Origins of Nato: 1948--1949

• Citation: Vol. 34 No. 0
• Publication year: 2019

Origins of NATO: 1948--1949

Lawrence S. Kaplan

ORIGINS OF NATO: 1948-1949

Lawrence S. Kaplan^*

Overview

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) originated in the trauma of World War II. The human cost of that war at last motivated Europe to remove the barriers to economic integration that had promoted warfare among the nation-states since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.¹ The devastation of western Europe also inspired the United States as the major victor in that war to abandon its traditional isolation from European political and military affairs.² Accelerating these fundamental changes was the awareness on both sides of the Atlantic of the threat Soviet-led Communism posed to the future of Western democracy.³

However, recognizing the necessity did not equate with effective immediate action to cope with these two challenges in the post-war world. Too many obstacles had to be overcome. For Europeans to rebuild, Europe required a defeated Germany in the New Order, an almost impossible task considering the behavior of its Nazi past. For Americans, the tradition of non-entanglement in the affairs of the Old World after the termination of the Franco-American Alliance of 1778 was not yet breached.⁴

Despite the frequent charges that NATO was a product of America's imperial reach after World War II, it was Europe's initiative—not that of the United States—which opened the way to NATO. Led by Britain's Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, and France's counterpart, Georges Bidault, Western Europeans feared that their efforts to collaborate in a future defense organization could not succeed without American involvement.⁵ Their economies could not be rebuilt without massive American support, and their defense capabilities

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could not cope with the aggressive Soviet Union without an American commitment to counterbalance the Communist adversary.

What the Europeans wanted from the United States was clear: join a new western alliance that would deter the Soviets from further military pressure. This was not a solution the Truman Administration could accept; the U.S. public was too suspicious of European intentions.⁶ Yet there was a way to link America to Europe: the Marshall Plan of 1947.⁷ The Plan recognized that only an infusion of American aid could revive the economies of Western Europe and make them prosperous consumers of American manufactures. This aid was not a loan as in World War I, but an investment that would benefit the American economy.⁸ A further potential advantage for the West was that European revival could make the beneficiaries of U.S. aid partners in the containment of Soviet-led Communism.⁹

The escalation of Soviet threats to the West had already accelerated U.S. movement toward military entanglement with Europe. The key concept was embodied in the term containment.¹⁰ "This change did not signify acceptance of binding agreements with European nations. It did mean that the United States was prepared to recognize that the survival of Western democracies threatened by Communist external aggression or internal subversion was vital to the security of the United States itself."¹¹ The Truman [A]dministration drew on the advice of George F. Kennan, a Soviet specialist in Moscow, whose seminal 'long telegram' in 1946 outlined a way to manage the menace in order to give direction to this policy.¹² "As a scholarly and perceptive student of Communism, Kennan propounded the thesis that only firm containment could control the dynamic ideology of the Soviet system. Conventional diplomacy was irrelevant to the relationship between the two nations. So was the U.N."¹³

"Hostility was inherent in the nature of the two societies."¹⁴ Aside from conventional warfare, "[t]he only way to cope with this challenge was by patient

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containment of Soviet expansionism, anticipating the day when its economic failures and lack of internal cohesion would lead to its demise."¹⁵ My take on implications of Kennan's likening Communism to a religion, like Christianity and Islam, would lead to schisms that would weaken its authority.¹⁶ In 1947, Kennan won an appointment as head of the State Department's policy planning staff because of his containment recommendations."¹⁷

Yet neither Congress nor the nation at large seemed to share Kennan's views.¹⁸ The Truman Administration's policymakers used Greece's civil war to force the U.S. to come to grips with Britain's inability to afford continuous support of the Greek government against Communist armed forces.¹⁹ This "became the occasion to assume the British burden in the Mediterranean."²⁰ The Truman Doctrine was announced in March of 1947, "promising economic and military support to the beleaguered countries of Greece and Turkey, who at that time were combatting Soviet pressures on their borders."²¹ The Truman doctrine posed a bigger promise, "to support as well [as to] 'free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.'"²²

