Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of Private Ordering

Published date01 September 2018
Date01 September 2018
AuthorVirginia Harper Ho
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12123
American Business Law Journal
Volume 55, Issue 3, 407–474, Fall 2018
NonïŹnancial Risk Disclosure and the
Costs of Private Ordering
Virginia Harper Ho*
In 2016 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considered for the ïŹrst
time whether ïŹnancial disclosure reform should address information on
sustainability matters and other sources of nonïŹnancial risk. The resulting debate
over these issues raised fundamental questions about how well the federal disclosure
regime addresses emerging risks and about how well private ordering, through
shareholder engagement, the work of private standard-setters, and corporate
voluntary disclosure, can ïŹll the gaps. This article argues that the current model of nonïŹ-
nancial risk disclosure, based largely on private ordering, is ineffective and undermines
the SEC’s mission to protect investors, facilitate capital formation, and promote fair,
orderly, and efïŹcient markets. This conclusion rests on evidence that the current state of
sustainability disclosure is inadequate for investment analysis and that these deïŹciencies
are largely problems of comparability and quality that cannot readily be addressed by pri-
vate ordering. This article also highlights the costs of agency inaction to investors and to
public companies, which have been largely ignored in the debate over the future of ïŹnan-
cial reporting. It concludes by proposing avenues for disclosure reform.
*
Professor of Law, University of Kansas. The author is grateful for the opportunity to
engage with members of several committees of the American Bar Association’s (ABA)
Section of Business Law on initiatives related to the issues explored in this article,
including the SEC’s Regulation S-K reforms and the work of the Financial Stability
Board’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD). However, the views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not reïŹ‚ect the views of the ABA
or any of its working groups. Special thanksisowedtoDonLangevoort,JillFisch,Tom
Lin, Hilary Allen, Arthur Laby, Michael Vandenbergh, Stephen Park, Josephine Sandler
Nelson, James Coburn, and Veena Ramani, as well as participants at the 2016 Lewis &
Clark Business Law Forum, the 2017 J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Environmental Law
Symposium at the George Washington University School of Law, the 2017 National Busi-
ness Law Conference, the 2017 University of ShefïŹeld Conference on Law, Finance, and
Sustainability, and faculty workshops at Washington & Lee, Villanova, and the Chicago-
Kent College of Law for their insights on the issues addressed here.
©2018 The Author
American Business Law Journal ©2018 Academy of Legal Studies in Business
407
Every investment analyst should be able to identify and properly eval-
uate investment risks, and ESG issuesareapartofthisevaluation.
—Paul Smith, CFA, President and CEO of the CertiïŹed Financial Analysts
Institute
1
Certain areas of reform, most notably in the 
 ESG space, are better
addressed by ongoing engagement with 
 investors, rather than
through SEC mandates.
—Shearman & Sterling LLP
2
INTRODUCTION
Since 2013 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been
engaged in the ïŹrst comprehensive overhaul in decades of the disclosure
requirements that apply to public companies, a “Disclosure Effective-
ness” project that will deïŹne public reporting under the federal securities
laws for the twenty-ïŹrst century.
3
As part of that review, the SEC issued
an ambitious Concept Release in 2016—over 300 pages long and con-
taining 340 multipart questions—seeking public comment on how best to
modernize and simplify the business and ïŹnancial disclosure rules con-
tained in Regulation S-K.
4
The SEC’s initial recommendations and sub-
sequent proposed rules to reform Regulation S-K address only a small
1
CFA INST., ENVIRONMENTAL,SOCIAL,AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN INVESTING:AGUIDE FOR
INVESTMENT PROFESSIONALS 3 (2015).
2
Comment of Shearman & Sterling LLP on Regulation S-K Concept Release to Brent
J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/
s7-06-16/s70616-367.pdf.
3
This review was mandated by Congress in 2012 under the Jumpstart Our Business Start-
ups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) [hereinafter the JOBS Act] and again in
2015 under the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94,
129 Stat. 1312 (2015) [hereinafter the FAST Act]. The ïŹrst stages of the Disclosure Effec-
tiveness review included a report to Congress on its disclosure rules and a review of the
rules governing ïŹnancial statements under Regulation S-X and a review of the rules gov-
erning the business and ïŹnancial disclosure outside the ïŹnancial statements under Regula-
tion S-K. See generally Disclosure Effectiveness, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/disclosure-
effectiveness.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); see also U.S. SEC.&EXCH.COMM’N,REPORT ON
REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K (2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf (reviewing the history and scope of
the current framework) [hereinafter SEC REPORT ON REVIEW].
4
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K: Concept Release, 81 Fed.
Reg. 23,916 (Apr. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Concept Release].
408 Vol. 55 / American Business Law Journal
subset of the issues the SEC raised in the Concept Release and the next
steps of the Disclosure Effectiveness review are still pending.
5
Taking stock of the current reporting regime for public companies has
reopened fundamental questions about the purpose of mandatory disclo-
sure and how much ïŹ‚exibility companies should have in determining
what information is material to investors under the standard set by the
U.S. Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.
6
Nowhere is
this more obvious than in the responses the SEC received to questions in
the Concept Release, which, for the ïŹrst time, formally sought input on
whether ïŹnancial reporting should address nonïŹnancial indicators of ïŹrm
risk and performance related to sustainability and other environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) matters.
7
Although these eight questions
accounted for only a fraction of the questions in the C oncept Release , they
attracted responses from over two-thirds of the more than 300 unique
comment submissions.
8
Over eighty percent of all Concept Release com-
ments urged the agency to improve the level of sustainability disclosure in
5
In response to its mandate under the FAST Act, the SEC issued proposed rules in 2017 to
amend select provisions of Regulation S-K that do not pertain to nonïŹnancial disclosure.
FAST Act Modernization and SimpliïŹcation of Regulation S-K, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,988 (Nov.
2, 2017) [hereinafter Regulation S-K Proposed Rules]; see also U.S. SEC.&EXCH.COMM’N,
REPORT ON MODERNIZATION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF REGULATION S-K(2016), https://www.sec.gov/
reportspubs/sec-fast-act-report-2016.pdf [hereinafter REG ULATION S-K RECOMMENDATIONS]. A
future phase of the review will cover executive compensation and governance. Concept
Release, supra note 4, at 23,917.
6
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
7
Concept Release, supra note 4, at 23,969–73 (“Disclosure of Information Relating to Public
Policy and Sustainability Matters”). As the Concept Release explains, “[s]ustainability disclo-
sure encompasses a range of topics, including climate change, resource scarcity, corporate
social responsibility, and good corporate citizenship. These topics often are characterized
broadly as environmental, social, or governance (‘ESG’) concerns.” Concept Release, supra
note 4, at 23,970. The terms “ESG” and “nonïŹnancial” are used interchangeably through-
out this article. The term “sustainability reporting” refers to a corporate responsibility or
other voluntary report separate from the company’s annual report.
8
The SEC received over 300 unique comments, in addition to over 25,000 form letters dis-
tributed by two investor advocacy groups. See Comments on Concept Release: Business and
Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, U.S. SEC.&EXCH.COMM’N, https://www.sec.
gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). Many of the comments
focused exclusively on these questions, but most responded more broadly and linked sus-
tainability responses to other parts of Regulation S-K that cover risk disclosure. See generally
Virginia Harper Ho, Comments on the Regulation S-K Concept Release: An Analysis of
Reform Proposals on Materiality, Risk, and Sustainability (2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(on ïŹle with author).
2018 / NonïŹnancial Risk Disclosure 409

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