Organizational Economics.

• Position: Program and Working Group Meetings

Members of the NBER's Organizational Economics Working Group met April 12-13 in Cambridge. Research Associate Robert S. Gibbons of MIT organized the meeting. These researchers' papers were presented and discussed:

* Andrea Prat, Columbia University; Michael C. Best, Columbia University and NBER; and Adnan Khan and Oriana Bandiera, London School of Economics, "Incentives and the Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats"

* Devesh Rustagi, Goethe University Frankfurt, "Waiting for Napoleon? Historical Democracy and Norms of Cooperation"

* Mitchell Hoffman, University of Toronto and NBER; Guido Friebel and Nick Zubanov, Goethe University Frankfurt; and Matthias Heinz, University of Cologne, "What Do Employee Referral Programs Do?"

* Guo Xu, University of California, Berkeley; Marianne Bertrand, University of Chicago and NBER; and Robin Burgess, London School of Economics, "Social Proximity and Bureaucrat Performance: Evidence from India" (NBER Working Paper No. 25389)

* Daniel V. Barron and Yingni Guo, Northwestern University, "The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments"

* Oliver D. Hart, Harvard University and NBER, and David Frydlinger, Cirio Law Firm, "Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles"

* Daniela Scur, MIT, and Renata Lemos, The World Bank, "The Ties That Bind: Family CEOs, Management Practices and Firing Costs"

* Christian Zehnder, University...