One party, many 'vassals': revival of regionalism in China and governance challenges of the party state.

AuthorSong, Weiqing
PositionEssay

Nationalization of Chinese Regions

Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), a popular and influential newspaper in China focusing on international news, introduced the concept of Quanguohua (nationalization of the entire country) in two editorials in January 2011, on the eve of the Spring Festival--the traditional Chinese New Year ("Quanguohua" 2011; "To Build a National Consensus" 2011). The editorials assert that China is undergoing a process of nationalizing socioeconomic standards within its own territory to reduce the urban-rural gap and regional disparities. Moreover, the process is so tremendous and profound that it is comparable to, if not greater than, that of globalization. Truly, the challenge of regional differences and inequality is most vividly reflected in the annual Chunyun (Spring Festival travel season), when several hundred million people travel to their hometowns for family reunions and for the traditional Chinese New Year celebrations.

The concept of Quanguohua highlights an increasingly serious problem in China: regional heterogeneity in development. In fact, regional differences and disparities in China are not a new phenomenon. In socioeconomic terms, the coastal areas in eastern and southern China have been more prosperous than the other parts of the country, in particular the interior regions, and the disparities between the rich and poor regions have been exacerbated over the past three decades. An Economist article published in February 2011 (All the parities in China 2011) compared Chinese provinces with different countries and showed how these provinces differ considerably from one another in terms of total gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, population, and exports. Some provinces themselves would rank fairly high in the global league. For example, Guangdong's GDP ($665 billion at market exchange rates) is almost as high as that of Indonesia ($703.2 billion); the output of both Jiangsu ($596 billion) and Shandong ($574 billion) exceeds that of Switzerland ($527.9 billion); Guangdong ($362.4 billion) and Jiangsu ($207.5 billion) export as much as South Korea ($363.5 billion) and Taiwan ($203.7 billion), respectively; and Shanghai's GDP per person ($22,983) is as high as that of Saudi Arabia ($22,850)--at purchasing power parity. On the other extreme, one of the poorest provinces, Guizhou, has an income per head ($3,335 that closely matches that of India ($3,480).

In fact, these regional differences have been evident for a long period, and since 1998 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) consistently publishes an annual report on China's national human development. A persistent issue highlighted in the report is regional disparity. It is vividly represented in a table comparing the Human Development Index (HDI) of Chinese provinces (see, e.g., UNDP 2010, 132). There is a huge difference between high-HDI provinces and low-HDI ones. The HDI of Shanghai, for example, is equivalent to that of Portugal, whereas the HDI of Tibet, one of the poorest regions in China, is similar to that of Laos. In between are a few provinces that are on par with the level of high-HDI countries, but most other provinces fall into the medium-HDI category. Thus, we observe a China that has an uneasy collection of heterogeneous regions.

More profound, the issues of regional differences and disparities have raised a fundamental problem in China: the lack of nationwide coherence and the governance challenges faced by the central government. China has long been recognized as a unitary state with a high degree of centralization and homogeneity. However, the call for China's nationalization by Huanqiu Shibao, which is also affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), warns us that this view may be a very superficial understanding of the country. The massive intrastate migrations alone indicate that China is not as homogenous as we perceive it to be.

Furthermore, the name "Quanguohua" is not a new invention, as the editorials claim. It refers to the existence of Chinese regionalism in the process of nation building, a topic long addressed by political scholars. China indeed exhibits a serious problem of segregation along socioeconomic and administrative dimensions. Contemporary China is a country of various regional "vassals"--not to be confused with the European feudal subordinate owing allegiance to a lord, but rather a number of regional lords who are almost autonomous, usually compete against one another, and sometimes challenge the imperial authority. These "vassals" are only interwoven by the encompassing CCP. The segregated features of China and its severe consequences are largely attributable to the often acclaimed "China Model" of state development, which is a hybrid of the strictly controlled party state and the incorporation of a partial market economy. The paradox is further compounded by historical legacies of ancient empires and the incomplete building of a modern nation-state. The CCP finds itself faced with ever-demanding challenges.

Reemergence of Chinese Regional "Vassals"

The stereotypical view of China is that it has had a long history of centralization ever since the reign of Qin Shi Huang, the first Chinese emperor, more than two thousand years ago; moreover, this centralized characteristic was strengthened after the Communist regime assumed power in 1949. However, veteran historians of Chinese studies may remind us that the ancient Chinese empires frequently struggled to bind the different parts of the country (Lu 2011, 76, 167, 250, 537; Huang 2007, 7989, 127-137, 142-144, 224-226, 295-299). Some careful observers of contemporary China may further argue that, in reality, not only regional differences and disparities but also regional segregation and autonomy exist in this apparently centralized state.

Indeed, regionalism has been a recurrent issue in Chinese history. In imperial China, the relationship between the central government and its different regions was complicated, and the country was constantly oscillating between unification and disintegration. This relationship of mutual interaction was interrupted only when the Communist regime came into power.

In the first decades of its rule, the CCP instituted a very strict governance mode in China, covering all aspects of social life from personal affairs to the national economy. However, this typical Stalinist style was unsustainable, and the country was almost on the brink of bankruptcy in 1976 following the Cultural Revolution and other social and political upheavals. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Chinese leadership decided to undertake a strategic transformation by implementing the policy Gaige Kaifang (Reform and Opening Up).

A revival of Chinese regionalism began when the Chinese central government steadily delegated increasing powers to provincial and local governments in order to introduce the so-called socialist market economy. China vaguely defined the role of regional governments and the relationship and division of power between the central and regional governments in the Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the People's Republic of China in 1979 and the revised Constitution of 1982. Therefore, the readjustment of the central-regional relationship and process of decentralization are subject to the discretion of the CCP's leadership, which is largely arbitrary and changeable.

Economic regulation is key to this decentralization policy. The regional governments have been granted substantial powers in economic matters...

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