Non-alj Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, and Removal

• Publication year: 2018

Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, and Removal

Kent H. Barnett
University of Georgia School of Law, khbarn@uga.edu

Russell Wheeler
The Brookings Institution and the Governance Institute, rwheeler@brookings.edu

NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL^†

Kent Barnett^* and Russell Wheeler^**

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This article republishes—in substantively similar form—our 2018 report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concerning federal agencies' adjudicators who are not administrative law judges (ALJs). (We refer to these adjudicators as "non-ALJ Adjudicators" or "non-ALJs.") As our data indicate, non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. Yet non-ALJs are often overlooked and difficult to discuss as a class because of their disparate titles and characteristics. To obtain more information on non-ALJs, we surveyed agencies on non-ALJs' hearings and, among other things, the characteristics concerning non-ALJs' salaries, selection, oversight, and removal. We first present our reported data on these matters, which are the most comprehensive data to date on the non-ALJs' indicia of impartiality. We then provide suggested practices for agencies to promote non-ALJs' actual and apparent impartiality in presiding over agency hearings.

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction..............................................................................5

A. KEY FINDINGS.....................................................................8
B. KEY ALTERNATIVE PRACTICES.......................................... 11

II. Non-ALJ Hearings and Prior Research.............................12

A. BASELINE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS......... 15
B. NON-ALJ HEARINGS.......................................................... 18
C. PRIOR STUDIES CONCERNING NON-ALJS........................... 19

1. The Frye Study.......................................................... 19
2. 1992 ACUS Report....................................................21
3. The Limon Study.......................................................21
4. The Asimow Study.....................................................22

III. Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of Project................23

A. PURPOSE...........................................................................24
B. SCOPE...............................................................................25
C. SURVEY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS.....27

IV. Dataset...................................................................................30

V. Survey Data............................................................................31

A. TYPES OF NON-ALJS..........................................................31

1. Number of Non-ALJs................................................. 32
2. Titles .......................................................................... 37
3. Salaries ...................................................................... 38
a. Non-ALJs on General-Service Pay Scales.................39
b. Non-ALJs on Special Pay Scales ............................... 44

B. TYPES OF NON-ALJ ORAL HEARINGS..................................48

1. Nature of Hearings....................................................48
2. Agency as Party.........................................................51
3. Appeals and Finality.................................................52
4. Case-Processing Goals...............................................55

C. NON-ALJ SELECTION......................................................... 57
D. NON-ALJ OVERSIGHT AND INDEPENDENCE.......................60

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1. Separation of Functions ............................................ 61
a. Non-ALJ Functions ................................................... 61
b. Reporting Relationships............................................64
2. Ex parte Communications.........................................67
3. Physical Separation................................................... 70
4. Recusal Requirements...............................................72
5. Performance Appraisals and Bonuses.......................73
a. Subject to Performance Appraisals...........................73
b. Nature of Performance Appraisals ............................ 75
c. Bonus Eligibility ........................................................ 77
d. Precautions with Performance Appraisals and Bonuses....................................................................81
6. Non-ALJ Removal.....................................................83

VI. Suggested Alternative Practices..........................84

A. NON-ALJ SELECTION.........................................................85

1. Agencies should consider using a panel-based process to select their non-ALJs...........................................85

B. NON-ALJ OVERSIGHT AND INDEPENDENCE.......................89

1. Agencies might consider implementing separation of functions for non-ALJs and separating non-ALJs from others in the agency ......................................... 89
2. Agencies might consider limiting non-ALJs' ex parte communications concerning the merits of any agency adjudication over which they are presiding............91
3. Agencies might consider memorializing recusal requirements for non-ALJs......................................93
4. Agencies might consider promulgating clear criteria that are unrelated to case outcomes for non-ALJs' performance appraisals and bonus eligibility ......... 93

C. NON-ALJ REMOVAL...........................................................96

1. Agencies might consider promulgating clear grounds for non-ALJs' removal from their adjudicatory roles or for other adverse action against them.................96

D. AGENCY TRANSPARENCY AND ASSESSMENT......................99

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1. To further transparency, salience, and efficacy, agencies might consider using notice-and-comment rulemaking when promulgating provisions that concern non-ALJ independence...............................99

Appendix A..................................................................................102

Appendix B..................................................................................116

Appendix C..................................................................................123

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I. INTRODUCTION

Federal administrative adjudication dwarfs federal judicial adjudication in volume and variety.¹ Some agency adjudications, such as those over which approximately 2,000 administrative law judges (ALJs)² preside, share a statutory framework under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA also provides uniform provisions that seek to protect ALJs from undue agency interference with their decision-making.³ This framework permits relatively easy interagency comparison and discussion.

But these APA hearings are only a fraction of agencies' adjudicatory hearings. Instead, most administrative hearings are before adjudicators who are not ALJs. These adjudicators—who number more than 10,000—go by numerous titles but are often collectively called "non-ALJ adjudicators," "non-ALJ-hearing officers," "administrative judges," or variations of those terms.⁴ In this paper, we use the simpler (and admittedly imprecise) term "non-ALJs." Likewise, we refer to (and define in more detail below) the hearings over which they preside as "Non-ALJ Hearings." Neither these Non-ALJ Hearings nor the non-ALJs themselves share a statutory framework, whether under the APA or other statute.⁵ As a result, there are many differences among various agencies' proceedings and in characteristics of their non-ALJs. These differences render it difficult to describe and analyze those characteristics and proceedings comparatively and to offer recommendations for non-ALJs collectively.

Judicial doctrine over the past few decades has allowed agencies more discretion to use non-ALJs in place of ALJs.⁶ In contrast to

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ALJs, non-ALJs almost never have statutory protections with respect to their independence.⁷ Congress and policymakers have concentrated on agencies' rulemaking powers and process, providing little oversight or coordination over non-ALJs and their hearings.⁸ Non-ALJs, if not confused with ALJs, have largely worked in the shadows as the federal bureaucracy's "hidden judiciary."⁹ But non-ALJs' independence is as important for regulated parties and the agencies themselves as it was when Congress enacted the APA with ALJs' protections. Impartial non-ALJs are central to due process, fair proceedings with correct decisions, and—perhaps most overlooked—faith in government and administrative programs.¹⁰

Recognizing these problems, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) commissioned this report to obtain data and provide recommendations concerning non-ALJs' appointment, independence, and oversight, especially as contrasted with ALJs'.

This report's two key purposes are (1) to build on prior projects by reporting updated and more comprehensive data concerning non-ALJs, and (2) to identify, based in part on these data, practices for non-ALJ selection, oversight, and independence that promote non-ALJs' actual and apparent impartiality. We recognize that agency officials may have countervailing and disparate views as to our recommendations, and that agencies have different statutory charges and various factors to consider in administering their agencies and adjudication systems. Accordingly, we offer suggestions in the spirit of providing agencies alternative approaches to establishing or reconsidering their adjudication regimes and these regimes' effects on adjudicator impartiality.

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In early 2017, we circulated a detailed survey to 64 federal agencies and received responses from at least one subcomponent of 53 of those agencies, for a response rate of 83%.¹¹ We asked the responding agencies to provide information on a certain class of hearings...