Other Conservation Easement Litigation

Date01 August 2020
Published date01 August 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/npc.30755
Bruce R. Hopkins’ NONPROFIT COUNSEL
6 August 2020 THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMP T ORGANIZATIONS MONTHLY
Bruce R. Hopkins’ Nonpr ofit Counsel DOI:10.10 02/n pc
concluded that the regulation’s “proportionate value”
and “donor improvement” approaches are not arbitrary
or capricious. Also, the age of the regulation was held
to give weight to this presumption of reasonableness,
with the court observing that the regulation has never
been amended over its 34 years of existence, although
the charitable deduction section has been amended over
30 times. (The court cited the public law section of every
amendment.)
A dissent opens by stating that “[o]ur holding today
will likely deny any charitable deduction to hundreds or
thousands of taxpayers who donated the conservation
easements that protect perhaps millions of acres.” It
added that “[t]his is the second time we’ve taken an ax to
entire forests of these deductions” (see, e.g., the October
2017 and March 2019 issues). The essence of the dissent’s
view is that the court majority held that the “Treasury
Department gets to ignore basic principles of administra-
tive law that require an agency to give reasoned responses
to all significant comments in a rulemaking proceeding.”
The dissent explored in considerable detail the comments
submitted in connection with the proposed easement reg-
ulations, concluding that Treasury’s response amounted to
the “chirping of crickets.” The dissent takes the position
that Treasury’s failure to respond to relevant significant
comments is a violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act and that the regulation may be substantively invalid
because Treasury is relying on post hoc rationalizations
to defend its decision-making. It concludes by expressing
the “fear that our efforts to clear cut and brush hog our
way out of the volume of conservation-easement cases
we have to deal with has left us a field far stumpier than
when we began.”
Twelve judges were in the majority (one partially).
There were four concurrences (two partial) and one dis-
sent. The four opinions in Oakbrook occupy 172 pages;
the dissent accounted for 47 of these pages.]
COMMERCIALITY DOCTRINE
DERAILS ILLEGAL DRUG
MITIGATION EFFORTS
A nonprofit organization was formed to address the
pressing problem of organized theft and fraud that sup-
ports opioid and heroin addiction. It facilitates collabo-
ration among consumers, participating retailers, and law
enforcement agencies engaged in the investigation of
organized retail crime by providing innovative software
support for drug theft reduction. Its programs include
data analytics to reduce theft, a return fraud initiative,
and drug epidemic mitigation. The goal of this entity “is
to make an important contribution to the effort to stem
the flow of illegal drugs and the addiction that drives the
demand for illegal drugs.”
One would think that this organization qualifies as
a tax-exempt charitable entity because it is promoting
health and lessening the burdens of government. But
one would be wrong in this regard, at least according
to the IRS. Once again, absurd application of the com-
merciality doctrine is invoked, with the IRS characterizing
this case as that of an organization that is merely pro-
viding a “service for a fee to retail stores,” which (stated
that way) is not a charitable undertaking (Priv. Ltr. Rul.
202021026). More specifically, the IRS’s position is that
this organization’s primary activity is the “provision of
retail theft prevention and mitigation services to retail
businesses for a fee.” The services this organization pro-
vides are dismissed as “ordinary commercial activities.”
Provision of these services is, of course, a means to a
larger end, which is combatting the opioid and heroin epi-
demics. The IRS’s position that public charities must abjure
fee-for-service arrangements is wrong as a matter of law
(see IRC § 509(a)(2)). This application (expansion) of the
commerciality doctrine warrants correction. [4.9(a)]]
ADDITIONAL FILING
DEADLINE EXTENSIONS
Various extensions by the IRS of filing due dates in
the tax-exempt organizations context to July 15 are
summarized in the June 2020 issue. Two more of these
extensions have been announced (Notice 2020-35).
The annual electronic notification (Form 990-N) filing
deadline has been so extended. Also so postponed is the
time to commence a declaratory judgment action (IRC §
7428) in the US District Court for the District of Columbia
and the Court of Federal Claims. An extension of time to
file such an action in the US Tax Court was provided in
prior guidance (Notice 2020-23). [28.2(a)(iv)] ]
OTHER CONSERVATION
EASEMENT LITIGATION
A company contributed a water storage easement to
a public charity, claiming a $200,000 charitable con-
tribution deduction. A Form 8283 was attached to
the appropriate tax return but it has, in the words of
the US Tax Court, “multiple omissions.” In rejecting
a defense of substantial compliance, the court wrote
that the donor’s “compliance can best be described
as slipshod.” Accompanying the appraisal summary
was a letter from a lawyer (a litigator) opining as to
the value of the donated property. Aside from the
fact that this individual is not a qualified appraiser,
the court noted that the letter does not discuss the
method of valuation or the “specific basis” for deter-
mining the fair market value of the property, does

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