On Behalf of the Condemned? The Impact of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on Capital Punishment Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

• DOI: 10.1177/106591299805100109
• Author: Steven C. Tauber
• Published date: 01 March 1998
• Date: 01 March 1998
• Subject Matter: Articles

191

On

Behalf

of

the

Condemned?

The

Impact

of

the

NAACP

Legal

Defense

Fund

on

Capital

Punishment

Decision

Making

in

the

U.S.

Courts

of

Appeals

STEVEN

C.

TAUBER,

UNIVERSITY

OF

SOUTH

FLORIDA

There

is

a

rich

history

of

scholarship

demonstrating

that

interest

groups

have

influenced

judicial

policymaking,

but

there

has

not

been

a

system-

atic

test

of

whether

a

single

group

has

contributed

to

case

outcomes

over

an

entire

policy

area

while

controlling

for

other

elements

of

judicial

deci-

sion

making.

Additionally,

the

degree

to

which

extra-legal

factors

domi-

nate

a

group’s

ability

to

influence

judicial

policy

has

not

been

explored

sufficiently

Finally,

there

needs

to

be

an

empirical

test

of

the

extent

to

which

elements

of

judicial

decision

making

affect

an

interest

group’s

choice

to

litigate.

This

study

examines

these

questions

by

assessing

the

NAACP-

Legal

Defense

and

Education

Fund’s

(LDF)

contribution

to

the

popula-

tion

of

217

capital

punishment

cases

decided

in

the

U.S.

Courts

of

Appeals.

This

article

finds

that

when

considered

in

light

of

the

judicial

decision-

making

context,

the

LDF

is

not

a

significant

factor

influencing

case

out-

comes.

Moreover,

an

interaction

model

suggests

that

the

LDF’s

ability

to

affect

case

outcomes

is

controlled

largely

by

extra-legal

factors.

Finally,

there

is

no

evidence

that

the

LDF’s

decision

to

litigate

follows

a

pattern

based

on

this

judicial

decisionmaking

context.

These

findings

should

prompt

future

scholars

researching

a

group’s

litigation

campaign

to

ex-

amine

his/her

subject

in

the

framework

of

the

judicial

decision-making

process

instead

of

in

isolation.

140TE:

The

author

wishes

to

thank

David

O’Brien,

Steven

Finkel,

Paula

McClain,

Susan

MacManus,

and

the

editors

and

anonymous

reviewers

of

Political

Research

Quarterly

for

their

thoughtful

comments

and

suggestions

on

earlier

drafts

of

this

article.

Despite

their

help,

I

assume

all

responsibility

for

the

analysis

presented

here.

192

When

David

Truman

(1951:

479)

wrote

that

&dquo;the

activities

of

judicial

officers

of

the

United

States

are

not

exempt

from

the

processes

of

group

poli-

tics,&dquo;

he

recognized

interest

group

litigation

as

a

legitimate

focus

for

political

science.

Despite

its

supposedly

counter-majoritarian

nature,

the

federal

judi-

ciary,

like

the

popularly

accountable

branches,

is

subject

to

group

pressure.

Subsequent

research

has

uncovered

how

interest

groups

influenced

the

fed-

eral

judiciary

by

filing

amicus

curiae

briefs

in

cases

where

the

group

has

a

stake

in

the

outcome

(Caldeira

and Wright

1988:

1990;

Epstein

1985;

Krislov

1963;

Kuersten

and

Songer

1994;

O’Connor

1980;

and

O’Connor

and

Epstein

1982,

1983),

and

sponsoring

cases

in

order

to

achieve

a

political

end

(Epstein

1985;

Greenberg

1977, 1994;

Ivers

1995;

Kluger

1975;

Manwaring

1962;

Meltsner

1973;

O’Connor

1980;

O’Connor

and

Epstein

1984;

Tushnet

1987;

Vose

1958,

1959;

Wenner

1982).

Once

it

recognized

interest

groups

as a

viable

part

of

the

judicial

process,

the

public

law

field

began

to

explore

the

extent

that

inter-

est

groups

influence

policy

outcomes

in

the

federal

judiciary.

This

article

ad-

dresses

this

question

and

related

issues

by

examining

the

NAACP

Legal

Defense

Fund’s

(LDF)

impact

on

capital

punishment

decisions

in

the

U.S.

Courts

of

Appeals.

EARLY

INTEREST

GROUP

STUDIES

At

the

vanguard

of

interest

group

litigation

research

is

Vose’s

(1959)

study

of

the

NAACP’s

campaign

to

end

racially

restrictive

housing

covenants.

Vose

forced

scholars

to

reexamine

this

presumably

private

litigation

battle

as

a

con-

flict

distinguished

by

a

public

interest

group

struggle

as

fierce

as

the

ones

taking

place

in

legislatures.

Although

Vose

focused

on

a

political

aspect

of

litigation-interest

group

activity-he

still

framed

his

analysis

in

the

legal

model,

which

perceives

judicial

decision

making

through

the

lens

of

legal

doctrine.

According

to

the

legal

model,

the

manner

in

which

judges

apply

precedent

to

a

set

of

facts

and

their

methods

of

interpreting

statutes

and

the

Constitution

are

the

principal

determinants

of Judicial

decision

making.

For

African

Ameri-

cans

seeking

housing

equality,

the

federal

judiciary

was

the

best

forum

in

which

to

wage

their

fight

because

success

in

that

branch

was

not

a

function

of

political

and

electoral

strength,

fields

in

which

they

were

lacking.

Instead,

a

skillful

legal

argument

and

strategy

were

the

major

prerequisites

to

victory

in

the

federal

judiciary.

Vose’s

group

litigation

concept

was

extended

by

studies

1

For

more

on

the

legal

model

consult

George

and

Epstein

(1992);

Segal,

Songer,

and

Cameron

(1995:

239);

Segal

and

Spaeth

(1993:

33-64);

and

Songer,

Segal,

and

Cameron

(1994).

Some

studies

of

court

decision

making

operating

under

the

legal

model

include

Abraham

and

Perry

(1994);

Corwin

(1924);

and

Cushman

(1955).