Once troubled C-17 program provides acquisitions lessons for today.

• Author: Brady, Steve

Imagine a time when war is ending, large-scale security requirements are receding, and defense budgets are declining. Add to this a push for acquisition reform and arms-length relationships with the defense industrial base. If this sounds similar to the current environment, it is. The last time this level of pressure was put on defense programs was the early 1990s.

Back then--in an era of so-called "peace dividends"--Congress saw the Air Force's C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft as a white elephant. Cost overruns and delays posed further risks to the program.

The C-17 offers an example of how a troubled program can go from the brink of extinction at its outset to an award winning one today. To understand how to successfully navigate a weapons program through these volatile days, it might be useful to identify a case study from the early 1990s. Selecting a program that easily maintained its leadership support and funding would have been a happier story, but it wouldn't provide the lessons learned for those who are facing an uncertain unknown future.

The C-17 provides a case study of a troubled program that was turned around by wise leadership.

Three key lessons learned from the C-17 acquisition are: the importance of communication among stakeholders; using the right contracting mechanism; and fostering commitment across a defense-industry program team.

In the early 1990s, the political landscape in the United States and the world had changed. The Cold War had been declared over, and politicians were anxious to turn their attention to what was termed the peace dividend." Leadership focused on eliminating or reducing the costs associated with large defense programs and acquisitions. While today's conflicts are more kinetic than the Cold War, the budgetary and political response is similar.

The C-17 program was born out of the ground forces requirement to respond rapidly with heavy equipment to meet an aggressor on an underdeveloped battlefield. To meet those needs, the Defense Department determined in 1981 that the Air Force would have to be able to deliver up to 66 million ton-miles per day. The C-17 was one aspect of growing the capabilities and capacities to meet that need. The C-17 would deliver large, oversized equipment and also function tactically, landing on short, unimproved runways.

The C-17 contract was awarded to the McDonnell Douglas Co. in 1981, eight years before the fall of the Berlin Wall and 10 years before the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In July 1990, the Senate--following the collapse of the Soviet Union--pushed to remove $18 billion from the defense budget for 1991. By the time Congress recessed in August, the C-17, along with the B-2 and the MILSTAR satellite constellation all were on the verge of cancelation or curtailment.

Meanwhile, the C-17...