Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?

• Author: Jones, David T.
• Position: Viewpoint essay

Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?

By Adam Garfinkle, Editor, The American Interest

Reviewed by David T. Jones, co-author of Uneasy Neighbo(u)rs

Text: www.fpri.org/footnotes/1410.200905.garfinkle.nucleardeterrenceterrorism.html

Adam Garfinkle's analytic/philosophical lecture entitled, "Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?" expends considerable effort on definitions. He chops through a labyrinth of sub-issues such as whether actually we live in an "age of terrorism," what effect terrorism has on nuclear weapons states, and even what is "deterrence."

Perhaps such intellectual excursions are de rigueur for a lecture such as Mr. Garfinkle delivered for the Foreign Policy Research Institute; however, it gives the eager reader a sense that he is incinerating straw men of his own devising before getting to "the meat." And the meat, essentially, is whether nuclear weapons can deter terrorism.

Here Mr. Garfinkle temporizes: "The answer is variably maybe; it depends; probably not most of the time." Again, Garfinkle resorts to contextual analysis. He notes, "There is no automatic, universally guaranteed static formula for deterrence."

Basically for deterrence to function, there must be agreement on the "rules"--and for terrorists there are no rules. However, if the terrorist (Hamas, Hezbollah) is involved in a social framework that it values, perhaps the threat of damage to that framework can deter. Al Qaeda is not so involved, thus it is a harder problem. In that regard, Garfinkle suggests that the prospect of swift, violent retaliation against a state sponsor/ally of a terrorist organization might be a deterrent for any state so contemplating. Almost tongue-in-cheek, he suggests that the threat of violent sanctions could reverse the normal function of deterrence: Instead of...