Opaque transparency: an analysis of the Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008

• Author: Albert Veksler
• Date: 01 November 2012
• Published date: 01 November 2012
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.431

■Academic Paper

Opaque transparency: an analysis of the

Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008

Albert Veksler*

Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

After some failed attempts to regulate the lobbying, the Israeli Parliament—the Knesset—passed the Lobbyist Law o n

April 2nd 2008. Although lobbying is a common and legitimate part of the democratic process, it raises issues of trust,

equality of access, and transparency. What motivated the MKs to regulate lobbying—public interest, privateinterest, or

symbolic politics? The MKs claimed that the law was needed for improving transparency whereas MK Yechimovich

declared that it balances the strength of the rich, represented by lobbyists and the wide public. Assessing the achieved

transparency inthe comparative framework of other lobbying regulatory regimes, we see that the law confers tangible

benefits on powerful interestgroups, while providingonly symbolic gesturesto the public. Lack of information available

for MKscreates a need for lobbyistsfor political intelligenceand MKs need toidentify the interestsin play to guarantee for

themselves thenecessary legislative subsidy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords: Lobbying regulations, Israel

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE

REVIEW

Lobbying is practiced by a wide variety of organiza-

tions and in virtually every issue area imaginable.

Nownes (2006, pp. 2–7) defines lobbying as an effort

designed to affect what the government does,

defines organized interest as an organization that

engages in activity designed to affect what the

government does, and defines a lobbyist as a person

who lobbies on behalf of an organized interest or

numerous organized interests.

Chari et al. (2010, p. 4) explain that the regulations

represent a set of codified formal rules, which are

passed by parliament, and often written in law that

must be respected, and which are enforced. The latter

point suggests that the risk that lobbyists run in not

complying with the rules results in penalization,

whether that is a fine or, potentially, a jail sentence.

Geraats (2002, p. 562) claims that there are benefits

associated with transparency, such as bettering the

democratic quality of life and making citizens less

apathetic towards the world of politics.

McGrath (2009a,pp. 265, 266) argues that lobbying

poses certain dangers and challenges, and therefore,

the lobbying regulation is an essential precondition

to a well-functioning democracy. Who lobbies on

behalf of who, through what means, and to what

effect, are the questions to be asked. Another area of

particular concern is the so-called revolving door

practice, whereby an individual will move over the

course of his or her career betweena variety of public

and private sector posts.

RATIONALE FOR THE LOBBYING

REGULATION

The classical public interest theory is viewed both as

a positive theory about what motivates policy

makers and as a normative theory about what

should motivate them. The theory posits political

actors who act, sometimes perhaps mistakenly, to

further a vision of the public good or public interest

(Levine and Forrence, 1990: pp. 167–169).

In contrastto the ‘public interest’theory,t hereexists

the ‘capture,’or ‘special interest’theory of regulatory

behavior. Levine and Forrence (1990, pp. 169–170)

explain that in this model, government regulation

*Correspondence to: Albert Veksler, Hebrew University in

Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

E-mail: albert.veksler@mail.huji.ac.il

†

I owe great thanks to those who discussed with me the ideas in

this Article, which was based on my MA thesis paper. Special

thanks to my supervisors Dr. Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan and

professor David Levi-Faur from the Federmann School of Public

Policy and Government of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I

benefited greatlyfrom their insight and commentaries.

Journal of Public Affairs

Volume 12 Number 4 pp 270–278 (2012)

Published online 10 November 2011 in Wiley Online Library

(www.wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.431

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.