Online boilerplate: would mandatory website disclosure of e-standard terms backfire?
| Date | 01 March 2006 |
| Author | Hillman, Robert A. |
TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. THE E-STANDARD-FORM ENVIRONMENT A. Do Consumers Read Their E-Standard Forms? B. Can Market Pressure Discipline E-Businesses? II. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF MANDATORY WEBSITE DISCLOSURE III. WILL MANDATORY WEBSITE DISCLOSURE BACKFIRE? A. Will Mandatory Website Disclosure Alleviate Market Failures? 1. Disclosure as a Method of Increasing Reading 2. Watchdog Groups B. Legal Ramifications of Mandatory Website Disclosure When Consumers Do Not Read and Shop CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION
A law backfires when it produces results opposite from those its drafters intended. (1) Lots of laws may have backfired. For example, people opposed to hate crimes legislation think that the laws "inflame prejudice rather than eradicate it." (2) The Endangered Species Act, according to some analysts, has helped destroy rather than preserve the creatures listed by the Act. (3) Even consumer protection laws, some believe, increase prices and confuse consumers instead of protecting them. (4)
This Article analyzes whether mandatory website disclosure of e-standard terms, advocated by some as a potential solution to market failures when consumers contract over the Internet, is another potential legal backfire. By mandatory website disclosure, I do not mean a "clickwrap" presentation of terms, in which a consumer must click "I agree" or the like on a screen presenting the terms prior to the completion of a transaction in progress. (5) Mandatory website disclosure would require a business to maintain an Internet presence and to post its terms prior to any particular transaction so that a consumer could read and compare terms without making a purchase at all.
The problem is not that mandatory website disclosure would increase the cost of doing business, which would be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Businesses have been unable to demonstrate that displaying their terms on their websites would be costly. (6) Nor should drafting rules that implement the law be too difficult. (7)Businesses could be required to display their terms on their homepage or on another page reachable directly through a clearly identified hyperlink. Further, businesses could be required to prove the availability of their terms by furnishing relatively inexpensive archival records of their websites. Mandatory website disclosure may backfire, however, because it may not increase reading or shopping for terms or motivate businesses to draft reasonable ones, but instead, may make heretofore suspect terms more likely enforceable. (8)
Part I reviews why market forces may fail adequately to police standard forms on the Internet. It summarizes previous work in which I report that, despite the relative luxury of time and the lack of sales pressure, consumers generally do not read their e-standard forms presented during a transaction beyond price and the description of the goods and rarely shop for terms. (9) As a result, market pressure may be insufficient to deter some businesses from overreaching.
Part II shows that mandatory website disclosure as a remedy for market failure is worthy of a focused analysis because its surface attractiveness means that lawmakers are likely to adopt it. Mandatory website disclosure is appealing because, in theory, it would increase the numbers of readers of and shoppers for standard terms, who would have time to contemplate and compare terms, or, at least, it would increase the opportunity to read and shop for terms. Further, mandatory website disclosure would help motivate businesses to write fair terms in order to avoid losing customers to competitors with better terms or to avoid adverse publicity from watchdog groups that can monitor websites and spread the word about unreasonable terms quickly and easily over the Internet. Mandatory website disclosure, therefore, arguably would promote reasonable terms, decrease the instances of market failure, and legitimize the idea that e-purchasers have assented, at least impliedly, to the terms. (10) Further, mandatory website disclosure would not be too expensive or administratively infeasible. (11)
Part III addresses whether mandatory website disclosure can succeed. Despite its appeal, I worry that it may not achieve its objectives, or worse, may backfire. My preliminary empirical work on e-consumer reading of standard forms, as well as studies of e-shopping behavior, suggests that advance disclosure of terms likely will fail to increase reading or shopping for terms. (12) This should be no surprise. Despite the opportunity to read, most e-consumers may still have ample rational reasons for not reading and cognitive processes that deter reading and processing terms. (13) In addition, e-consumers, drawn to the speed and novelty of the Internet, are unlikely to have the patience or discipline to compare terms regardless of when the terms become available. Further, watchdog groups may not positively motivate businesses because they may lack influence and because businesses may conclude that the benefits of particular terms outweigh any potential costs in adverse publicity.
