Public Diplomacy or Propaganda? Targeted Messages and Tardy Corrections to Unverified Reporting

• Author: Robert Bejesky
• Position: M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), L.L.M. International Law (Georgetown)
• Pages: 967-1052

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OR PROPAGANDA? TARGETED

MESSAGES AND TARDY CORRECTIONS TO UNVERIFIED

REPORTING

ROBERT BEJESKY*

I. INTRODUCTION

Having rapidly risen to the spotlight, public diplomacy is being labeled

by scholars as a new field of international relations.1 Although it is natural

for a government to frame issues of public concern,2 attempt to “shape

international rules that are consistent with its interests and values,” and

persuade perceptions so that foreign policy “actions . . . appear legitimate

in the eyes of others,”3 controversy has arisen. The “spirited

debates . . . among analysts and practitioners” over how to interpret public

diplomacy might best be epitomized by Professor Bruce Gregory’s inquiry:

whether the term “public diplomacy is code for propaganda.”4 Indeed, if

recipients view the state purveyor’s message favorably, crafted discourse

designed to influence international relations may be labeled public

diplomacy.5 Alternatively, a gove rnment that more cl early engages in a

Copyright © 2012, Robert Bejesky.

* M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), L.L.M.

International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught courses in International Law at

Cooley Law School and for the Department of Political Science at the University of

Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law at Alma College, and Business

Law at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami.

1 See Bruce Gregor y, Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field, ANNALS AM.

ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., March 2008, at 274, 274–75 (noting that the term public diplomacy

was adopted in the 1970s and now sees widespread use throughout the world).

2 See Michael T. Wawrzycki, Language, Morals, and Conceptual Frameworks in

Dispute Resolution: Establishing, Employing, and Managing the Logos, 8 CARDOZO J.

CONFLICT RESOL. 209, 215 (2006) (explaining that framing “allows one to manipulate the

choice alternatives another has in its disco urse, and therefore enables the framer to

influence how others think and to obtain their consent without ever even giving the

impression that one is attempting to be persuasive”).

3 JOSEPH NYE, SOFT POWER 10–11 (2004).

4 Gregory, supra note 1, at 275.

5 See id. (noting that the term public diplomacy was adopted to avoid the negative

connotations of the term “propaganda”).

968 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [40:967

“deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate

cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response” from the recipient

may be “propagandizing.”6 This article considers definitional particulars

by examining the accuracy of a government’s message and the identified

target audience.

First, clearly false government messages should not be regarded as

public diplomacy because they violate principles of comity and trust in

international relations.7 However, there is a deeper and frequently

overlooked consideration. If a government employs self-interested

advocacy on an issue of public concern, but data underlying the advocacy

are ultimately false and remain uncorrected until the issue becomes stale,8

perhaps the negative cognitive impact on recipients during this interim

period should also disqualify the discourse from being called public

diplomacy. One might even deduce gradations in the sender-government’s

false statements by applying tort law taxonomy. For example, fraud occurs

when statements are known to be untrue; misrepresentations involve

concealing material facts that would have made the discourse false; and

negligent misrepresentations are statements made in careless disregard of

their accuracy or without reasonable grounds for believing the

representations to be true.9

Second, while a government may specify a target audience and label

the message, thereby tacitly identifying the type of dissemination and

intent for that message, the target audience is no longer isolated with

today’s global media.10 Information diffusion may even obviate

differentiation between foreign and domestic audiences. Cursorily,

enumerating a target recipient may inject a biasing heuristic that permits

6 GARTH S. JOWETT & VICTO RIA O’DONNEL L, PROPAGANDA & PERSUASION 7 (5th ed.

2011) (emphasis removed).

7 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20) (“One of the

basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their

source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-

operation . . . .”).

8 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1050 (2d ed. 1988) (noting

that when the government delays publication of important stories, it deprives the stories of

their timely news value.).

9 CAL CIV. CODE § 1710; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1976); Gagne v.

Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (Cal. 1954).

10 John H. Johns, Foreign Policy, National Security, and Nation Building, 6 REGENT J.

INT’L L. 313, 359 (2008).

2012] PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OR PROPAGANDA? 969

overlooking or extenuating attributes of the message that might otherwise

be unacceptable for “unintended” target audiences. What may be called

public diplomacy for a foreign audience, and presented as a message that

the nation champions may in fact be controversial, unsubstantiated, or

polarizing. Likewise, a message relayed to the domestic audience may

portray rather unified foreign approval when the message is polemical.

Given that this new field of international relations seemingly arose in

conjunction with, if not substantially due to, the invasion and occupation of

Iraq,11 this article categorizes post-invasion information examples to

substantiate the tardy correction hypothesis and the multiple-recipient

distinction. The research distinguishes among government statements

provided by media from within the United States, from Iraq but

disseminated to Americans, and from Iraq but intended for Iraqi and

foreign audiences. The analysis is further sub-categorized by substantive

message—namely that one of the following possible reasons for invasion

was met: (1) that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in

violation of United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolutions; (2) that

Iraq had ties to al-Qaeda;12 or (3) that Iraqis required liberation from

Sadaam Hussein’s regime.13

II. SHAPING AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS

A. Instilling Patriotism

Prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Administration of President George

W. Bush routed the course for military action against Iraq by imbuing the

media with several months of security threats.14 The nation later learned

that Iraq neither had WMDs nor had connections to al-Qaeda, and that

allegations were carelessly made.15 Even as allegations were presented,

11 See Gregory, supra note 1, at 284 (noting that terrorism and the Iraq War have been

driving current research on government, media, and public relationships).

12 Because the name “al-Qaeda” has been translated from Arabic to E nglish by various

sources, it is spelled differently among the many translations. This article refers to “al-

Qaeda”; however, other acceptable spellings include: “al Qaeda,” “al-Qaida,” “al-Qa’ida,”

and “Al Qaeda.” These alternates are maintained when quoted from other sources

referenced in this article. All variations refer to the same group.

13 Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections Lessons Learned: Evidentiary Presumptions

and Burdens of Proof, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 295, 304–12, 358, 360 (2011).

14 Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 44

CREIGHTON L. REV. 811, 855–56 (201 1).

15 Id. at 858–63.