One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict.

• Author: Opp, Karl-Dieter

A wave of brutal wars has followed the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, such barbaric events are hardly unusual--the Holocaust is the most horrible example from recent history. In such events, large numbers of individuals act on behalf of groups. Russell Hardin's recent book, One for All, "is an effort to understand the motivations of those who act on behalf of groups and to understand how they come to identify with the groups for which they act" (p. 4).

The book is not a historical work intended to describe specific ethnic conflicts, although it presents many details; rather, it is primarily an attempt to explain those conflicts. For this purpose, Hardin applies the Theory of Rational Action, a theory with a long tradition in the social sciences. Notwithstanding the book's explicit theoretical perspective, it is accessible to a general reader with some social science knowledge, and it is enjoyable to read--something one can say of only a few social science books.

Hardin's starting point is the observation that acts of nationalism or group conflict are types of collective action. The problem is to explain how these extreme types of collective action come about. A large body of literature, based on the Theory of Rational Action, deals with the general conditions under which members of a group act collectively to attain common goals or, put differently, to provide collective goods (e.g., peace or a clean environment). According to Mancur Olson's seminal work (The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), members of large groups usually do not act to attain their common goals, the major reason being that in a large group an individual actor has only a negligible influence on creating the collective good, but has to bear a cost if he or she contributes. Furthermore, if a common goal (collective good) is provided, every group member can enjoy it even if he or she has not contributed to producing it. Hence, the incentive to "free ride"--to wait until others have provided the good, and then consume it. Collective action in large groups requires "selective incentives," costs or benefits that depend on whether people contribute. Because acts of nationalism are a specific type of collective action, the question becomes: How can this type of collective action arise? Answering this question is the task of Hardin's book (p. 5).

One...