Outcome Findings from the HOPE Demonstration Field Experiment

• Date: 01 November 2016
• Author: Debbie Dawes,Gary Zajac,Doris Layton MacKenzie,Elaine Arsenault,Pamela K. Lattimore,Stephen Tueller
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12248
• Published date: 01 November 2016

RESEARCH ARTICLE

HOPE DEMONSTRATION FIELD

EXPERIMENT

Outcome Findings from the HOPE

Demonstration Field Experiment

Is Swift, Certain, and Fair an Effective Supervision Strategy?

Pamela K. Lattimore

RTI International

Doris Layton MacKenzie

Gary Zajac

Pennsylvania State University

Debbie Dawes

RTI International

Elaine Arsenault

Pennsylvania State University

Stephen Tueller

RTI International

Research Summary

More than 1,500 probationers in four sites were randomly assigned to probation

as usual (PAU) or to Honest Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE),

which is modeled on Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (Hawaii

HOPE) program that emphasizes close monitoring; frequent drug testing; and swift,

certain, and fair (SCF) sanctioning. It also reserves scarce treatment resources for those

The Evaluation of the HOPE Demonstration Field Experiment was supported by Award 2011-RY-BX-0003 from

the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings,

and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily

reflect those of the Department of Justice. The authors would like to thank Eric Martin of the National Institute

of Justice, Ed Banks of the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Angela Hawken and Jonathan Kulick of Pepperdine

University, and the many individuals at the four study sites who assisted with our data and information

gathering. Direct correspondence to Pamela K. Latttimore, Center for Justice, Safety, and Resilience, RTI

International, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 (e-mail: lattimore@rti.org).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12248 C2016 American Society of Criminology 1103

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 15 rIssue 4

Research Article HOPE Demonstration Field Experiment

most in need. The four sites offered heterogeneity in organizational relationships and

populations as well as implementation that was rated very good to excellent—thus,

providing a robust test of the HOPE supervision model. Recidivism results suggest that

HOPE/SCF supervision was not associated with significant reductions in arrests over

PAU with the exception of a reduction in drug-related arrests in one site. There were

significant—albeit conflicting—differences in time to revocation, with survival models

suggesting shorter times to revocation in two sites and longer times to revocation in

one site.

Policy Implications

HOPE—or the more general SCF approach to community supervision—has been

widely praised as an evidence-based practice that reduces substance use, violations, new

arrests, and revocations to prison. Substantial reductions in return to prison have been

associated with claims of significant cost savings for HOPE/SCF over PAU despite the

need for additional resources for warning and violation hearings, drug testing, and

warrant service. Results from this recently completed, four-site randomized control trial

(RCT) showed that recidivism arrest outcomes were largely similar between those on

HOPE/SCF probation and those on PAU and are consistent with findings from the

Delaware Decide Your Time (DYT) RCT reported in this issue. No differences in

arrests between HOPE and PAU probationers suggest that HOPE can be implemented

to provide greater adherence to an idealized probation in which violations aremet with

a swift (but non-draconian) response without compromising public safety. Nevertheless,

the larger numbers of revocations for HOPE probationers in two sites, coupled with

the additional expenses for drug testing, warrant service, and so on associated with

HOPE, also suggest that overall cost savings may not be realized. Although additional

research is needed to determine whether there are groups for whom HOPEmay be more

effective than PAU,HOPE/SCF seems unlikely to offer better outcomes and lower costs

for broad classes of moderate-to-high–risk probationers.

Keywords

HOPE; swift, certain, and fair; community supervision; deterrence; graduated

sanctions

The concept that criminals engage in a decision-making calculus that considers

rewards and punishments dates to Bentham (1789) and Beccaria (1963 [1764])

and has recently experienced a resurgence of interest (e.g., Apel, 2013; Carmichael

and Piquero, 2004; Nagin, 2007, 2013; Paternoster, 2010). Although there are important

differences among criminal choice models based on different decision-making theories, all

models assume that benefits and costs associated with a choice are weighed and that an

action will be chosen only if anticipated benefits exceed anticipated costs. Within such a

1104 Criminology & Public Policy

Lattimore et al.

calculus framework, the probability and severity of punishment provide the offset to any

anticipated gains from criminal (or antisocial) behavior.Recently, Durlauf and Nagin (2011)

argued that evidence supports a move toward “certainty-based as opposed to severity-based

sanction policies” (p. 14; also see Apel and Nagin, 2009).

The HOPE supervision model, also known as the “swift,cer tain, and fair (SCF)” proba-

tion program, was developed in 2004 as Hawaii’sOpportunity Probation with Enforcement

(Hawaii HOPE) program, building on similar efforts that use certain but nonsevere grad-

uated sanctions to deter probationers from violating supervision conditions. The Hawaii

HOPE program emphasizes close monitoring, frequent random drug testing, and SCF

sanctioning. It also reserves scarce treatment resources for those most in need. Original

findings of the effectiveness of Hawaii HOPE suggested large reductions in drug use, ar-

rests, and revocations, leading HOPE—or the more general SCF approach to community

supervision—to be widely praised as an evidence-based practice that reduces substance use,

violations, new arrests, and revocations to prison. Subsequently, there have been considerable

efforts in the United States and elsewhere to implement HOPE/SCF programs.

Under HOPE/SCF, it is anticipated that negative behaviors (drug use, failure to keep

appointments with probation officers, etc.) will be identified by supervising agents and

responded to immediately with a violation hearing resulting in short but escalating jail

stays. It is anticipated that the certainty and not the severity of punishment is the important

component in deterring offenders from violating conditions of supervision and engaging in

criminal activities. HOPE/SCF is anticipated to reduce the costs of incarceration associated

with revocations to prison as probationers and parolees adjust their behaviors in response

to short jail stays. In addition, these individuals are expected to be deterred from future

criminal activities, reducing recidivism and attendant costs. At a minimum, HOPE/SCF

is assumed not to impose additional public safety costs in the form of increased criminal

activity over supervision as usual.

The initial examinations of the Hawaii HOPE program garnered much attention

nationally as findings suggested substantial reductions in drug use and arrests for Hawaii

HOPE probationers (Hawken, 2010; Hawken and Kleiman, 2009). Morerecently, however,

Hawken and colleagues (2016) reported the results of a long-term (76-month) follow-

up of the original Hawaii HOPE experimental subjects that show less dramatic effects.

Furthermore, as documented in this issue, a randomized controlled trial (RCT) testing

HOPE/SCF in Delaware failed to show any positive effects of HOPE over probation as

usual (PAU; O’Connell, Brent, and Visher, 2016, this issue).

As HOPE replications or variations were considered across the United States, a

demonstration field experiment (DFE) of the renamed Honest Opportunity Probation

with Enforcement (HOPE) program was implemented to examine the effectiveness and

generalizability of this probation innovation. The HOPE DFE consisted of Bureau of

Justice Assistance support for implementing the HOPE model in four competitively selected

U.S. jurisdictions and technical assistance to facilitate fidelity to the Hawaii HOPE model,

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