Nuclear Energy Policy in the European Union: Meltdown or False Alarm?

• Author: Johnson, Debra

[A]part from the Green movement, there is little evidence of widespread public opposition to the continued operation of existing nuclear plants in Western and Northern Europe

Recent elections in Sweden, Germany and France have helped shift the political balance in Europe from the center-right to the center-left, with the result that in one-third of European Union (E.U.) member states, green parties either support or are represented in the ruling government. With the environmental ministers of Finland, France, Germany and Italy representing their respective green parties, environmental issues--especially the future of nuclear power--have moved up on the European political agenda. In Germany following the 1998 election, the so-called Red-Green coalition, comprising the Social Democratic Party and the Alliance 90/The Greens (the Green Party), made a commitment to phase out nuclear power entirely.

Despite these political developments, European public opinion towards nuclear power has been less hostile than the ascendancy of the environmentalists would suggest. Lately, the balance in the debate about energy and the environment has in fact shifted more in favor of nuclear power, given its potential as an alternative to fossil fuel combustion in an era when greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced. In short, public opinion about nuclear power and nuclear policy itself are functions of wide-ranging economic, political and market considerations--not solely shifts in the political winds. Many Europeans are quite aware that the feasibility of plans for early nuclear phase-out is dubious for cost and market-based reasons.

At times of concern about energy security, public opinion about nuclear power tends to become more positive, whereas public support for nuclear power declines following accidents like that at Chernobyl in 1986. Using Sweden and Germany as examples, this article examines the future of nuclear power in Europe in light of recent political realignments and fluctuations in public opinion. It concludes that the political shift to the center-left and the increasing concern with nuclear energy is more a reflection of the arithmetic of coalition politics in Europe--and as such is not likely to be sustained--than of a major shift in public opinion. European public opinion, in fact, though less enthusiastic than it was in the period immediately following the 1973 oil crisis, continues to favor nuclear power. In support of my conclusions, I examine the Swedish government's continuing, and so far unsuccessful, attempts to pioneer anti-nuclear policy; the German coalition's early signs of strain about the pace of phase-out; and related market and environmental pressures.

NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The potential for nuclear power to play a major role in European energy supplies was acknowledged in the 1950s by the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), which along with the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome comprised the founding treaties of the European Union. Euratom outlined a vision of nuclear power as a clean, safe fuel. Its signatories "resolved to create the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide extensive energy resources, lead to the modernization of technical processes and contribute, through its many other applications, to the prosperity of their peoples."(1)

Although E.U. regulations and directives relating to energy and the environment are binding on member states, the choice of power and energy supplies remains firmly within the sphere of member-state sovereignty. In practice, therefore, the future of nuclear power within Europe lies not in the hands of E.U. institutions but in those of individual member states. The Periodic Illustrative Nuclear Programmes for the Community (PINC)(2) are the nearest the European Union comes to a nuclear policy. The PINCs review the role of nuclear energy within the framework of E.U. energy policy and market developments, and are generally positive about the role of nuclear power. Specific E.U. nuclear policies are limited to providing guidelines on safety issues, facilitating nuclear research and working to prevent proliferation of nuclear material.

Amidst widespread concerns in the 1970s about energy supply security and the exhaustibility of conventional fuel sources, nuclear power held out the promise of relatively abundant, cheap and clean energy. It was during this period, when European enthusiasm for nuclear power was at its highest, that the foundations of the present-day nuclear industry were laid. In anticipation of a period of volatile oil prices, Sweden decided as early as 1965 to develop a nuclear capacity to complement its hydroelectric resources. In 1974 the French government, concerned about a lack of indigenous energy resources, embarked upon an unprecedented nuclear construction program with the result that nuclear power currently accounts for 77 percent of the electricity generated in France. Germany and the Netherlands also saw nuclear power as a solution to energy supply concerns. Under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, the United Kingdom--where seven Magnox(3) stations with a combined capacity of 3,223 megawatts (MW) had already been commissioned between 1962 and 19734(4)--was strongly committed to the further construction of nuclear power stations. Today eight E.U. member states possess nuclear power capacity, and approximately 35 percent of electricity generated within the E.U. originates from nuclear generation.

CHANGING EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON POLITICS

Popular opposition to nuclear power has been present throughout Europe as long as nuclear power has existed. However, apart from Austria--where an anti-nuclear referendum in 1978 stopped the construction of a nuclear plant--nuclear opposition was not part of the political mainstream in the 1970s and was able to do nothing more than impose delays on nuclear construction programs. The 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the United States--the most serious civilian accident to that date--began to change this. While the effects of the incident were contained, there was an immediate negative impact on European public opinion. This was most notable in Sweden, where opposition to nuclear power had grown during the 1970s. In a 1980 referendum, nearly 80 percent of the Swedish population voted for a moratorium on new nuclear construction and a phasing out of existing nuclear power facilities within 25 years--and almost half of those proponents demanded a phase-out within a decade. Although the referendum was legally non-binding, successive Swedish governments have continued to grapple with its implications.

Elsewhere in Europe, although there were signs of a growing distrust of nuclear power following the Three Mile Island incident, the oil crisis during the same year fueled fears about energy supply shortages and inflation, increasing the attractiveness of nuclear power. Such fears persisted during the early 1980s when Cold War considerations were at their height, and reached a peak when West Germany decided to import gas from the Soviet Union--a strategy that Germany's allies claimed would make it too vulnerable to the dictates of Soviet foreign policy. Only the emergence of oil supply surpluses in the mid-1980s and the subsequent drop in oil prices reduced the fears about supply shortages. Until then, concerns over supply security served to counteract the negative impact of the Three Mile Island accident on public opinion.

The 1986 Chernobyl accident, an extremely grave incident whose direct effects were felt a long distance away from the reactor,(5) strongly reinforced public fears of nuclear energy. These worries were subsequently translated into new policy measures. In 1986 the Danish...