No Money, No Representation: A Case Study of Zeguo Town in China

• Date: 01 March 2018
• DOI: 10.1177/0032329218754511
• Author: Jing Ye
• Published date: 01 March 2018
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329218754511

Politics & Society

2018, Vol. 46(1) 81 –99

© 2018 SAGE Publications

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DOI: 10.1177/0032329218754511

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Article

No Money, No Representation:

A Case Study of Zeguo

Town in China

Jing Ye

University of International Business and Economics

Abstract

Authoritarian regimes rely on fiscal resources to build patronage networks. And

so it is with China. Budget making is usually dominated by government leaders.

However, some local governments in recent years have invited ordinary people to

review budgets and even to determine parts of budgets. Why would local leaders

make themselves accountable to their constituencies in an authoritarian setting? Why

would local governments in China tie their own hands? Using detailed description of

a township government, this article argues that fiscal affluence based on land is an

important factor for local governments in launching fiscal reform. Richer areas have

become more fiscally accountable by opening up new discussion and encouraging

citizen participation.

Keywords

local accountability, lands, fiscal affluence, participatory fiscal reform

Corresponding Author:

Jing Ye, University of International Business and Economics, Chaoyang District, Beijing, China.

Email: yejing@uibe.edu.cn

754511PASXXX10.1177/0032329218754511Politics & SocietyYe

research-article2018

82 Politics & Society 46(1)

Scholars increasingly recognize that a strict dichotomy between democracy and

authoritarianism is overly simple and naive.1 These two broad categories not only

include separate subtypes but are also, in reality, intertwined. Democratic countries

may have subnational authoritarian enclaves.2 At the same time, authoritarian coun-

tries incorporate democratic practices.3 China is a very interesting case in this regard.

Some scholars have argued that Leninist state institutions have maintained the auton-

omy of the state and escaped social constraints in post-Mao China.4 However, that is

not in fact the case. It is true that the overall political system remains intact, but politi-

cal change in China has been occurring incrementally and gradually, especially at the

local level.5 Village committees were launched in the late 1980s.6 Local People’s

Congresses have become substantively representative.7 Local People’s Political

Consultative Conferences now serve as a direct form of political participation and

consultation with social elites.8 And similarly to other democratic countries, China has

an operationally autonomous civil society to work with local governments.9

Democratic practices are evident even in the fiscal field. China has been regarded

as one of the least transparent countries with regard to fiscal reports and as having little

engagement with the public. It is understandable that an authoritarian regime would

rely on fiscal resources to buy supporters.10 Therefore, for many years, budgeting has

been regarded as an exclusive instrument the government uses to ensure its authority

and to prevent public involvement in China.11 In the open budget index, China was

ranked ninety-first among 102 countries worldwide in 2015, much lower than other

equivalent developing countries such as Brazil (sixth), Russia (eleventh), and India

(fifty-third).12 In this broad scenario, however, there are now some grassroots fiscal

reforms. Local governments in several regions have invited ordinary citizens to review

budgets and even to decide parts of budgets. Such regions include towns and districts

in Shanghai, Henan, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Sichuan, Beijing, Yunnan, and

Guangdong provinces.

In most of these cases, local government leaders play pivotal roles. That fact is

especially puzzling given that local government leaders can reap two kinds of benefits

when they dominate the fiscal decision-making process. First, they can take advantage

of fiscal resources to secure political achievements for themselves, leading to promo-

tion. Because promotion of local leaders is controlled by the nomenklatura system,

local leaders are more accountable to the upper hierarchical levels.13 Fiscal resources

provide tools that can be used to impress superiors. For instance, local leaders are

believed to spend more money in the later parts of their tenures to improve their pros-

pects for official promotion.14 In addition, local governments spend more money on

infrastructure and less on investment in human capital and public services, because

infrastructure is more visible to higher level officials.15 Second, as Wan, Ye, and

Franco noted, neoguanxilism has become a main mechanism of resource allocation in

China.16 When they dominate fiscal allocation, local leaders distribute fiscal resources

on the basis of informal networks. For that reason, budget making dominated by gov-

ernment leaders should be among the most resilient practices in the Chinese political

system. How would engaging the public in the process be possible in China? Why

would local leaders in an authoritarian setting make themselves accountable to the