Labor organizing by executive order: Governor Spitzer and the unionization of home-based child day-care providers.

• Author: Gregory, David L.

1. INTRODUCTION

   On May 8, 2007, New York Governor Eliot Spitzer issued Executive Order No. 12, opening the door for the unionization of 60,000 persons paid directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by state funds, to provide home-based day-care for the children of working parents. (1)

   The Governor's action was dramatic, stark, and extraordinarily significant. Rather than wait for the New York State Assembly and Senate to reenact legislation previously vetoed by former Governor Pataki in 2006, Governor Spitzer used the prerogative of the executive order to cut through many Gordian knots. (2)

   Meanwhile, powerful unions have carved up the organizing turf: the United Federation of Teachers ("UFT") is successfully organizing home-based providers in New York City, and the Civil Service Employees Association ("CSEA") will organize those providers throughout the rest of the state. (3)

   Critics of the Governor's initiative vociferously contend that it is a blatant legal fiction to characterize these providers as employees. This legal fiction, however, is certainly more enlightened than the perpetuation of the long-standing arrangement that relegates these providers to the economic margins. (4)

   The child-care industry has more workers with earnings falling below the poverty line than any other industry, with over fifty percent of providers earning at the poverty level. (5) They are also overwhelmingly women of color. (6) Meanwhile, these providers of day care for children furnish an indispensable service to the working-parent cornerstone of the economy. In addition, "from 1947 to 2004, the labor force participation rate of mothers with children between six and seventeen years climbed from roughly twenty-five percent to more than seventy-seven percent." (7)

   By some economic measures, these essential service providers are very much employees. (8) But, employees of whom? Are the parents and guardians of the children consigned to the care of these providers their employers? No. Rather, by operation of Executive Order No. 12, it is the State--but the State as employer in very important, and yet very limited, ways. (9)

   At the federal level, the past term of the United States Supreme Court was decidedly adverse to the interests of low-wage workers. (10) In Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, the Court unanimously ruled that domestic workers, including the home health workers employed by third parties, were not protected by the federal minimum wage law, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and thus had no federal claim for overtime pay at a premium rate. (11) At the same time, 2007 witnessed the dawn of significant promise for an important component of workers on the economic margins in New York. (12) At least in part, these initiatives may represent a response to the erosion of labor protections or the lack of hope in improving labor rights at the federal level.

   This Article discusses Governor Spitzer's May 8, 2007 executive order as well as earlier legislative and executive initiatives in New York and other states to provide organizing rights to groups of workers paid through state funds. In particular, it looks at California's analogous initiative via legislation, Governor Pataki's veto of similar legislation in 2006, executive orders of Illinois, Oregon, Iowa, and New Jersey governors, organizing initiatives by major unions, their likely consequences, and some implications for future innovations in organizing.

2. UNIONIZATION OF HOME-CARE AND CHILD-CARE WORKERS IN OTHER STATES

   1. The California Precursor

      One of the most significant gains in union membership in fifty years occurred in 1999, when over 70,000 home-care workers voted to join the Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") in Los Angeles. (13) This successful organizational drive had its genesis in the 1980s, when SEIU and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME") began attempts to organize these home-care workers, (14) with Los Angeles as the epicenter for particularly intense grassroots organizing. (15)

      The core legal problem confronting the home-care workers was their ambiguous and problematic employment status. California used a state agency, the In-Home Supportive Services ("IHSS"), to administer state monies for home care. (16) California argued that the workers are independent contractors, employed by the elderly and the disabled, (17) even though the state paid "the workers' wages and unemployment and disability insurance." (18) Without an employer, there was no employer entity with whom the union could purport to effectively negotiate. (19)

