On Modeling the Social-Psychological Foundations of Support for Donald Trump

Published date01 November 2021
Date01 November 2021
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211022188
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211022188
American Politics Research
2021, Vol. 49(6) 551 –567
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X211022188
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Article
Why did Americans vote for and support Donald Trump?
Trump’s status as a non-traditional, inexperienced outsider
has made the answer to this question considerably more elu-
sive than similar questions asked about other presidents.
Even intra-party dynamics appear different, with many
researchers embracing the idea that Trump supporters differ
in important ways from non-Trump supporting Republicans
(Barber & Pope, 2019; Blum & Parker, 2019; Reny et al.,
2019). These differences have elevated the accounting of
Trump support to a “key social-science challenge” (Federico
& de Zavala, 2018, p. 110).
What explanations does the literature offer? On the one
hand, the classical social-psychological antecedents of polit-
ical behavior (i.e., partisan and ideological identities) are
consistently strong predictors of Trump support (i.e., posi-
tive feelings toward him and vote choice) (Bartels, 2018). On
the other hand, an expanding literature has uncovered numer-
ous other deep-seated social-psychological factors that addi-
tionally predict Trump support. These factors range from
group orientations, such as racial prejudice and sexism, to
more general postures toward political power and culture,
such as anti-political correctness attitudes and conspiracy
thinking (e.g., Schaffner et al., 2018). While any one of these
factors is unlikely to supplant the role of partisan and ideo-
logical orientations on its own, they may still contribute to a
more complete accounting of Trump support, as others have
demonstrated.
Even though researchers now have a better grasp of which
social-psychological orientations might lead to support for
Trump, this literature has developed in a piecemeal fashion,
leaving questions about how to best model Trump support.
This can partially be attributed to Trump’s tactics catching
researchers off guard and without the necessary survey
instruments to test explanations against one another.
Consequently, many studies fail to include potentially con-
founding explanations of Trump support, leading to omitted
variable bias. Yet, other studies find that inclusion of appro-
priate controls can result in unstable estimates of the effects
of key social-psychological predictors (e.g., Grossmann &
Thaler, 2018), due to multicollinearity. Regardless of the sta-
tistical problem, our understanding of the attitudinal anteced-
ents of Trump support are being obscured.
In this study, we use unique data from the 2018 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES) and publicly available
data from the 2016 American National Election Study
(ANES) to demonstrate these problems. After observing
high correlations between constructs such as racial
1022188APRXXX10.1177/1532673X211022188American Politics ResearchEnders and Uscinski
research-article2021
1University of Louisville, KY, USA
2University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA
Corresponding Author:
Joseph E. Uscinski, University of Miami, 240D Campo Sano Building, 1300
Campo Sano Blvd., Coral Gables, FL 33146, USA.
Email: uscinski@miami.edu
On Modeling the Social-Psychological
Foundations of Support for Donald Trump
Adam M. Enders1 and Joseph E. Uscinski2
Abstract
Scholars have identified many social-psychological factors correlated with support for Donald Trump; however, attempts
at modeling these factors tend to suffer from omitted variable bias on the one hand, or multicollinearity on the other.
Both issues obscure inferences. Using two nationally representative surveys, we demonstrate the perils of including or
failing to include many of these factors in models of Trump support. We then reconceptualize the social-psychological
sources of Trump support as components of a broader “profile” of factors that explains Trump support in 2018 and vote
choice in 2016, as well as attitudes about issues connected to Trump. Moreover, this profile—an amalgamation of attitudes
about, for example, racial groups, immigrants, and political correctness—rivals partisanship and ideology as predictors of
Trump support and is negatively related to support for mainstream Republican candidates. Our analyses suggest that Trump
benefited from activating dimensions of public opinion that transcend traditional party cleavages.
Keywords
Donald Trump, elections, vote choice, partisanship, ideology
552 American Politics Research 49(6)
resentment, sexism, and xenophobia, we demonstrate the
perils of both including the many hypothesized predictors of
Trump support in a single model, and of failing to include
many of such predictors.1 Undertaking a series of model
robustness checks, we find that inferences about the substan-
tive impact—including size, statistical significance, and
sign—of the many predictors of Trump support are highly
contingent on which of those predictors are included in the
model. To avoid such problems, we model Trump support as
a constellation, or “profile,” of attitudes and orientations that
are empirically related. The profile we construct either
matches or outperforms partisanship and ideology in predict-
ing Trump vote choice, general support for Trump, and a host
of attitudes about several of Trump’s core issues (e.g., build-
ing the U.S.–Mexico border wall). Importantly, this profile
does not merely capture partisanship or ideology in another
way; indeed, it is negatively correlated with support for
establishment Republicans running in the 2016 primaries.
