Operational Challenges in Ground Operations in Urban Areas: An IDF Perspective.

AuthorAlon, Nitsan
PositionIsrael Defense Forces - Special Issue: The Law of Armed Conflict

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 737 II. THE NECESSITY FOR GROUND OPERATIONS IN 738 URBAN AREAS III. OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITIES IN GROUND 744 OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS A. Maneuvering 744 B. The Subterranean Factor 750 C. Civilian Presence and Infrastructure 753 D. Target Identification 756 IV. THE IDF RESPONSE 759 V. CONCLUSION 762 I. INTRODUCTION

The Israel Defense Forces (the IDF) is well versed in conducting ground operations. Since its inception along with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the IDF has conducted a number of ground operations, as part of conflicts both long and short, against various actors, and in different circumstances. The Independence War of 1948, the Six Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 provided experience with ground operations against organized state militaries. The large-scale maneuver in the First Lebanon War of 1982 and the more limited maneuver in the Second Lebanon War of 2006 are examples of ground operations against non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in the territory of other states. And the limited maneuvers in the Gaza Conflicts of 2008-09 and 2014 are examples of ground operations against NSAGs operating in territory under their full control.

In the more recent of these conflicts the IDF's operations have been increasingly drawn into the urban terrain. This, together with the manner in which our adversaries exploit such surroundings to their advantage, has presented a number of challenges and complexities that do not generally arise in ground operations divorced from the civilian context. On the basis of the IDF's experience with such operations, this Article intends to explain the necessity of ground operations as part of warfare occurring in the urban terrain (Part II), to consider some of the operational complexities involved in such operations (Part III), and to briefly and partially present the IDF's response to such challenges (Part IV).

  1. THE NECESSITY FOR GROUND OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS

    Ground operations in urban areas generate unique tactical, humanitarian, and political challenges.

    Ask any experienced and educated military commander, and he or she will tell you that the urban battlefield presents the most complex tactical challenges of any of the possible battle arenas. This is not true only of present day conflicts. A brief study of the Battle of Stalingrad in World War II, the Battles of the Suez Canal in 1956 or the First Battle of Grozny in 1994, for example, will demonstrate clearly how the urban theater makes warfare exceedingly difficult and decisive victory elusive. Physical structures limit movement, reduce the range of means available, conceal enemy positions, prior-emplaced explosives, military assets, and movement, and increase the spaces from which attacks may emanate. Every single structure has the potential to be a military asset and pose a threat to the advancing forces. The very deployment of forces into combat exposes them to harm--both direct harm from fire as well as through other means (such as abduction)--and all the more so in the confined spaces of the urban theater. (1) Essentially, urban surroundings encumber the ability of forces to achieve their mission.

    Ground operations in urban areas also create humanitarian challenges, as the presence of hostilities necessarily creates risks for the populace, and forces are required to factor in such risks to their actions as well as to adapt when such risk translates into actual instances of civilian harm. This is particularly so for militaries such as the IDF, whose ethics include mitigating the risk of harm to civilians as much as possible. Civilian risk of harm is not an element that we wish to--or can--ignore when conducting operations. This includes mitigating the risk of damage to civilian infrastructure as well, such as sewerage and water services--both because the continued functioning of infrastructure reduces the risk that civilians will expose themselves to harm by searching for access to such services, and also because it means our forces will need to divert less resources to providing or facilitating such services. Yet the need to exercise substantial force to achieve the mission and to preserve one's forces is oftentimes at odds with the desire to minimize the risk of civilian harm and damage to the surroundings, creating significant challenges.