"Although Kennan recognized that the [D]octrine was more sweeping than anything he had envisioned, the Truman [A]dministration understood the need for jarring the U.S. public out of its complacency."²³ However, the administration's leaders knew that military aid alone would not be sufficient to assure Europeans.²⁴ Europe needed massive economic aid to promote both its recovery and ability to resist the intimidation of Communism.²⁵

The Marshall Plan emerged from Secretary of State George C. Marshall's commencement speech on June 5, 1947, at Harvard University.²⁶ Undersecretaries of State Dean Acheson and William L. Clayton formed it "to

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be an extension of the Truman Doctrine."²⁷ For the United States to provide effective support of the military efforts of embattled nations, "as it rallied to the defense of Greece and Turkey, it was necessary that the economic base of the beneficiaries had to be strong enough to take advantage of military assistance."²⁸ In order to not replicate the chaos that was occurring in Greece and Turkey, in France or Italy—where large Communist parties were flourishing—"the United States must help Europeans create economic conditions that would permit them to cope with the promises of Communism."²⁹ The Marshall Plan—or European Recovery Program—"promised massive economic aid to countries that . . . demonstrate[ed] a willingness to help themselves and to break down barriers with other beneficiaries of U.S. support."³⁰

In one sense, the Marshall Plan was an unparalleled success. The tweleve billion dollars not only nurtured the recovery of Europe, but also advanced the movement toward European integration.³¹ In the mind of President Truman, "the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were 'two halves of the same walnut.'"³²

However, the complimentary nature of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was not apparent to all observers.³³ Walter Lippmann, an influential observer, initially found irreconcilable differences between the two initiatives.³⁴ To Lippmann, the suddenness of the Truman message to Congress suggested "a hasty reflex action driven by the exigencies of the moment rather a carefully worked out plan within the larger frame of foreign policy."³⁵ While, "military aid to Greece and Turkey was primarily a stopgap military exercise, plugging leaks in a corner of Europe."³⁶ In this context, the Truman Doctrine "was just a major strike in the burgeoning Cold War."³⁷

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According to Lippmann, the Marshall Plan, "was a more mature expression of the assistance the United States gave Europe after World War I without the stigma associated with unpaid loans."³⁸ The Truman Administration recognized that its own prosperity rested on the economic recovery of Europe.³⁹ The Truman Administration required "European beneficiaries to give evidence of their own efforts toward recovery" in order to ensure success in Congress.⁴⁰ This could be done by showing "progress by reducing trade barriers that had prevailed before World War II and moving toward economic integration of the continent or at least that part of Europe outside Soviet control."⁴¹

If any doubts existed "about the conjunction between the Marshall Plan and the U.N., the endorsement of leaders of the American Association for the United Nations (AAUN) should have resolved them."⁴² The Marshall Plan, with its emphasis on European self-help and mutual aid, satisfied many Americans, including Lippmann, who had been worried about the Truman Doctrine's excessive dependence on arms to counter Soviet expansionism.⁴³

Approval from Congress came as well, "but only after agonizing debates about spending so much money on possibly unreliable and ungrateful beneficiaries."⁴⁴ Skeptics "wondered about the lasting effectiveness of foreign aid as well as the potential impact on the domestic economy."⁴⁵ Republican Robert Taft of Ohio, who had led the isolationist wing of the Republican Party before and during World War II, "managed to cut the proposed three-year program to a single year, with proportionate reduction in funds" for this period.⁴⁶ Congress came to terms with the interim aid bill on December 15, 1947 following the "impending breakdown" of the four-powers Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London.⁴⁷ The bill became Public Law 389 of the Foreign Aid Act of 1947 two days later.⁴⁸

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Flying back to Washington immediately after the adjournment of the London conference, [Secretary] Marshall lent his weight to the [A]ct in a radio report on [December 19]. He made it clear to the U.S. public that the East-West conflict would be fought out over the [European Recovery Program] rather than over the a [sic] doomed peace conference on the future of Germany. This modest success was a signal for the full aid program to proceed in full force.⁴⁹

Generally, Europeans recognized the opportunity that had been offered by the Marshall Plan and proceeded to meet it. With British and French foreign ministers leading the...