-known political commissars, when they were first instituted in the early days of the Revolution, represented an essential compromise between the early political needs of the revolutionary army and the urgent demand for military commanders who had had command and battle experience during the Imperial r6gime. The political commissar in the early days of 1917 answered the need for an ideological control existing alongside and within the command structure of the Revolutionary Arms. Kerensky in hie Provisional Government had established "front commissars" as early as 1917. By the following year, 1918, an Order of the People's Commissar for Defense established commissars 8.8 the direct political organs of the government in the Army. Their task was to "see to it that the Army does not become a thing apart from the entire Soviet system and that the various military establishments do not become foci of conspiracies or instruments against workers and peasants." In those days, so close was the control that all military orders of the commanders had to be countersigned by the commissars as a form of guarantee

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SOVIET MILITARY LAW

that no counter-revolutionary activity lay behind the order. It did not mean that the commissar had to concur in all military orders issued.

In the reorganization of the Red Army that took place in 1924under Frunze, who replaced Trotsky, and which was continued under Voroshilov in 1925, the role of the commissars was reduced to one of political education. The revolutionary army of the Bolsheviks felt it could breathe a little more easy. After the military purges of 1937, the political commissar came into his own more and ranked equal with the military commanders. Military orders were once again signed by both. One of the most interesting consequences of the disastrous Finnish campaign of 1940 was the temporary disappearance of the political commissar from the Red Army. The chaos that had ensued in that campaign was seen 88

directly caused by the duplication of command between the commander and the political commissar. In July 1941, one month after the German invasion, the political commissars were re-established by an Order that proved to be fatal for these individuals. Unknown to the Russians, the Germans in May of 1941before the invasion of Russia issued a Fuehrer Order to the effect that all political commissars who fell into the hands of the Germana should be ruthlessly exterminated. There is clear evidence from the captured German documents held in the Pentagon that this order was thoroughly and effectively carried out. By October of 1942, the political commissar was an institution of the past, His political tasks in the armed forces were, in future, to be carried out by the Zampolit, or political deputy commander. This functionary is today appointed by the Party and Is responsible to his superior, the Zampolit at the next highest military formation. His primary task is one of political education for all ranks a8 well as the strengthening of the discipline in the armed forces. He has no power in command matters, but to a certain extent his role and that of the military commander are complementary. The emphasis in the modern Red Army is in marked contrast to that which was so evident in the early days of the Revolution. Then the emphasis was upon camaraderie, international socialism, and class prejudice against officers. Those who have seen the film "The Battleship Potemkin" will not have failed to notice the latter. The modern idea is to strengthen military discipline, to insist on punctilious respect for military rank, and the general observance of military law. In part, the reduced political role of the Zampolit is accounted far by the fact that something like 86.4 percent of the officers of the Red Army are now members of the Communist Party.

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MILITARY LAN REVIEW

At the same time that the political hierarchy is represented on the military command level by the Zampolit, there is attached to each unit, from division upward, detachments of the security police (00 Section) which come under the Committee on State Security. This body is, in its turn, subordinated to the Council of Ministers. These security sections work, unlike the Zampolit, under cover and have the negative role of counter-action against subversives. By way of contrast, the Zampolit has a positive role performed...