      In April 1988, workers demanded recognition of their SEIU Local 434, and sought Los Angeles County's acknowledgement of its status as their official employer. (20) The SEIU began negotiating with the Los Angeles county government, but in January 1989, California refused to recognize a collective bargaining agreement that had been reached by Los Angeles County and SEIU Local 434. (21) The union filed suit in California state court, demanding enforcement of the agreement. (22) In February 1989, the court ruled against the union, (23) and the California Court of Appeal upheld the ruling on appeal. (24) Restating the decision of the trial court, the Court found that because the county exercised little control over the home-care workers they could not be considered public employees. (25) As a result, the SEIU's initial legal attempt to force the county to bargain with them was judicially roadblocked. (26)

      Nevertheless, the union continued to endeavor to organize home-care workers throughout California. Lobbying led to the passage of bills that authorized the creation of county level public authorities. (27) These public authorities acted as employers of record with whom the unions could negotiate. (28) Section 12302.25 of the California Welfare & Institutions Code mandated that the counties act as, or establish, employer entities, subject to state labor laws by 2003, and expressly stated that the employer established by the county could collectively bargain with the home-care workers. (29)

      Over the course of the 1990s, the California counties created such authorities, enabling the home-care workers to collectively bargain and secure labor contracts, which culminated in the successful unionization of over 70,000 Los Angeles home-care workers in early . (30)

      Meanwhile, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") was splintered by the formation of the Change to Win coalition led by SEIU President Andy Stern, spurring intense organizational rivalry between the AFL's AFSCME and Change to Win's SEIU. (31) A developing AFSCME-SEIU conflict was resolved in September 2005, which led to the creation of the Pennsylvania and California-based United Child Care Union ("UCCU"). (32) The UCCU supported California legislation that would permit all child-care workers to unionize and collectively bargain, (33) as section 12302.25 of the California Welfare & Institutions Code granted collective bargaining rights to home health-care workers, but did not provide similar rights to child-care workers. (34) Governor Schwarzenegger, however, vetoed the legislation supported by the UCCU in September 2006 claiming that unionization and collective bargaining would strain the state budget and "make child-care too costly for low-income families that are not receiving child-care subsidies." (35) Assembly Bill 1164 would allow child-care providers to choose union representation. (36) This bill is currently before Governor Schwarzenegger, having passed the California Assembly and Senate in early September 2007. (37)

   2. Earlier Executive Orders

      Before Governor Spitzer signed Executive Order No. 12, five other governors signed analogous orders permitting the unionization or organization of child-care workers. The first among these was Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich who issued Executive Order 2005-1 on February 18, 2005. (38) The executive order permitted 49,000 child-care providers to bargain with the state through a union. (39) Six months after Blagojevich issued the order, legislation was passed that made subsidized child-care providers public employees of the state, but solely for the purpose of collective bargaining. (40)

      A brewing conflict between the SEIU and the AFSCME finally erupted after the governor's executive order. The SEIU maintained that it worked to organize Illinois' child-care providers for nine years prior to Blagojevich's executive order. (41) It alleged that AFSCME entered into the scene much more recently, and in essence was attempting to hijack the SEIU's organizing campaign. (42) During the election where the workers chose between the unions, the AFL-CIO resolved the dispute by ordering AFSCME to shut down its campaign. (43) Following this decision, the SEIU announced that it won the campaign, stating that it received 82% of the vote. (44)

      In December 2005, the SEIU reached an agreement with the state on its first contract. (45) The contract was a thirty-nine month deal that increased pay by 35%, and represented the first rate increase in seven years for child-care workers in Illinois. (46) Before the negotiation, approximately 75% of the workers received reimbursement rates of $9.48 per child per day. (47) Under the contract, the reimbursement rate was raised to $10.48 starting on April 1, 2006, and will be raised again to $12.75 in July 2008. (48) Additionally, some of the workers will gain health-care benefits in the third year of the contract, which will be paid out of a $27 million trust set up by the state. (49) The contract is estimated to cost Illinois approximately $250 million. (50) The cost was estimated to fall within the state's budget targets for the first fifteen months. (51)

      Following the lead of Illinois, Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski signed two separate executive orders allowing for the organization of child-care workers. (52)...