Out of the Service, Into the House

Published date01 June 2017
Date01 June 2017
DOI10.1177/1065912917691359
Subject MatterArticles
/tmp/tmp-1828U7Ukq9LvCM/input 691359PRQXXX10.1177/1065912917691359Political Research QuarterlyLupton
research-article2017
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2017, Vol. 70(2) 327 –339
Out of the Service, Into the House:
© 2017 University of Utah
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Military Experience and Congressional
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917691359
DOI: 10.1177/1065912917691359
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
War Oversight
Danielle L. Lupton1
Abstract
While evidence from international security and civil-military relations shows that elites with military experience have
distinct policy preferences from elites who have not served in the armed forces, the effects of military service are
not apparent in congressional voting records on foreign and defense policy. If elites with military experience have
distinct policy preferences, why has this gap failed to manifest itself in congressional policy positions? I argue that the
effects of military service are most pronounced on issues where this experience is highly salient: on the oversight
of war operations. Using a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of an index of roll call votes in the House of
Representatives during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, I find that congresspersons with military experience are
significantly more likely to vote to increase congressional oversight over war operations, including increased access
to information and limiting the deployment of troops in theater. Further tests confirm these findings are not simply
due to partisan effects. I discuss how my results carry serious implications for war termination and the declining
number of veterans in Congress during the post-9/11 era, as well as the impact of military service on foreign policy
and international security.
Keywords
foreign policy, civil-military relations, Congress, international conflict, military veterans, oversight
The backgrounds and personal experiences of political
personal experiences and military service on foreign-policy
elites can profoundly impact their policy preferences and
decision making and carries serious implications for how
behavior (Burden 2007; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015).1
scholars approach the impact of military service across the
Military experience, in particular, influences how individu-
foreign-policy and international-security literatures.
als approach international conflict and react to foreign-
These questions, however, are largely overlooked and
policy challenges (Cohen 2000; Dempsey 2010; Gronke
understudied by scholars of international conflict, civil-
and Feaver 2001; Holsti 2001; Huntington 1959; Roman
military relations, and congressional foreign policy.
and Tarr 2001). Although there is evidence that political
While there is evidence that military service affects the
elites from divergent military and civilian backgrounds
decision making of primary leaders (e.g., presidents),
hold distinct policy preferences, known as the civil-military
scholars must also thoroughly examine the effect of mili-
gap (Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Gelpi
tary service on foreign-policy decision making among
and Feaver 2002; Holsti 1998), the effects of military ser-
legislators. For scholars of American foreign policy,
vice are not apparent within the broader context of American
investigating the effect of military service within
foreign policy when examining the voting behavior of US
Congress is critical to understanding the pervasiveness of
congressional representatives (Bianco 2005; Bianco and
the civil-military gap and the extent to which military ser-
Markham 2001). This lack of evidence for a substantive
vice affects foreign policy in a broader context; yet, few
voting gap between military veterans and nonveterans in
studies directly address this issue. By investigating the
Congress is puzzling. If civilian elites who previously
impact of military experience on foreign-policy decision
served in the military have distinct policy preferences from
their counterparts without military experience, why has this
1Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, USA
gap failed to manifest itself in congressional policy posi-
tions? What are the consequences of this puzzle for foreign
Corresponding Author:
Danielle L. Lupton, Department of Political Science, Colgate
policy and international conflict behavior? Answering these
University, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, NY 13346, USA.
questions is critical to understanding the broader effects of
Email: dlupton@colgate.edu

328
Political Research Quarterly 70(2)
making during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this
draw conclusions regarding the effect of military service
paper makes three significant contributions across the lit-
on control of war operations and foreign-policy decision
eratures on American foreign policy, civil-military rela-
making more broadly.
tions, and international security. First, it clarifies the
conditions under which military experience is salient to
Military Experience and Foreign-
foreign-policy decision making. Second, it explains the
Policy Decision Making
mechanisms by which these experiences affect policy.
Third, it illuminates the effect of past experiences on the
The unique experiences and knowledge gained through
decisions of legislators in a broader context. Accordingly,
military service can shape how individuals view foreign
this study expands our understanding of the conditions
policy. Research from international security evidences
under which the military experiences of elites substan-
significant differences across the behavior of elites with
tively impact international conflict.
military experience and those who did not serve in the
Other scholars examining a wide breadth of foreign
armed forces. Most notably, international leaders with
policy and defense issues argue that the effects of military
certain types of military experiences are more likely to
service on congressional decision making should be mar-
initiate militarized disputes or favor more hawkish for-
ginal, but find that, even at the margins, the impact of
eign policies (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Grossman,
veteran status is negligible (Bianco 2005; Bianco and
Manekin, and Miodownik 2015; Horowitz and Stam
Markham 2001). I instead argue that, if military experi-
2014; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015; Stadelmann,
ence should only narrowly matter, scholars must test for
Portmann, and Eichenberger 2015); yet, democratic lead-
the impact of military service where military expertise is
ers with combat experience are less prone to conflict
highly applicable. I propose that the effects of military
(Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). Accordingly, military
service are highly pronounced on issues associated with
service affects both the world view and behavior of inter-
civilian control of military operations (see Kriner 2010),
national leaders.
and I present two competing hypotheses regarding the
Within American foreign policy, a significant civil-
impact of military experience on war oversight. Although
military gap exists between the attitudes and experiences
the logic of most existing research suggests that con-
of the civilian and military spheres of American society
gresspersons with military backgrounds will be reticent
(Roman and Tarr 2001). Military elites express distinct
to extend civilian control over the military, I present an
preferences from their civilian counterparts based on
alternative hypothesis indicating military experience may
their experiences while serving in the armed forces
actually lead these elites to be more supportive of civilian
(Dempsey 2010; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Holsti 1998,
control over war operations. I then test these hypotheses
2001). Military elites and civilian elites with prior mili-
against an index of salient roll call votes in the House of
tary experience are more reserved in the initial use of
Representatives across America’s two most recent con-
force, are more realistic about the ability of militarized
flicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. My results show that mili-
force to achieve foreign-policy goals, and are less casu-
tary service significantly impacts congressional oversight
alty averse than civilian elites from nonmilitary back-
of these wars. These results challenge the conventional
grounds (Feaver and Kohn 2000; Gelpi and Feaver 2002;
wisdom, as I find that legislators with military experience
Holsti 2001).
are more likely to support civilian control of war opera-
This difference in world views is not just limited to
tions in Iraq and Afghanistan. These findings carry criti-
military elites. Rather, members of the armed services, in
cal implications regarding the effects of military service
general, are more likely to view the military as critical
on foreign-policy decision making in the post-9/11 era, as
“instruments of foreign policy,” while civilians perceive
scholars cannot definitively conclude that military ser-
the military’s role as more limited (Dempsey 2010, 50).
vice is insignificant to the conduct of congressional for-
In times of war, veterans, serving military members, and
eign policy. This also suggests that military experience
military elites are also more skeptical of the authority of
can significantly influence foreign-policy decision mak-
civilian elites, who are viewed as less qualified to make
ing among not only primary elites, but also legislators.
...

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