NWPA Is Still a Viable Option for Solving the Nuclear Waste Dilemma

Date01 August 2010
Author
40 ELR 10800 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 8-2010
R E S P O N S E
NWPA Is Still a Viable Option for
Solving the Nuclear Waste Dilemma
by Daniel T. Swanson
Daniel T. Swanson is the Senior Counsel for Environmental and Nuclear Regulatory Law for the Idaho National Laboratory. He
was an attorney for the U.S. NRC, representing it in multiple licensing and enforcement proceedings for reactors, including the
TMI accident hearings. He also served as the lead environmental and nuclear regulatory attorney for Battelle Memorial Inst. in
the DOE SNF and HLW repository siting program, and in that capacity was invited by DOE numerous times to lecture to other
U.S. agencies and repository siting contractors on NRC licensing. He is a 1974 graduate of Vanderbilt University Law School.
In his a rticle, Solving the U.S . Nuclear Waste Dilemma,1
Richard B. Stewart analyzes the history of the failure of
the U.S. to manage the rec ycling a nd disposal of spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW)
from t he nuclear fuel c ycle a ssociated with the production
of electricity. He then develops some insightful sug gestions
to rectify the problem, recognizing that our current govern-
ment policy is not moving the country toward a viable solu-
tion for disposal of SNF and HLW.
Stewart is correct in concluding that the current arra nge-
ment of onsite storage of civilian nuclear waste provides a
relatively safe near-term option. However, there are very
real security considerations attendant to indenite storage
of wa ste at locations never selected or constructed to store
waste, with the potential for terrorists to target well-known
quantities of low-level radioactive waste (L LRW) and HLW
at reactor sites. As politicians become complacent with the
lack of serious security incidents resulting from their failure
to take decisive action to nd disposal solutions, it becomes
easier for them to ignore this volatile issue.
One consequence of the failure to take responsibility for
the disposal of SNF and HLW is its negative impact on the
development of nuclear power. A certain portion of the popu-
lation opposes any growth in nuclear power as long as there is
no demonstrated disposal option for SNF and HLW. Taking
responsibility for the waste with a permanent repository will
advance our energy security by helping us to maintain diverse
sources of energy supply with t he elimination of one serious
impediment—the absence of safe disposal of SNF—while
increased nuclear power will reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases. A repository will also advance our national security by
helping to provide operational certainty to our nuclear Navy
1. Richard B. Stewart, Solving the U.S. Nuclear Waste Dilemma, 40 ELR (E’
L.  P’ A. R.) 10783 (Aug. 2010) (derived from Richard B. Stew-
art, U.S. Nuclear Waste Law and Policy: Fixing a Bankrupt System, 17 N.Y.U.
E’ L.J. 783 (2008)).
and by facilitating the decommissioning of nuclear weapons
and the secure disposition of nuclear materials.2
Based on experience obtained in the search for viable sites
for a SNF and HLW repository, I have a dierent perspective
than Stewart as to whether the law that directed the process,
the NWPA, was to blame for the failure to select a viable
repository site. Rather t han being a failure, the NWPA was
very successful in creating a process that identied poten-
tially acceptable sites. Considerable resources were devoted to
screening and exploration using a variety of media across the
country, with a number of sites being identied as very prom-
ising from a geological and political perspective. e U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) initially identied nine sites
as being potentially acceptable. Nine Draft Environmental
Assessments (EAs) supported that decision.3 Several of the
communities in proximity with the target sites welcomed
the prospect of being host communities with the attendant
benets of jobs a nd government payments.4 In accordance
with the NW PA,5 the list of nine was narrowed down to
ve locations representing three dierent rock media, for
which DOE developed nal environmental assessments.6 Yet
the technical process was thwarted by Congress in selecting
the Nevada site and eliminating the four other sites without
2. S S A, R   S 
E R  S   Y M S  
R U  N W P A  1982 2, 31 (Feb.
2002).
3. Draft Environmental Assessments for Lavender and Davis Canyon Sites, Utah,
Cypress Creek and Richton Dome sites, Miss., Deaf Smith and Swisher Coun-
ties, Texas, Vacherie Dome, La., and Yucca Mtn., Nev., and Hanford, United
States Department of Energy, Oce of Civilian Radioactive Waste Manage-
ment 10-17 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Environmental Assessme nt, Davis Canyon Site, United States De-
partment of Energy Oce of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
(1986); Environmental Assessment, Deaf Smith County Site, Tex as, United
States Department of Energy Oce of Civilian Radi oactive Waste Manage-
ment (1984) (discussing a unifor m lack of reluctance among communities to
serve as host communities for such site in light of th e possibility o f federal
funds and federal jobs).
5. 42 U.S.C. §10132(b).
6. Final Environmental Assessments for Davis Canyon, Deaf Smith County,
Hanford, Richton Dome, and Yucca Mountain, United States Department of
Energy Oce of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (1986).
Copyright © 2010 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

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