Our findings have several methodological and theoretical
implications for the study of vote choice. Given that social-
psychological orientations toward social, racial, and political
“others” are, as the burgeoning literature on social identity
suggests (e.g., Mason, 2018), frequently related to each
other, perhaps such orientations should not be treated sepa-
rately. Our analyses empirically demonstrate the inferential
pitfalls of separately modeling constructs that have become
tightly interwoven over time. As polarization and sorting
have made it more difficult to disentangle inherently over-
lapping orientations, social scientific theories about which
orientations matter and when, and how to empirically deci-
pher the unique effects of such orientations, have not subse-
quently adjusted. Our results also demonstrate that significant
correlations between left-right predispositions and choices,
like partisanship and vote choice, and various social-psycho-
logical orientations, like xenophobia, imply little about the
precise nature of the partisan divide. Indeed, we find that
even though the average Trump supporter registers high lev-
els of racial resentment and xenophobia in the absolute, they
also register low or middling levels of sexism and conspiracy
thinking; likewise, Clinton supporters exhibit non-trivial lev-
els of anti-political correctness attitudes, even though there
are significant differences between Trump and Clinton sup-
porters when it comes to these orientations. Thus, our analy-
ses highlight blind spots in how survey questions designed to
estimate orientations like sexism and xenophobia are inter-
preted and applied to models of vote choice.
The Many Predictors of Support for
Donald Trump
Since 2015, scholars across social scientific disciplines have
attempted to explain why Americans support Donald Trump.
Traditional explanations, such as partisanship and ideology,
account for considerable variance in attitudes toward Trump,
just as they have for most presidents since the advent of
modern polling (Bartels, 2018). Even so, these factors cannot
explain why some key, historically Democratic districts sup-
ported Trump, nor can they account for intra-party differ-
ences in choosing Trump over his Republican competitors. A
complete accounting of the sources of Trump’s support
requires more than the traditional model of vote choice has to
offer. In attempting to decipher precisely what additional
factors may play a role in Trump support, researchers have,
for the most part, made inferences about which elements of
Trump’s personality and communication style might reso-
nate with the mass public. This exercise has resulted in many
explanations for Trump support, spanning the sociodemo-
graphic, psychological, and cultural.
To begin, examinations of sociodemographic explana-
tions have garnered only weak support. Education, for exam-
ple, is negatively associated with Trump support, but it is
unclear whether something about a lack of educational
attainment itself makes Trump more appealing or lower edu-
cational attainment merely serves as a proxy for other orien-
tations (Silver, 2016). Others saw a theme of working class
vulnerability in Trump’s campaign communications (Bucci,
2017; Morgan & Lee, 2018), but a wide range of analyses
employing different models, data, and assumptions suggest
that—at best—economics is an inconsistent predictor of sup-
port (e.g., Green & McElwee, 2018; Mutz, 2018; Ogorzalek
et al., 2020; Silver, 2016).
Of course, it is easy to find examples of racism, sexism,
xenophobia, conspiracism, and authoritarianism in Trump’s
rhetoric (e.g., Finley & Esposito, 2019; Jamieson & Taussig,
2017; Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Sanchez, 2018); thus, these ori-
entations have constituted fruitful avenues for explaining
Trump support. Many researchers have found a connection
between Trump support and various racial orientations—
from white identity to racial prejudice (Abramowitz &
McCoy, 2019; Craig et al., 2018; Donovan & Redlawsk,
2018; Engelhardt, 2019; Green & McElwee, 2018; Jardina,
2019; Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018; Lopez Bunyasi, 2019;
Schaffner et al., 2018; Sides et al., 2019). Immigration being
a key element of Trump’s platform, xenophobic tendencies
also correlate with Trump support (Hooghe & Dassonneville,
2018; Manza & Crowley, 2018; Wright & Esses, 2019). The
same can be said about attitudes toward women, from hostile
to ambivalent sexism (Bracic et al., 2019; Cassese & Holman,
2019; Deckman & Cassese, 2019; Frasure-Yokley, 2018;
Schaffner et al., 2018; Setzler & Yanus, 2018). Importantly,
the literature also finds that attitudes about racial groups,
immigration, and gender each played a greater role in
explaining vote choice in 2016 than in previous elections,
suggesting that Trump activated these orientations in a way
that previous Republican presidential candidates had not
(Donovan & Redlawsk, 2018; Reny et al., 2019; Sides et al.,
2017; Valentino et al., 2018, but see Al-Gharbi, 2018).
Finally, several broad orientations toward political power
and culture can be found among both Trump’s rhetoric and
the psychology of his supporters. Negative attitudes toward

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