An original omission? Property in Rawls's political thought.

• Author: Taylor, Quentin P.

John Rawls has been hailed recently as "the most distinguished political philosopher" of the twentieth century (Nussbaum 1999, 424). In large part, this accolade is based on the Harvard philosopher's originality as a political thinker. Rawls's Theory of Justice ([1971] 1999) single-handedly revived the tradition of "grand theory" at a time when political philosophy as a constructive, creative enterprise was widely viewed as "dead in the water." Moreover, Rawls provided a sophisticated and novel account of justice that captured the imagination of an entire generation of scholars and students. Indeed, no single work has had a wider impact or greater influence on formal political thinking over the past thirty years than A Theory of Justice. As a result, Rawls's leading tenets--"justice as fairness," "the difference principle," "fair equality of opportunity," "equal basic liberties," "the original position," "the veil of ignorance"--have become permanent fixtures in the lexicon of academic political discourse. Like many of his famous predecessors in the field of political speculation, Rawls owes his notoriety as much to his critics as to his admirers. On sheer volume alone, the critical responses to A Theory of Justice suggest that its author had something important, provocative, and original to say. An inventory of these responses confirms this suspicion because no thinker of common metal could have generated the heated, voluminous, and sustained outpouring of debate that has surrounded Rawls's chief work. Agree or disagree with its teaching, A Theory of Justice has attained the status of a political classic, an honor that rests in large part on the originality of its author's philosophical achievement.

Although studies of Rawls continue apace, the leading tenets of Theory have received serious, sustained, and comprehensive examination. I am not claiming that nothing remains to be said, for by definition a classic provides an inexhaustible supply of grist for the mill. On the whole, however, it is questionable that another critique of the "original position," the "difference principle," and so forth will yield much of scholarly interest or value. In fact, the better-known and more original of Rawls's doctrines have been scrutinized ad nauseam, and further inquiry along conventional lines runs the risk of irrelevance and redundancy.

One original feature of Theory, however, has escaped the notice of readers for the most part--namely, that Rawls's theory of justice "leaves open the question whether its principles are best realized by some form of property-owning democracy or by a liberal socialist regime" ([1971] 1999, xv). "Justice as fairness" theory does not entail the determination of specific economic arrangements of even take up the matter of ownership of the means of production (242).

At first glance, this omission may appear unimportant. Why should the status of property relations necessarily be part of a theory of justice? Is it not possible--indeed, reasonable--to assume that justice is compatible with either a capitalist economy or a socialist economy? This position, which Rawls takes, deserves more scrutiny than it has received. Perhaps he is perfectly justified in excluding property relations from his account of "justice as fairness," but given the importance of property in the history of political philosophy, the exclusion cries out for an explanation. At the least, it would seem apposite to provide a rationale for leaving this important question open-ended. We may then consider whether this rationale is internally consistent with Rawls's principles of justice. Finally, we may ask if a theory of justice that fails to deal with the vital issue of property relations qualifies as a political philosophy in the comprehensive sense.

Rawls's Basic View of Property Relations

In the first chapter of Theory, Rawls asserts that the topic of his book "is ... social justice." He then provides a summary of that subject:

For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. By major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family are examples of major social institutions. Taken together as one scheme, the major institutions define men's rights and duties and influence their life prospects.... The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start. ([1971] 1999, 6-7) From Rawls's summary we learn that "justice" involves political as well as economic arrangements and that "private property in the means of production" exemplifies a major social institution. We learn also that economic arrangements are part of the "basic structure" of society and fall under the subject of justice owing to their "profound" impact on people's lives. The notion that "[t]he primary subject of the principles of justice is the basic structure of society" (47) is repeated throughout Theory, therefore creating the impression that the determination of economic arrangements (including property relations) constitutes a vital and necessary component of justice. This impression is strengthened by the fact that Rawls invariably links "the arrangement of major social institutions" to the basic structure, or the "primary subject of justice." "Our concern," he writes, "is solely with the basic structure of society and its major institutions and therefore with the standard cases of social justice" (50).

Such statements appear to indicate clearly that "justice as fairness" will include, at the very least, a consideration of the merits of basic economic arrangements. Insofar as the principles of justice will "regulate the choice of a political constitution and the main elements of the economic and social system" (7, emphasis added), we may reasonably expect Rawls to specify the relation between justice and the "main elements" (that is, the property relations) of economic arrangements. The expectation is piqued by the first formulation of Rawls's "two principles of justice." The first principle states that "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others" (53). Among the basic liberties, Rawls includes "the right to hold personal property," a right he justifies on the basis of individual autonomy and integrity. The second principle pertains to economic issues more directly: "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all" (53). Implicit in this principle is the toleration of economic inequality, the condition in which some persons possess more wealth and income than others. As long as such inequalities are mutually advantageous and do not involve exclusion from any remunerative position, they are consistent with "justice as fairness."

At this point in the argument, one may suspect that Rawls is providing a rationale for the inequalities that exist in capitalist democracies. His critics on the left often read him in this way. The reader need only turn the page, however, to discover that Rawls, though unequivocally committed to democracy, is by no means committed to capitalism. As noted earlier, he includes "the right to hold personal property" under the basic liberties but excludes "the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g., means of production) and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire" (54). For Rawls, such rights "are not basic; and so they are not protected by the priority of the first principle [of justice]" (54). The exclusion of property rights beyond personal items from the list of basic liberties raises a number of important questions. If such rights are not basic to liberty, what is their relation to liberty, if any? Is there any right to property beyond personal holdings? If so, what is the basis of this right, and how may it be justified? If no such right exists, does this lack imply that justice requires public ownership of the means of production? If so, how far may the right of personal ownership extend before it encroaches on the right of public ownership? Furthermore, on what basis does the "right" of public ownership stand? Rawls does provide something like answers to these questions in the form of the "difference principle" (the second principle of justice), but for the moment let us defer consideration of this controversial aspect of his thought.

Property Relations and Economic Equality

The assertion that private ownership beyond personal property is not a basic liberty is a red flag for readers who suspect Rawls is "privileging" capitalism. Indeed, any hopes (or fears) that Rawls aims to defend private ownership tout...