Northern Ireland: A Promising or Partisan Peace?

• Author: Dunn, Seamus

Despite the continuing difficulties of the April 1998 Good Friday Agreement--which for the first time allowed all the involved constituencies a voice and a role in the future of Northern Ireland--there is still a degree of optimism in the province. The absence of serious intercommunity violence, the sight of local politicians trying to be constructive, the apparent marginalization of perpetual dissidents and the sense of an economic and cultural revival are all strongly felt. There is also evidence of a determination that the horrors of the past will not recur and that the will of the people--as expressed in the referendum and in the subsequent elections--will be obeyed.

The long conflict emerged as much from social and cultural differences between the two communities as from politics. The civil rights campaign in the late 1960s derived its energy and validity from a nationalist(1) sense of injustice and discrimination. The resulting violence had its origins, at least in part, in the local government's inability or unwillingness to deal with that perception: it continued for so long because of the absence of trust on all sides that justice could be guaranteed. Nationalists have therefore argued consistently that peace has to be accompanied by justice. The consequence of this view can be detected not only in much of the debate preceding the agreement--especially in the demand for confidence-building measures--but also in much of the content of the agreement itself. The demand for North-South bodies, for example, reflects the need for a Dublin voice in the governance of the North as a guarantor of just processes. The emphasis on human rights, policing and prisoners are all examples of measures intended to build confidence.

On the unionist side, changes within Northern Ireland--including dramatic developments such as direct rule imposed by London in 1972 and the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement--have resulted in a correspondingly potent sense of alienation, loss and injustice.(2) This is also reflected in unionist anxiety about the peace process, in their demand in the Good Friday Agreement for constitutional reform in the Republic of Ireland and in their determination to continue their parading traditions and to resist demands from nationalists for police reform.

Politics alone will not provide a final resolution. The continuing anxieties and fears on both sides betoken the deep-rooted mutual distrust between the unionist and nationalist communities, their mutual sense of injustice and their concern that only vigilance will ensure justice in the future. Success in resolving these difficulties may well be the final building-block in the process and despite the apparent intractability surrounding them, there is evidence that a large proportion of the population on all sides is willing to compromise and move on.

ORIGINS OF PEACE

It is impossible to identify the exact moment when what became known as the peace process began. The violence during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, and the many associated atrocities, deaths and injuries, meant that almost everyone in Northern Ireland had at least one personal experience with violence and its results. These experiences, and the bitterness and anger that they caused, constituted the greatest barrier to any peace process. Because of these personal experiences, and for political reasons, the idea of becoming involved in talks or negotiations with leaders on the other side was anathema. Even those politicians who saw the need to swallow the bitter pill of consultation with opposition paramilitary group representatives were always aware of more extreme political elements in the wings waiting to attack. The result was that the twists and turns of the peace process--and the political motivations and changes accompanying it--produced a complex, tortuous story.

From an early stage, the program of reform developed by the civil rights movement meant that many of the structural and political determinants necessary for a resolution were already apparent. These included power sharing between nationalists and unionists, since the political demography meant there would otherwise be a permanent unionist majority with consequent unrest. Of equal importance was the need for an Irish dimension--a role for the Dublin government--as a guarantor of justice and safety for the minority In addition, as time went on, the possibility of a military victory for either side was perceived to be increasingly unlikely The progress of events, and in particular the deaths of 10 republican(3) prisoners as a result of hunger strikes in the early 1980s, led to increased support for Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), at the ballot box. The resulting anxiety in London and Dublin encouraged the two governments to work together to reduce support for violence.

Eventually secret negotiations between the two governments took place, leading to the signing in November 1985 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In some ways this was the most dramatic and significant event in the recent history of the conflict. This agreement gave the Dublin government, for the first time, a formal and legitimate role in the affairs of Northern Ireland and dramatically increased its capacity to influence events. Since the discussions between the two governments leading up to the agreement had been secret, the unionist politicians were not involved.(4)

The anger and bitterness of unionist response to the Anglo-Irish Agreement were perhaps the truest measure of its significance. Unionists had always opposed giving Dublin any role in Northern Ireland's internal government since this could be perceived as a step toward Irish unity. The agreement thus erected a significant obstacle, and it was not until the early 1990s that the political process began to move again.

In early 1988 John Hume, leader of the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), Northern Ireland's main nationalist party, began a series of meetings and talks with Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein. For some commentators these meetings represented the first steps in the peace process. Hume realized that no peace could be attained without the involvement of republican hard-liners and those with influence on the IRA. Despite much criticism, stoppages and interruptions, the talks continued and helped to clarify fundamental matters within the various strands of nationalism. In the early 1990s there were also secret talks between British government representatives and Sinn Fein, much to the dismay of the unionists and the Irish government.(5)

Continued discussions between the British and Irish governments resulted in the Downing Street Declaration in 1993.(6) This was a further development of the British-Irish relationship and a consequence of the growing agreement that each step in the political process had to take account of the fears on both sides. The British government declared that it had no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland and that it wanted to see peace, stability and reconciliation among all the people who lived on the island of Ireland. It further maintained that its role was to encourage, facilitate and enable agreement through dialogue and cooperation based on recognition of the rights of both traditions in Ireland. This was perceived as a form of reassurance for nationalists.

The Irish government agreed that it would be unacceptable to try to unify Ireland without a majority vote of the Northern Ireland population, and that the "democratic dignity and the civil rights and religious liberties of both communities"(7) had to be respected. It also made a commitment to change the Irish Constitution in the event of a...