Les Pharons du nouvel empire.

PositionBook review

Les Pharons du nouvel empire: Une pensee strategique (1550-1069 avant J.-C). By PIERRE GRANDET. L'Art de la Guerre. Monaco: EDITIONS DU ROCHER, 2008. Pp. 381. [euro]19.

People do not read Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species much anymore. The same may be said of Clausewitz's Zum Krieg. The reason normally given is that neither of these epoch-making works has stood the test of time. Empirical data, it is claimed, has replaced the need to peruse these once sturdy and apparently timeless works. After all, have not munitions altered since Napoleonic times? Has not the rapid development of modern transportation rendered Clausewitz's analysis of sea versus land power, a position that Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan followed with such strong belief, nugatory? These two points--additional ones are easy to proffer--all too frequently come to the fore when a serious discussion of warfare ensues. Yet the crucial nature of those treatises, one that prevents them from ever becoming outdated, is the generality of approach. Clausewitz and Darwin each presented an overarching theory in which individual components of data could be explained. By doing this, a "general theory" could be propounded in which separate units of approach--in Clausewitz's approach the army, the famous tripartite division of the "nation," or the degrees of development within a war, leading in some cases a outrance, could be tied together into a harmonious unity. (1) That this was never achieved in this case was due to the premature death of the writer. Nonetheless, Clausewitz went into precise detail when he found it necessary to provide a definitional and philosophical account of war. With regard to this fundamental aspect, the key points for which he is remembered include his concept of "friction," one that knits perfectly with physics and economics, and the division between strategy and tactics.

It is the latter that ought to have concerned Grandet in this work, if we follow its title. Were there any accepted theoretical foundations to underpin the conduct of Egypt's external relations during the New Kingdom? By what concepts did the elite of Egypt attempt to deal with foreign affairs, both from a military as well as a diplomatic point of view? Can we delve into and beyond the expected hieroglyphic rhetoric of "tribute" (trade to the home country) and "gifts" (trade to the foreign peoples), such as another Middle Kingdom--that of China--did, in order to elucidate more accurately what the Egyptian imperium was attempting to achieve? What did the rulers feel and how effective was the implementation of their efforts to achieve some type of lasting gain in Asia? Elsewhere I, too, have written about similar matters, in a more narrowly presented volume on warfare in Egypt. At present I think that the tragic nature of the Egyptian New Kingdom encounter with Asia has been neither properly assessed nor emphasized.(2) Grandet avoids such pregnant issues, preferring instead to turn to a blow-by-blow account of the New Kingdom's relations with the northeast.

In order to interpret correctly the term "strategy," I will refer to one and only one document, one that reveals strategy par excellence. The analysis is the only worthwhile intellectual account of the problems facing international relations in the decades preceding World War I. (3) The item is called the Crowe Memorandum. (4) In it, one immediately sees and appreciates a depth of historical reasoning. In this account the importance of human interaction is clear as crystal; materialism is avoided. The memorandum proves beyond a doubt that history is spiritual, as Leopold von Ranke always claimed: "Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime ascendency. ... Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition, and thinking for the present of using her legitimate position and influence as one of the leading Powers in the council of nations, is seeking to promote her foreign commerce. ..." (5) In other words, there are only two possibilities with regard to Germany's strategy: planned domination or unplanned supremacy. We are thus at the navel of historical interpretation: was there a strategy for an expanding power, run by its elite, or not? This question reverberates in time both forwards to our era, where there appears to be no strategy on the part of the American government, or backward to the Egyptian Eighteenth Dynasty. Surely this is what Grandet should have pursued, if only...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT