On the Stability of Social Preferences in Inter-Group Conflict: A Lab-in-the-Field Panel Study

• Author: Robert Rybnicek,Robert Böhm,Jürgen Fleiß
• Date: 01 July 2021
• Published date: 01 July 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002721994080
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

On the Stability

of Social Preferences

in Inter-Group Conflict:

A Lab-in-the-Field

Panel Study

Robert Bo

¨hm

1

,Ju

¨rgen Fleiß

2

, and Robert Rybnicek

2

Abstract

Despite the omnipresence of inter-group conflicts, little is known about the

heterogeneity and stability of individuals’ social preferences toward in-group and

out-group members. To identify the prevalence and stability of social preferences in

inter-group conflict, we gather quota-representative, incentivized data from a

lab-in-the-field study during the heated 2016 Austrian presidential election. We

assess social preferences toward in-group and out-group members one week

before, one week after, and three months after the election. We find considerable

heterogeneity in individuals’ group-(in)dependent social preferences. Utilizing

various econometric strategies, we find largely stable social preferences over the

course of conflict. Yet, there is some indication of variation, particularly when the

conflict becomes less salient. Variation is larger in social preferences toward

in-group members and among specific preference types. We discuss the theoretical

implications of our findings and outline potential avenues for future research.

1

Department of Psychology, Department of Economics, and Copenhagen Center for Social Data Science

(SODAS), University of Copenhagen, Denmark

2

Department of Corporate Leadership and Entrepreneurship, School of Business, Economics and Social

Sciences, University of Graz, Austria

Corresponding Author:

Ju¨rgen Fleiß, Department of Corporate Leadership and Entrepreneurship, School of Business, Economics

and Social Sciences, University of Graz, Austria.

Email: juergen.fleiss@uni-graz.at

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2021, Vol. 65(6) 1215-1248

ªThe Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002721994080

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Keywords

inter-group conflict, social preferences, parochialism, in-group favoritism, field

experiment, preference dynamics

Introduction

Inter-group conflicts are omnipresent and can be observed between various types of

groups, e.g., nations and ethnic, religious, or political groups, but also within and

between companies or universities. Inter-group conflict may take different forms

and use different means, ranging from subtle discrimination against out-group

members in everyday life to large-scale disputes between political groups and even

violent encounters in wars. Hence, inter-group conflicts are part and parcel of human

interactions, having important impact on our psychological, physical, and economic

welfare (Bo¨hm, Rusch, and Baron 2020; Kimbrough, Laughren, and Sheremeta

2020).

Participation in inter-group conflict is individually costly (e.g., time, effort, risk

of injury or death), whereas the outcomes—either gains or losses (e.g., power,

territory)—are often shared equally among all in-group members, largely indepen-

dent of their individual contributions. Hence, inter-group conflict is well described

as a social dilemma (e.g., Bornstein 2003; Boyd and Richerson 2009; Henrich 2004;

Darwin [1871] 2009). As a consequence, individuals’ conflict engagement should be

at least partly related to their social preferences: it benefits the in-group but harms

the out-group at personal cost. Therefore, contributors should have different prefer-

ences for the welfare of in-group vs. out-group mem bers. Indeed, the theory of

parochial altruism (Bowles 2009; Choi and Bowles 2007; Garca and van den Bergh

2011; for reviews, see Rusch 2014; Bo¨hm, Rusch, and Baron 2020) cla ims that

adaptations to the high levels of conflict exposure in ancestral societies may have

favored the joint development of positive social preferences toward in-group mem-

bers (i.e., altruism, fairness) and negative social preferences toward out-group mem-

bers (i.e., competitiveness, aggression). Consequently, inter-individual differences

in conflict engagement should be explained by differences in individuals’ (group-

dependent) social preferences, i.e., how they are concerned about the welfare of

in-group members vs. out-group members.

Here, we address a related yet largely unexplored issue: the stability vs. variation

of social preferences over the course of inter-group conflict. Social preferences are

theoretically assumed “not to change substantially over time” (Becker 1976, 5).

Although this assumption is core to theories of individual economic behaviors (see

Loewenstein and Angner 2003, for an in-depth theoretical discussion), it is ulti-

mately an empirical question. We contribute to answering this research question

by investigating social preferences toward in-group and out-group members in a

lab-in-the-field panel study with three measurement points over a period of more

than three months. Our data consists of a quota-representative population sample in a

1216 Journal of Conflict Resolution 65(6)

heated inter-group conflict setting: the Austrian presidential election of 2016. The

intense conflict between the opposing camps allows us to identify even extreme

preferences, ranging from altruism to competitiveness, and potential diffe rences

regarding these preferences toward in-group members (i.e., those individuals who

support the same candidate) and out-group members (i.e., those individuals who

support opposing candidates). We assess individual preferences toward in-group and

out-group members shortly before, shortly after, and three months after the election.

Due to our panel design, we are able to determine the stability vs. variation of social

preferences over the course of conflict both on the individual and on the aggregated

level.

In a nutshell, our results are the following: In line with previous research, we find

substantial discrimination against out-group members. Yet, we also find consider-

able heterogeneity in individuals’ social preferences toward in-group and out-group

members. Although these social preferences appear to be largely stable over the

course of conflict, group dependency somewhat decreases with decreasing salience

of the conflict (i.e., three months after the conflict), that is, universal egoism

increases. Yet, variation in social preferences is larger toward in-group members

and weakly parochial altruists are more likely to change.

Related Literature

Our study contributes to the growing literature on social preferences in

inter-group conflict. Group identity may be responsible for differences in social

preferences toward in-group and out-group members, as suggested by social

identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and as formulated in economics by

Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Supporting this perspective, Chen and Li (2009)

observed that individuals are willing to forego more of their own payoff for the

benefit of an in-group member as compared to an out-group member. These

findings have been replicated in different variations in the lab (e.g., Ockenfels

and Werner 2014; Kranton et al. 2016) and in the field, investigating various

natural groups, e.g., neighborhoods (Falk and Zehnder 2013), army battalions

(Goette et al. 2012), ethnic groups (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Burns 2012;

Chuah, Fahoum, and Hoffmann 2013; Schubert and Lambsdorff 2014), different

cultural (Chuah et al. 2007) and also political groups (Balliet et al. 2018). Taken

together, there is consistent evidence for group-dependent social preferences,

i.e., that people on average are more willing to benefit in-group members than

out-group members at personal cost (for a meta-analytical review, see Balliet,

Wu, and De Dreu 2014).

However, previous research is silent regarding the stability vs. variation of

group-dependent social preferences over time. There is some work on the stability

of standard, that is, unconditional social preferences: Brocklebank, Lewis, and

Bates (2011) find a large correlation of r¼:84 between different dictator game

decisions (Charness and Rabin 2002) over a period of two weeks. Bruhin, Fehr,

Bo

¨hm et al. 1217