Organized Armed Groups as Ruling Organizations

• Author: Peter Haldén
• Published date: 01 October 2018
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X17752908
• Date: 01 October 2018
• Subject Matter: Forum on Cohesion

Forum on Cohesion

Organized Armed

Groups as Ruling

Organizations

Peter Halde

´n

1

Abstract

Previous studies of the cohesion of organized armed groups (OAGs) have made

great progress, but they have mostly focused on units fighting for modern Western

states. I argue that the study of OAGs that contain their own legitimacy requires a

broadened theoretical framework. Such groups may be conceptualized as “ruling

organizations” in Max Weber’s terminology. Examples of such groups range from

early medieval warbands to modern militias and guerrillas. Members of ruling

organizations obey commands for a combination of three reasons: rational, tradi-

tional, and charismatic—these in turn form the basis of the legitimacy of the orga-

nization. Pinpointing the foundations of obedience in a group provides us with

another way of emphasizing weak points that we want to either target or reinforce.

This study contributes theoretically to the study of cohesion by linking it to theories

of legitimacy in political orders.

Keywords

cohesion/disintegration, military organization, sociology, political science

The understanding of cohesion in military units has made great advances. However,

I believe that there are dimensions that could be elaborated upon. This contribution

focuses on organized armed groups (OAGs) from other contexts than the modern

Western state and on the role of legitimacy. Barkawi (2015) has argued that debates

on military cohesion have suffered from being almost exclusively focused on

1

Forsvarshogskolan, Stockholm, Sweden

Corresponding Author:

Peter Halde

´n, Forsvarshogskolan, Drottning Kristinas va

¨g 37, Stockholm 114 28, Sweden.

Email: peter.halden@fhs.se

Armed Forces & Society

2018, Vol. 44(4) 606-625

ªThe Author(s) 2018

Article reuse guidelines:

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X17752908

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modern Western armies. Hence, the study of OAGs must be broadened theoretically.

This article advances a perspective on OAGs based on a reading of Max Weber’s

historical sociology.

1

Max Weber is probably most famous for his works on the

modern state and bureaucratic forms of organization. Scholars of war usually turn to

this side of Weber’s works (Centeno, 2002; Centeno & Enriquez, 2016; Tilly, 1992).

However, Weber also studied social formations other that states and did so with a

framework that I believe can be used to understand the formation, durability, and

breakdown of OAGs.

2

My adapted Weberian framework stresses the need to include

the legitimacy of the political order in the understanding of the cohesion of a fighting

group. Thereby the microlevel of social interaction, cohesion, can be linked to the

macrolevel of social structure, the legitimacy of the polity.

3

I do not seek to replace

previous theories but to add a new theoretical perspective that is mostly geared

toward understanding nonmodern and non-Western OAGs that function as ruling

organizations. However, it can add a layer to our understanding of combat motiva-

tion in military units operated by states.

My reading of Weber stresses the combinations of organizational forms that exist

in all organizations.

4

A focus on the multiple logics of organization and action that

exist simultaneously in a single organization allows a better understanding of its

driving forces as well as its inherent tensions and contradictions. Thereby we can

understand their strengths and weaknesses in relation to cohesion and survival. If we

can attain clearer knowledge of the social fabric that constitutes the cohesion of

armed groups, then more effective strategies can be devised against them. By under-

standing what makes groups fall apart, we can also better understand how to foster

cohesion in military organizations. In this article, I will not make hard distinctions

between different levels of analysis. The perspective that I am proposing could be

used for OAGs as well as states. Indeed, Malesˇevic´ (2002) used a modified version

of Weber’s framework to analyze the legitimacy of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Serbia.

This said, analyzing a state would be a more complex task than analyzing a militia or

a warband, and I thus cannot provide an example of a full analysis here.

The literature on cohesion is extensive and has focused on why units in modern

armies are effective (e.g., they perform collectively the tasks given to them) under

intense pressure. But what about entities where cohesion is linked to the stability of

the (proto) political system that they form? I believe that they can be conceptualized

with Weber’s concept ruling organizations (Herrschaftsverba¨nde). In brief, these

groups are orders that contain their own legitimacy. This trait is a sharp contrast to a

modern army unit. Its legitimacy and the authority of its leaders are derived from the

army and from the state. The cohesion of an army unit is interesting and important,

but if the unit breaks down, another one will replace it. OAGs are to a higher degree

self-sufficient in regard to legitimacy and authority. Thus, a corresponding unit of

analysis would be the army as a whole or even the state. Weber argued that authority

(e.g., the likelihood that commands will be obeyed) derives from three different

sources: rational bureaucratic, traditional, and charismatic grounds. All ruling orga-

nizations are compounds of these sources of authority, and by using these concepts

Halde

´n607