Olive Branches or Fig Leaves: A Cooperation Dilemma for Great Power Competition in Space

• Author: Matthew T. King
• Position: USAF (LL.M., McGill University, Institute of Air and Space Law; J.D., University of Pittsburgh; B.A., University of Virginia)
• Pages: 417-443

ARTICLES

Olive Branches or Fig Leaves: A Cooperation

Dilemma for Great Power Competition in Space

Matthew T. King*

In war the peaceful olive branch is useful. – Ovid

1

Ovid, Ex Ponto, LOEB CLASSICAL LIBR., https://perma.cc/8BUV-P2BY.

And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and

they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons. – Genesis 3:7

2

INTRODUCTION ............................................ 417

I. BENEFITS OF ENGAGEMENT .............................. 419

A. Benefits of Substantive Engagement and Norm Creation . . . . 420

B. Procedural Benefits from Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425

II. OLIVE BRANCHES, FIG LEAVES, AND THE COOPERATION DILEMMA. . . . . . 428

A. Olive Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428

B. Fig Leaves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430

C. The Cooperation Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432

III. UNITED STATES SPACE ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA: A COOPERATION

DILEMMA? ........................................... 436

A. Engagement with China – Olive Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436

B. Engagement with China – Fig Leaves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438

C. A Cooperation Dilemma with China? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443

INTRODUCTION

The United States finds itself in a multi-domain great power competition with

China

3

See James N. Mattis, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the

United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge 2 (2018), https://

perma.cc/H4YB-73Y9 [hereinafter National Defense Strategy] (“The central challenge to U.S.

prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National

Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers,” namely China and Russia) (emphasis in original);

—one in which states seek relative advantage across the spectrum of

* Colonel Matthew T. King, USAF (LL.M., McGill University, Institute of Air and Space Law; J.D.,

University of Pittsburgh; B.A., University of Virginia). Colonel King is a judge advocate in the US Air

Force. The views expressed in this article represent the personal views and conclusions of the author

writing in his personal capacity and are not necessarily the views, ideas, or attitudes of the Department

of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US government. The author has used only

information available to the public in the presentation of this work. © 2022, Matthew T. King.

1.

2. Genesis 3:7 (King James).

3.

417

Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, Renewing America’s Advantages: Interim National Security Strategy

Guidance 20 (Mar. 2021), https://perma.cc/SK35-S4DQ [hereinafter Interim National Security Strategy]

(focusing on China, stating that the strategy “will strengthen our enduring advantages, and allow us to

prevail in strategic competition with China or any other nation.”) (emphasis removed).

international power and across domains of activity, including the space domain.

4

See JOHN J. KLEIN, UNDERSTANDING SPACE STRATEGY: THE ART OF WAR IN SPACE 96 (2019)

(borrowing from Thucydides, finding that states are driven by “fear, honor, and interest” in every

domain, with space being no exception). In general, a “domain” is an area “within which military, civil,

and commercial activities are conducted.” J

OINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-14, SPACE

OPERATIONS I-2 (Apr. 10, 2018) (incorporating change Oct. 26, 2020). The space domain is a physical

domain, covering “the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become

negligible.” Id. The United States recognizes five domains: air, land, maritime, space, and cyber. See

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS (Nov. 2021), https://

perma.cc/XQN6-DKA4; see also National Defense Strategy, supra note 3, at 3 (“Today, every domain

is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.”).

However, the mere existence of a great power competition does not preclude

other, more cooperative, forms of engagement among competitors; states seeking

engagement—ranging from mere discussions to new rules regimes—should view

cooperation as a form of competition. This paper argues that viewing cooperation

as competition can benefit a state (the United States, in particular) in great power

competition if that state appreciates the competitive approaches to cooperation

and the attendant risks and challenges.

This paper explores engagement in space matters within this competitive con-

text and provides two lenses through which cooperative efforts can be viewed:

the olive branch approach and the fig leaf approach. Olive branches represent

peace and gestures of genuine cooperation, driving towards meaningful mutual

agreement; this approach reflects relative strength and can cement a lasting

advantage. Conversely, fig leaves hide weakness or shame; they reveal a position

of perceived inferiority, vulnerability, or discomfort. However, if used appropri-

ately, a state can derive strategic advantage through limited fig leaf engagement

from where it otherwise may not have existed. The approaches are value-neutral:

they are neither “good” nor “bad” on their own terms. Instead, they are tools

available to a state, and either one may be more appropriate given the state’s

goals, status in the international system, and available resources. The valuation of

the approach lies in whether it can serve a state’s pursuits.

In great power competition, both approaches may be useful and at times neces-

sary for the creation, maintenance, or preservation of relative power in this long-

term strategic contest.

5

However, as relative advantage and perceptions of mutual

4.

5. The underlying geopolitical disposition of this work is a realist one—viewing an anarchic system

in which states are the actors and are co-equal under the law (though not equal in capacity and relative

power). Within this realist context, power is a tool for other things; it is not an end unto itself, but the

currency in the system. In broad terms, power includes capacity for military force, economic purchasing

ability, options for advantageous diplomatic leverage, and influence through soft power; it is a means to

achieve national ends, which can generally be categorized into security and prosperity-focused goals.

Engagement—including mere discussions, cooperation, and even agreements that may appear to

abrogate short-term power capacity (in favor of long term benefit)—is a means of developing and

maintaining this power, thereby furthering overall national security and prosperity. That is, engagement

and cooperation are not alternatives to realist power—they are approaches to it, when taking a broader

and longer view than mere force capacity as the key to international gain. This is consistent with the

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