Organized Interests in Constitutional Assemblies

• Author: Ian M. Hartshorn
• Date: 01 June 2017
• Published date: 01 June 2017
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912917695190
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917695190

Political Research Quarterly

2017, Vol. 70(2) 408 –420

© 2017 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912917695190

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Article

Theory and Introduction

How does the method of organized interests’ inclusion in

constitution-drafting processes effect their capacity? This

paper argues that reserved seats on a constitutional assem-

bly are not a guarantee of a more labor-friendly constitu-

tion, and that in fact, not having reserved seats can

paradoxically benefit trade unions by forcing them to

engage other political actors, as happened in Egypt and

Tunisia, respectively. The outcome is surprising. If any-

thing, the reserved seats for “organized interests” should

have biased the constitutional process toward unions

according to most strains of liberal constitutional thought

(Ackerman 1994; Brown 2008). These findings also shed

light on the relative value of elected versus appointed

constitutional assemblies, and the potential emergence of

second-track constitutional negotiations. This topic

speaks to three intersecting sets of scholarly agendas:

constitutional components of democratization, labor in

critical junctures, and the political economy of the Arab

Uprisings. I hope to push forward an expanded research

agenda on mechanisms within constitution making,

which continues to be understudied (Elster 1995).

The last decade has seen thirty-six new national consti-

tutions written, while over a hundred new constitutions

have been crafted since the fall of the Soviet Union. While

social scientists have worked diligently to understand

organized and class interests in these new regimes,

their constitution-making processes remain opaque.

Constitutional tenure and the impact of constitutions on

democratization remain open questions. Recent evidence

suggests that organized interests, ranging from labor to

indigenous communities, can shape the context and con-

tent of new constitutions (Andolina 2003).1 Organized

interests’ exclusion from constitutional assemblies can

also have long-lasting consequences (Bajpai 2000).

Constitutional assemblies are an important feature of tran-

sitioning and consolidating regimes. Constitutions have

trended toward increasing length and complexity, poten-

tially affecting organized interests more than their prede-

cessor documents. Political scientists are increasingly

aware of the importance of constitutions in setting the

695190PRQXXX10.1177/1065912917695190Political Research QuarterlyHartshorn

research-article2017

1University of Nevada, Reno, USA

Corresponding Author:

Ian M. Hartshorn, Department of Political Science (MS 0302),

University of Nevada, Reno, 1664 N. Virginia Street, Reno, NV 89557,

USA.

Email: ihartshorn@unr.edu

Organized Interests in Constitutional

Assemblies: Egypt and Tunisia in

Comparison

Ian M. Hartshorn1

Abstract

How does the way organized interests are included in constitution-drafting processes effect their capacity? Two recent

examples of post-revolutionary constitution drafting in Egypt and Tunisia provide evidence that the way trade unions

are included in constitutional assemblies matters a great deal. These cases suggest that not just whether organized

interests are included in the constitution-drafting process but how impacts their long-term influence. Prior to the

revolutions, both countries used corporatist labor practices including hierarchical, exclusionary labor confederations

with close ties to the regime. Despite similar origins, labor-state relationships evolved differently. Tunisia’s Union

Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) enjoyed an “external” role and little formal challenge as interest aggregator

for trade unionists; Egypt’s Trade Union Federation (ETUF) faced challenges from independent trade unionists and

little influence in government. These differences can be seen through an understudied realm of contestation: the

constitutional assemblies. These outcomes are in part a result of the different ways these assemblies were crafted, and

the way trade unionists interacted with politicians as a result. This article is based on original fieldwork in Egypt and

Tunisia with politicians, trade unionists, and activists conducted between 2011 and 2014.

Keywords

constitutions, labor, democratization