On 'Interests' in Politics
| Author | William E. Connolly |
| Published date | 01 September 1972 |
| Date | 01 September 1972 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/003232927200200405 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
On
’Interests’
in
Politics
1
William
E.
Connolly
The
Import
of
Disputes
About
Interests
- -
-
An
explanatory
theory
of
politics
generates
a
set
of
normative
considerations
for
the
assessment
of
political
institutions
and
public
policies.
And
the
conceptual
system
within
which
a
given
explanatory
theory
is
framed
delineates
a
range
of
evidence
liable
to
conversion
into
reasons
for
or
against
particular
moral
claims.2
If
the
above
two
statements
are
true,
and
I
will
presuppose
rather
than
argue
in
detail
for
them
here,
then
it
is
surely
true
that
the
concept
and
interpretation
of
interests
in
politics
provides
a
central
medium
for
that
conversion
process.
Statements
such
as
&dquo;A
wants
x,&dquo;
&dquo;A
prefers
x
to y,&dquo;
and
&dquo;x
enhances
the
contentment
of A&dquo;
are
licenses
for
making
prima
facie
judgments
that x
is
good
or
desirable.
While
&dquo;good&dquo;
is
not
equivalent
to
any
set
of
descriptive
statements,
statements
which
refer
to
the
wants,
purposes,
and
preferences
of
persons
are
conceptually
linked
to
ascriptions
of
good.
And
talk
about
interests
carries
into
political
discourse
that
conceptual
connection
between
description
and
normative
appraisal.
For
although
various
notions
of interests
have
been
employed
in
political
literature,
each
of
those
seriously
advanced
includes
somewhere
in
its
definition
a
significant
reference
to
the
wants,
preferences,
and
purposes
of
persons
implicated
in
political
life.
Once
the
normative
function
of
talk
about
interests
is
understood,
the
import
of
disagreements
over
the
descriptive
conditions
or
criteria
of
the
concept’s
application
also
becomes
more
clear.3
For
one
set
of
criteria
will
draw
our
attention
to
particular
wants
and
preferences
formed
under
specified
conditions
and
deflect
attention
from
other
possible
wants,
etc.,
formed
in
different
circumstances.
The
effect
is
to
privilege
certain
actual
or
1.
My
thanks
to
Glen
Gordon,
George
Kateb,
David
Kettler,
and
Felix
Oppenheim
for
their
insightful
criticisms
of
an
earlier
draft
of
this
essay.
2.
For
a
strong
argument
in
support
of
this
thesis
see
Charles
Taylor,
"Neutrality
in
Political
Science,"
in
Peter
Laslett
and
W.
G.
Runciman,
eds.,
Philosophy,
Politics
and
Society,
3d
ser.
(New
York:
Barnes
and
Noble,
See
also:
Kurt
Baier,
The
Moral
Point
of
View
(New
York:
Random
House,
1965).
3.
See
the
distinction
between
the
"material"
and
"formal"
elements
of
a
concept
drawn
by
Julius
Kovesi
in
Moral
Notions
(London:
Routledge
and
Kegan
Paul,
1967).
Kovesi’s
approach
to
conceptual
analysis
suggests
a
profound
critique
of
the
approach
conventionally
adopted
by
political
scientists.
at SAGE Publications on December 7, 2012pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from
460
potential
conative
states
for
purposes
of
normative
appraisal
and,
often,
to
blind
us
to
possible
considerations
operating
outside
those
boundaries.
If
the
very
notion
of
interests
one
adopts
exerts
an
influence
on
the
&dquo;materials&dquo;
from
which
normative
appraisals
are
forged,
an
explanatory
theory
employing
that
notion
will
generate
more
sharply
defined
normative
implications.
Such
a
theory
purports
to
tell
us
what
interests
citizens
in
various
settings
have;
how
the
political
system
nourishes
and
protects
some
interests
while
dampening
others;
whether
those
dampened
interests
could
be
advanced
by,
say,
a
more
vigorous
application
of
pressure;
why
and
how
particular
segments
of
society
fail
to
recognize
some
of
their
interests;
to
what
extent
pressures
exerted
on
government
reflect
not
interests
but
those
unattainable
fantasies
and
wishes
citizens
sometimes
project
onto
politics.
The
explanatory
theory,
in
short,
&dquo;sets
the
crucial
dimensions
through
which
the
phenomena
can
vary&dquo;;
and,
through
its
assessment
of
the
possibilities,
costs,
and
risks
of
satisfying
those
wants
and
needs
identified
as
interests,
it
informs
us
&dquo;how
we
are
to
judge
of
good
and
bad.&dquo;4
In the
light
of
these
remarks,
it
is
surely
not
surprising
that
sharp
disagreements
have
persisted
among
political
analysts
concerning
the
proper
notion
and
theory
of
interests.
While
most
of
the
participants
in
these
debates
have
tried
to
limit
themselves
to
lines
of
argument
permitted
by
a
positivist
disjuncture
between
explanatory
inquiry
and
moral
commitment-thereby
debating
which
notion
of
interest
is
more
&dquo;operational&dquo;
or,
vaguely,
of
greater
&dquo;theoretical
importance,&dquo;
lurking
in
the
background
has
been
the
tacit
understanding
that
talk
about
interests
carries
normative
implications
in
political
discourse.
Our
reflections
will
provide
more
illumination,
then,
if
we
bring
this
tacit
understanding
to
the
conscious
level.
For
when
we
grasp
that
&dquo;by
the
’moral
point
of
view’
we
mean
a
point
of
view
which
furnishes
a
court
of
arbitration
for
conflicts
of
interest,&dquo;5
we
must
also
acknowledge
that
the
notion
of
interests
one
accepts
will
determine
what
sorts
of
conflict
become
prime
candidates
for
moral
arbitration,
while
the
theory
of
interests
advanced
will
demarcate
a
range
of
claims
to
be
assessed
from
the
moral
point
of
view.
I
would
not
myself
argue
(as
the
quote
from
Baier
might
suggest)
that
&dquo;interests&dquo;
is
the
only
concept
in
politics
which
serves
as
a
bridge
between
explanatory
and normative
judgment,
but
it
is
one
of
the
central
concepts
performing
this
crucial
function.
4.
Taylor,
op.
cit.,
pp.
30
and
40.
5.
Baier,
op.
cit.,
p.
96.
For
examples
of
other
essays
which
explicitly
place
"interests"
in
the
center
of
moral
discourse
see
Stanley
Benn,
"Egalitarianism
and
the
Equal
Consideration
of
Interests,"
in
Hugo
A.
Bedau,
ed.,
Justice
and
Equality
(Englewood
Cliffs,
N.J.:
Prentice-Hall,
1971),
pp.
152-167;
and
John
Rawls,
"Justice
as
Fairness,"
Philosophical
Review
(1958),
pp.
164-94.
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