    Finally, ground operations also incur political costs--in the very decision to send one's soldiers into harm's way, in the risk that the withdrawal of ground forces from the battlefield will be perceived as surrender or retreat, and in the risk of criticism (both internally and internationally) regarding civilian harm. In today's world, conflicts are also fought in the realm of public opinion and international fora--adding additional elements to achieving "mission completion" such as retaining international legitimacy and avoiding harm to the state's stature. (2)

    Thus, it is perhaps not for nothing that many democratic states are reluctant to put "boots on the ground" and have generally limited themselves to aerial and stand-off operations alone, even when it comes at a price. (3) Indeed, why do states send their militaries to conduct ground operations in urban areas at all?

    First, there are tactical aims that can only be achieved by introducing forces on the ground. Some military objectives and capabilities cannot be neutralized from the air--an aerial attack on a specific point on a tunnel, for example, will not prevent the continued use of other branches of the tunnel or diverting its route around the damaged part (see Figure 1). Rather, engineering forces are required to map out and lay explosives across the full length of the tunnel. Even where specific military objectives can be attacked from the air, military interests and tactics may require alternative action. Consider a conflict in which the adversary operates arrays of dispersed rocket launchers. (4) In such a situation, aerial operations may be able to target individual launches upon their identification, but ground forces can disrupt their entire operation by uncovering the central command room, engaging militants and forcing their retreat, or simply disrupting their freedom of movement by virtue of their presence in the adversary's area of operations.

    Second, ground operations also allow for conducting activities beyond kinetic targeting, such as capture or detaining missions and intelligence gathering missions (be it reconnaissance or the capture of physical objects or documents).

    Third, unlike aerial operations, ground operations facilitate action where intelligence is unavailable. From the air, attacks are generally conducted based on specific intelligence indicating a target. Where such intelligence does not exist, aerial assets become less effective, and they can only locate what they can see from the air. Ground forces, however, facilitate uncovering and locating the adversary's assets without specific intelligence and allow for uncovering assets located within buildings or underground. Aerial assets see the battlefield in two dimensions, ground forces operate within three.

    Fourth, ground operations also provide operational flexibility for commanders in that they increase the range of tactical decisions available--such as conducting targeted raids into different areas of enemy activity, attacking the enemy at places where attacks are not expected, cutting off supply lines, and the like. The enemy constantly seeks to learn the opposing side's methods and capabilities, and to circumvent them. For example, Hamas learned to place rocket and mortar launchers under tents and underground in order to avoid detection from the air (see Figure 2), as well as to create distance between the launchers and those operating them to avoid attack on the operators. Against such actions, aerial operations are rendered less effective, requiring ground forces to reach and uncover such assets.

    Fifth, ground operations may serve a strategic purpose that cannot be obtained through aerial operations. For example, if the state orders the military to decisively and completely defeat the adversary, then it is almost certain that presence on the ground will be required in order to wrest control from the adversary and ensure their ouster. Aerial attacks may weaken the adversary's assets and disturb their operations, but they will likely not be the deciding factor in a full victory over the adversary. (7) Strategic interests may require cutting off a key transport route or controlling a port, the sorts of acts that require physical presence. Ground operations in or near the adversary's power centers may also serve wider strategic interests, such as pressuring them to cease attacks or bringing them to the negotiating table. (8)

    Sixth, humanitarian considerations may, in some cases, weigh in favor of ground operations. In certain circumstances ground operations may result in reduced risk of civilian harm and damage, as ground forces have the capacity to exercise more pointed force such as rifle fire, (9) and may be able to better determine civilian presence in the battlefield than solely through aerial assets and other sensors.

    The nature of Israel's armed conflicts demonstrate the necessity for deploying ground forces. All of Israel's conflicts--old and new--have taken place on or within Israel's borders. A small country with a narrow waist (see Figure 3), Israel has limited strategic depth, meaning that these conflicts have had a direct and significant impact on the civilian population and have in some cases posed threats to the state.

    This means that when the IDF identifies an attack being planned or carried out, it must act swiftly and decisively in order to remove the threat that such an attack inevitably presents to Israel's homefront. In doing so, the IDF must employ whatever means will remove the threat as quickly as possible--often ground forces...

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