From the OAU to the AU: a normative shift with implications for peacekeeping and conflict management, or just a name change?

• Author: Rechner, Jonathan D.
• Position: Organization of African Unity, African Union

ABSTRACT

Many of the nations of Africa have struggled with violence since their independence from colonial powers. The formation of an intercontinental body, the Organization for African Unity, did little to reduce the number or severity of the conflicts. The failure of this organization to maintain peace was due in large part to normative boundaries that prevented its involvement in the internal conflicts of its member nations. The Organization of African Unity was dissolved in favor of a new organization, the African Union, in 2001. The mandate of the African Union is much more proactive than that of its predecessor with regard to intervention in internal conflicts. Additionally, some of structural and practical weaknesses of the Organization of African Unity have been addressed in the African Union. The conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan proved to be the first real test case for the efficacy of the African Union. It is already apparent from the African Union's performance in Darfur that some of the normative weaknesses of the Organization of African Unity have been overcome. Yet, the African Union must do more, both in Darfur and elsewhere, to show that it is not hampered by the weaknesses of its predecessor.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY A. Background B. OA U Intervention in Africa C. Was the OA U Effective at African Conflict Maintenance? D. Normative, Structural, and Practical Limitations of the OAU II. THE AFRICAN UNION A. The Formation of a New African Intercontinental Organization B. Differences between the A U Charter and the OAU Charter C. Will the A U Be More Effective at African Conflict Maintenance than the OA U? D. The A U and Peacekeeping: Darfur as a Litmus Test III. WILL THE PROMISE OF THE AU BEAR FRUIT? IV. CONCLUSION Africa. The name conjures up images of a faraway place of unfamiliar landscapes and alien cultures for most. The absence of direct experience readily allows popular images to fill the void. Africa becomes guns, warmongering, and endless death and destruction, all presented in bite-sized pieces on the front page of newspapers. The shock of the reported brutality, coupled with sentiments of its inevitability on a continent destined for endless strife, leads most to conclude that Africa is a lost cause. The complexity of the African situation, and the lengths to which some have gone to avoid and address deadly conflict within it, is lost as well. The first hurdle to understanding the true nature of conflict in Africa is the deceptive portrait that has been painted of it in much of the rest of the world.

To be sure, many independent African nations have been beset by conflict since their inception in the latter part of the twentieth century. Early in their history, however, these countries banded together to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU), an intercontinental organization designed to promote peace and prosperity on the African continent. Given the recent history of colonial domination, African countries were extremely reluctant to cede any form of control over their internal affairs. As a result, internal conflict, which would prove to be the most prevalent and deadly form in Africa in the coming decades, was entirely outside of the jurisdiction of the OAU. The result was that deadly conflict could rage unhindered for decades on the continent, giving Africa its reputation for ceaseless conflict.

The OAU was disbanded in favor of a new intercontinental organization, the African Union (AU), in the first years of the twenty-first century. Recognizing the urgent need to prevent and address internal conflict within African nations, the AU was given legal authority to intervene in certain forms of deadly internal conflict.

The new mandate given to the AU represented a normative sea change in African conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Whether the promise of the new mandate would bring practical change in addressing deadly conflict in Africa remained to be seen. A test case for the AU was necessary. In 2003, the internal conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan became that test case.

Part I of this paper discusses the OAU. Specifically, Part I.A. addresses the formation of the organization and the underlying principles that were adopted at its inception. Part. I.B. provides a history of its interventions in African conflicts. Part. I.C. gives a description of effective conflict maintenance, and examines the conflict maintenance capabilities of the OAU. Part I.D. details the normative, structural, and practical aspects of the OAU that limited its effectiveness in conflict maintenance.

Part II discusses the newly-formed AU. Part II.A. gives an account of how the AU came into existence, along with detailing its underlying principles. Part II.B. analyzes the differences between the Constitutive Act of the AU and the Charter of the OAU, and compares and contrasts the normative and structural aspects of each. Part II.C. examines whether the AU has the institutional capability to be more effective at addressing conflict than was the OAU. Part II.D. takes a look at the performance of the AU thus far in the context of the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan.

Finally, Part III takes a step back to get a bird's-eye view of the practical application of the Union's expanded powers, both in the context of Darfur and elsewhere. This Part details the successes and failures of the AU to date, and provides commentary on the direction this organization must ultimately take to be successful.

1. THE ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY

   1. Background

      In 1963, and political turmoil was rampant on the African continent. (1) The struggle for independence from colonial rule was well underway, (2) and the desire and demand for African independence and self-determination began to manifest itself politically. (3) The ideal of Pan-African unity gave rise to different political groupings of free African states, two of which predominated. (4) The Casablanca Group was the more revolutionary of the two, advocating for the formation of a "United States of Africa" under the power of a centralized command. (5) The Monrovia Group, on the other hand, stressed the importance of the independence, integrity, and sovereignty of each African state, and advocated a loose association of those states. (6)

      The two groups came to together to agree on the formation of the OAU. (7) The OAU Charter was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 25, 1963, at the closing of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government. (8) The OAU Charter "captured the radical-unionist Pan-African spirit" of the Casablanca Group, while emphasizing the independence and sovereignty of each individual state that was advocated by the Monrovia Group. (9) The goals of the OAU were to promote decolonization and independent self-government in African states; to guarantee respect for territorial boundaries of the states; and to promote social, political, and economic development on the African continent. (10)

      Article 2 of the OAU charter provides for purposes that reflect some of the goals and aspirations of the Casablanca Group in terms of African unity, along with some of those of the Monrovia group as well:

      Article 2

      1. The Organization shall have the following purposes:

         (a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;

         (b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;

         (c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;

         (d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

         (e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

      2. To these ends, the Member States shall- coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in the following fields:

         (a) Political and diplomatic cooperation;

         (b) Economic cooperation, including transport and communications;

         (c) Educational and cultural cooperation;

         (d) Health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation;

         (e) Scientific and technical cooperation; and

         (f) Cooperation for defense and security. (12)

         Further, the principles announced in Article 3 of the OAU Charter indicate a codification of the principles of sovereign and territorial integrity of the individual African states that were parties to the Charter:

         Article 3

         The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article [2] solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

      1. The sovereign equality of all Member States.

      2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

      3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.

      4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration.

      5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of neighboring States or any other States.

      6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.

      7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs. (14)

         State sovereignty, territorial inviolability, and non-interference of Member States with the internal affairs of another Member State were bedrock principles of the OAU from the time of its inception. (15) Thus, while certain Pan-African principles of the Casablanca Group are embodied in the Charter, the Monrovia Group's moderate approach, which emphasized the independence of the states, appeared to have been more thoroughly adopted. (16) The importance of the new independence of African states to the drafters of the OAU Charter is evident in the Preamble, (17) as well as in Articles 2 and 3. (18) Perhaps African nations were reluctant to cede such hard-won power to a new organization, despite the fact that they were members of it.

         The respect for the sovereignty of...