Our State’s Never Had Better Friends

• DOI: 10.1177/1065912912448539
• Published date: 01 June 2013
• Author: David C. W. Parker,Craig Goodman
• Date: 01 June 2013
• Subject Matter: Articles

448539PRQXXX10.1177/1065912912448539Par
ker and GoodmanPolitical Research Quarterly
Political Research Quarterly
66(2) 370 –384
Our State’s Never Had Better
© 2012 University of Utah
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Friends: Resource Allocation,
DOI: 10.1177/1065912912448539
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Home Styles, and Dual
Representation in the Senate
David C. W. Parker1 and Craig Goodman2
Abstract
We demonstrate that senators use office allowances to create positive constituent service and policy expert impressions
among voters, but the effects depend on the representational expectations of constituents and the nature of dual
representation. Whether a senator shares the same party and represents a densely populated state in part determines
the effectiveness of constituent service activities and efforts to establish policy expertise. The representational
challenge faced by senators is more complicated than those faced by House members and more nuanced than the
existing literature suggests. We conclude by examining the different challenges senators and representatives face in
building representational relationships.
Keywords
Senate, franking, travel, congressional staff, home styles, dual representation, office allowances, constituent impressions
Introduction
do not evaluate each senator in isolation, so the represen-
tational choices of each senator are affected by whether
Much of what we know about representation in the
their constituents view them as policy experts or con-
United States comes from studies of the House of
stituent servants.
Representatives, but the nature of representation in the
Using data from the Pooled Senate Election Study, we
Senate is starkly different.1 Senators represent entire
examine how constituents in each state view the activities
states, which in addition to having larger populations
of their senators and integrate that data with the represen-
than most congressional districts, are often more hetero-
tational choices that senators make. Each senator receives
geneous on measures of race, income, and economic
an official office allowance enabling them to fulfill their
development. Binder, Malzman, and Sigelman (1998)
representational responsibilities. Our findings paint a pic-
find senators from less-populous states are more popular
ture of representation in the Senate that is more complex
than senators from more populous states and Lee and
than what occurs in the House of Representatives. The
Oppenheimer (1999) find that constituents are more
critical point is that while senators have flexibility in
likely to contact their senators and seek assistance from
deciding how to represent their constituents, state size and
them in more lightly populated states. An oft-neglected
dual representation complicate these relationships and
difference affecting representation is the fact that each
make certain representational choices more advantageous.
state receives two senators. Schiller (2000) argues that
Dual representation encourages cooperation among shared
this dual representation has important consequences and
rather than senators behaving identically, the system of
1Montana State University, Bozeman, MT, USA
dual representation provides incentives for senators to
2University of Houston-Victoria, Victoria, TX, USA
diverge in their legislative activities. We build on this line
of work by exploring how the interaction between each
Corresponding Author:
of the senators in allocating their official office resources
David C. W. Parker, Associate Professor, Department of Political
Science, Montana State University, 2-139 Wilson Hall, Bozeman, MT
influences the perceptions of the constituents they repre-
59717-2240.
sent. These interactions are critical because constituents
Email: dparker@montana.edu

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Parker and Goodman
371
partisan delegations, particularly where constituent service
Cover 1992). Like Parker and Goodman (2009), we focus
activities are concerned in less densely populated states.
not on electoral security, but on how the activities of sen-
Population density does not affect constituent impressions
ators directly affect constituent impressions.
concerning a senator’s policy expertise, while serving in a
Few studies examine Senate representational styles
split partisan delegation suggests the benefits of creating
and allocation strategies (Bennett and DiLorenzo 1982;
an independent legislative portfolio. In order to tell the
Parker 1985). Fenno (1982) describes how senators
complete story of Senate representation, the interaction
approach the question of the representational relationship
between each pair of senators must be taken seriously.
over their careers, but does not systematically examine
their use of official resources like the frank or travel home.
Building Relationships with
He does touch on the question of population size and rep-
resentation, but his conclusions are impressionistic. Lee
Constituencies
and Oppenheimer (1999) find that population size affects
Richard Fenno (1978) argues that constituencies are
how senators are perceived by constituents, but other than
central to reelection for senators and representatives.
a series of interviews with senators, they do not explore
From constituencies, members assemble support by allo-
whether a state’s size affects the representational choices
cating personal and staff resources, presenting their
senators make. Wendy Schiller (2000) examines represen-
“self” to others, and explaining Washington activities.
tation within Senate delegations. Each House member
The allocation of personal and staff resources involves
represents a discrete geographic entity, but senators share
decisions about how frequently members travel home,
the same geographic constituency. This creates opportuni-
how members deploy congressional staffers, and how
ties and conflicts for senators as they attempt to build trust
much franked mail to send. Presentation of self captures
and win reelection. She finds that constituents do evaluate
the interactions that members have with their constitu-
their senators differently, and this yields electoral benefits.
ents in various settings. The final component, explaining
We build on Lee and Oppenheimer and Schiller by exam-
Washington activity, extends beyond communicating
ining how the allocation of official resources by senators,
roll call votes to a broader discussion of how a member’s
dual representation, and a state’s representational expecta-
work benefits the district. Fenno terms these activities
tions as measured by state size produce positive and par-
collectively as a member’s “home style,” and they are
ticular constituent impressions.
designed to build constituent trust.
Fenno suggests that members influence their electoral
Hypotheses
fate through their official actions. Specifically, members
develop a personal vote, which Cain, Ferejohn, and
Scholars have devoted little systematic attention to the
Fiorina (1987, 9) describe “as a candidate’s electoral sup-
practices of representation in the Senate. Fenno (1982,
port attributed to her personal qualities, qualifications,
1996) and others (Schiller 2000) provide some insights as
activities, and record.” Members of Congress travel
to how senators make decisions about representing their
home, highlight legislative accomplishments, or bring
constituents, but the impetus for hypotheses necessarily
federal dollars to the state so as to “control the images
comes from the House of Representatives. While there are
that constituents have of them” (47, emphasis added).
important structural differences between the two cham-
The official activities of members and senators increase
bers, we can reasonably extrapolate from the patterns
the probability that constituents can recall/recognize
observed in one chamber to the other. Do the activities of
incumbents, report personal contacts with them, posi-
senators affect constituent perceptions, and if so, how
tively evaluate them, and offer an evaluation of the
does dual representation and state size condition these
incumbent’s service to the district or state (166). This per-
impressions in ways different from the House? We utilize
sonal vote often brings electoral benefits (Alford and
measures of constituent impressions of their senators as
Brady 1993; Herrera and Yawn 1999).
dependent variables to test this and hypothesize that the
The notion that senators and representatives have par-
different activities senators undertake influence the num-
ticular home styles is well accepted (Parker 1986; Hill
ber of constituent responses falling into each category.
and Hurley 2002; Miler 2007; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina
Some senators take pride in their relationships with their
1987). It is less clear that home styles matter. Much of the
state and see themselves as staunch defenders of its inter-
literature about use of official resources focuses on
ests in Washington. We offer three hypotheses for impres-
whether their use generates greater electoral security in
sions regarding constituent service:
the House. The evidence is mixed (Fenno 1978; Yiannakis
1981; Cover and Brumberg 1982; Parker 1980, 1986;
Hypothesis 1: Senators who spend more money on
Parker and Parker 1985; McAdams and Johannes 1988;
travel are more likely to be perceived as con-
Johannes and McAdams 1981; Cover 1985; Serra and
stituent...