On Value Pluralism, Its Implications, and the Nature of Philosophy

• Published date: 01 November 2015
• DOI: 10.1177/0095399715598344
• Author: Michael W. Spicer
• Date: 01 November 2015
• Subject Matter: Disputatio Sine Fine

Administration & Society

2015, Vol. 47(9) 1077 –1086

© The Author(s) 2015

DOI: 10.1177/0095399715598344

aas.sagepub.com

Disputatio Sine Fine

On Value Pluralism, Its

Implications, and the

Nature of Philosophy

Michael W. Spicer1

Abstract

This essay responds to the critique of my work by Robert Talisse, the

philosopher, by further clarifying my views on the meaning of value pluralism,

its implications, and the nature of philosophy. I argue here that most, if not

all, of the substantive arguments that Talisse advances against me derive

from premises that are contested by respected scholars within his own field.

Keywords

value pluralism, philosophy, ethics, public administration

I welcome Robert Talisse’s (2015) contribution to our debate over value plu-

ralism and its implications for public administration and, in fact, was a little

flattered when I first heard he would take time and effort to discuss my argu-

ments, as well as those of Hendrik Wagenaar. Talisse is, of course, a well-

respected neopragmatist philosopher and also a well-known critic of value

pluralism. Mindful of this, I had expected a critical response. However, I

must admit I was disappointed at the somewhat ungenerous and sometimes

picayune tone of at least some of his comments, which seemed more designed

to shut off rather than encourage an open conversation on these important

issues, something I found somewhat ironic in light of his argument that value

pluralism, with its emphasis on hard moral choice, “runs the risk of being a

1Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA

Corresponding Author:

Michael W. Spicer.

Email: m.spicer@csuohio.edu

598344AASXXX10.1177/0095399715598344Administration & SocietySpicer

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