Opting Out: A Defense of Social Justice.

• Author: Otteson, James R.
• Position: Critical essay

Because "social justice" allegedly makes the mistake of maintaining that the "results of the spontaneous ordering of the market" are instead the result of "some thinking being [having] directed them," F. A. Hayek argues that it is worse than a conceptual error: it is "nonsense, like the term 'moral stone"' (1976, 62, 78). Hayek may have thought he put a stake through the heart of all talk of social justice, yet reference to and use of the term social justice have not abated since he wrote these words; if anything, they seem to have increased. Hayek has a point that neither formal nor informal institutions enforce themselves and that the patterns of choice and allocation of resources that we see in fact result from the decisions of individuals--who are therefore individually, not collectively, accountable. Nevertheless, his insistence

that we may criticize only individuals' particular decisions, not the overall results of many individuals' decisions, seems like idiosyncratic preference--in other words, prescriptivist, even rationalistic. The meaning of terms is determined by their use, and although we may stipulate a term's meaning based on consistent use or for the sake of argument, no one has the authority to fix, once and for all, the meaning of any term. Unfortunately for Hayek, then, the discussion of social justice is not closed.

In this brief essay, I propose to do three principal things. First, I provide a bit of background for why discussions of social justice often seem inconclusive. I then indicate why we should care about social justice, despite recurring definitional difficulties, and point out what I take to be some confusion in discussions of social justice. Finally, I draw on some arguments David Hume and Adam Smith offer in support of a commercial society to propose and defend my own conception of social justice.

Background on Social Justice

Hayek's discussion of social justice seems to generate a problematic not unlike what Plato describes in Euthyphro. Socrates was on his way to stand trial for impiety and corruption of youth, a trial for which, if found guilty, he could face anything from fines to exile to execution--and, of course, Socrates was ultimately convicted and put to death. The philosophical action of Euthyphro centers on Socrates's discussion of the notion of piety with the young man Euthyphro. Euthyphro is bringing his father up on charges of impiety--which could have similarly grave potential outcomes for his father if convicted--and so Socrates suggests that because Euthyphro is taking such an extraordinary step regarding his own father, then Euthyphro must know what impiety is. Socrates professes not to know what piety and impiety are, and because he, too, is facing a charge of impiety, he proposes to make himself Euthyphro's "pupil" in the hopes of coming to understand exactly what he is up against (Plato 2002, 5, 5a). There ensues an examination of several possible definitions of piety and impiety, all of which are found wanting. The dialogue ends with Euthyphro tiring of the embarrassment he suffers at Socrates's hands for not being able to produce a sound definition. Though Socrates wants to continue the discussion, Euthyphro decides simply to leave, and the dialogue ends inconclusively.

In later writings, Plato would articulate explicitly what is implicit in Euthyphro--namely, that for each term there is a single eternal essence, an Ideal or Form, from which the term gets its meaning and to which all proper uses of the term must refer. (1) If one is skeptical, however, about the existence of Platonic unchanging transcendent anchors for terms, then Hayek's criticism of the use of the term social justice begins to ring hollow. It sounds more like a plea to use justice the way he would prefer because he prefers not to use social justice at all. Fair enough, but others might have different preferences.

Nevertheless, there seem to be two recurring problems facing contemporary discussions of social justice. The first is that there is in fact no generally accepted, standard definition of the term. People apply the term social justice to many different things and to different kinds of things, so in arguing about it, they often end up talking past each other. The second and potentially weightier problem is that many of the various applications of the term do connect to and rely on one particular aspect of a standard conception of justice--namely, that it implies enforcement. So the issue concerns not just differences of opinion about how resources should be allocated, what virtue requires, what public institutions we should have, or how people should be treated. Rather, the issue is that the use of the term social justice, like the use of impiety in Socrates's time, entails either applying coercive mechanisms to enforce one view over another or endorsing punishment for incorrect behaviors or outcomes. The latter problem raises the stakes of the discussion: if something is a failure of social justice, then that means someone should be punished or made to pay. But if we are considering taking the significant step of punishing people or making them pay, then the former problem--definition--becomes more acute as well: we had better know what we are punishing or making them pay for.

Why Care about Social Justice?

There are many things one might find disagreeable in the world; some of them one might even consider unjust. An example of the latter might be the presence of large inequality: some countries are richer than others, and some people are richer than others. In some cases, the differences in wealth are huge: one hundred to one, one thousand to one, and even greater. A natural question is "Why?" Why are some countries richer than others? Why are some people richer, so much richer, than others?

But the question "Why?" has at least two senses. It might mean "How come?" and it might mean "What for?" The two are not the same thing. "How come?" asks for a process explanation: What are the historical mechanical or chemical or biological (etc.) causes that brought the situation, circumstance, eventuality (etc.) in question into being? By contrast, "What for?" asks for an intention explanation: Why did people do what they did? (2) The former, in other words, typically asks for a descriptive, empirical explanation involving no intent; the latter asks for a purposeful explanation of intent. The former, not being subject to rational action or autonomous judgment, admits of no moral judgment: it just is. (Why does the earth revolve around the sun? Because of gravity. Why is there gravity? Because there is.) The latter is the result of someone's--or of several someones', sometimes acting in concert or coordination, sometimes not--taking deliberate action that he or she or they could have chosen not to take: it is a result of moral agency and thus admits of moral judgment. (Why was the bank robbed? Because that person or those people chose to rob it.)

It is important to keep these two categories of "why" questions separate. Otherwise, one runs the risk of categorical confusion. It can lead us to ask the "What for?" behind blind physical processes (processes, in other words, for which there is no "What for?") and to ascribe purpose and intention where none exists. Sometimes things happen unpredictably and unforeseeably, and no one is to blame (or credit). Why did the tornado strike here? Why did the hurricane strike then? Why did the flash floods hit exactly when the group of Thai soccer players happened to be hiking, stranding them inside a flooded cave? If by asking "Why?" we want...