In light of the potential failure of mandatory website disclosure to increase reading and to discipline businesses, the only effects of the proposal may be to insulate businesses from claims of procedural unconscionability and to create a safe harbor for businesses to draft suspect terms. My goal is not to claim that mandatory website disclosure will certainly backfire so that the proposal should be taken off the table. In fact, I conclude that mandatory website disclosure ultimately may be the most viable alternative. I simply want to elaborate on the reasons that the possibility of backfire should be taken seriously before moving in the direction of mandatory website disclosure.
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THE E-STANDARD-FORM ENVIRONMENT
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Do Consumers Read Their E-Standard Forms?
Professor Rachlinski and I maintained that the e-standard-form environment presented consumers with several advantages:
Several factors suggest that consumers can defend themselves against undesirable terms more easily in the electronic environment. E-consumers can shop in the privacy of their own homes, where they can make careful decisions with fewer time constraints. They can leave their computers and return before completing their transactions, giving them time to think and investigate further. Also, at present, e-consumers tend to be better educated and wealthier than paper-world consumers, suggesting that they can better fend for themselves in the marketplace. The Internet has also taken comparison shopping to a level that is unimaginable in the real world. The ease with which consumers can compare business practices, including the content of standard forms, suggests that consumers do not need judicial intervention to protect themselves from business abuse. (14) Notwithstanding these benefits, we saw several pitfalls for consumers in the e-world, consisting of either rational, cognitive, or social reasons for failing to read terms or to consider them in their decisions. Some of the rational reasons coincide with paper-world barriers to reading, such as boilerplate's lack of lucidity, consumers' lack of bargaining power and choices, and the relative likelihood that nothing will go wrong. (15) In addition, the e-environment adds to the futility of reading because of the lack of a live contracting partner and the time and effort necessary to locate terms that e-businesses can easily hide. (16) In short, e-consumers may rationally compare the costs and benefits of reading terms and find a net benefit in spending their time on another activity.
Cognitive reasons for failing to read and process terms also coincide with those in the paper world. These include consumers' propensity to equate "low probability" risks with "zero probability" risks, (17) and their tendencies to digest a limited quantity of information and to rely instead on hunches and processes that simplify decisionmaking. (18) For these reasons, terms that apply when things go wrong, such as dispute resolution and forum selection, especially may not be salient to consumers. (19)
On the surface, the e-environment appears to favor e-consumers by eliminating social pressures such as hovering sales agents and impatient people in line. (20) However, Rachlinski and I pointed out that the e-environment substitutes other hurdles to reading and processing terms. E-consumers may not attach appropriate significance to a mouse click and therefore may fail to appreciate the seriousness of their actions. (21) Further, computers and the Internet appear to cast a spell over many consumers, making them impatient, even impetuous. (22) We used the term "click-happy" to describe the activity of many consumers contemplating e-standard forms. (23)
In light of these factors, Rachlinski and I predicted that e-consumers were just as unlikely to read and shop for standard terms as their paper-world counterparts, who, by and large, ignore their standard forms and fail to shop for favorable terms. (24) Preliminary empirical evidence from my forthcoming survey of ninety-two contracts students bears out this prediction. (25) Beyond price and product description, only four percent of the sample read their e-purchase contracts "as a general matter." (26) Further, forty-four percent of the respondents reported affirmatively that, other than price and product description, they do not read their e-purchase contracts under any circumstances. (27) One-third of the respondents may be spurred on to read when the value of the contract is high, and one-third may read when the vendor is unknown. (28) About seventeen percent read some selected terms, mainly warranties, product information, disclosures, and warnings. (29) Impatience accounts most often for the failure of respondents to read their forms, reinforcing the image of the "click-happy" consumer. (30) Finally, only seven percent of...
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