On the semantic foundation of P[a.bar]ninian derivational procedure: the derivation of kumbhak[a.bar]ra.

• Author: Scharf, Peter
• Position: Essay

The treatment of upapada-tatpurusa compounds in Grimal, Venkataraja Sarnia, and Laksh-minarasimham's (2007) Book of Compound Words and the treatment of the starting point in Paninian derivation in several recent papers by Houben (2003, 2009a, 2009b, 2010) occasion a rearticulation of initial phases and particular points of Paninian derivational procedure. Grimal et al. (2007) omit early steps from their derivations and, as a result, show nominal terminations present at their first step in the derivation of upapada tatpurusa compounds. (1) Even though their annotations reveal the correct understanding of P[a.bar]nini's derivational procedure, omitting early steps gives the incorrect impression that P[a.bar]nini's derivational procedure begins with these speech forms present rather than with the semantic and syntactic conditions that occasion them. Their exposition closely follows that of Bhattojidiksita; yet the latter himself diminishes the role of semantic and syntactic conditions in derivational procedure in departure from his predecessors. Houben (2003, 2009a, 2009b, forthcoming) deliberately argues that P[a.bar]ninian derivation begins with speech forms and does not begin with the early steps in question at all. He asserts that the derivation begins with a sentence or phrase that the speaker uses the grammar to check for correctness. He argues that semantic and syntactic conditions are incapable of determining speech forms without the guidance of user decisions, and that the grammar is used merely to reconstitute a preliminary sentence that the user of the grammar has in view in order to validate its correctness. Given these challenges to the view that P[a.bar]ninian derivation begins with semantics, the occasion is ripe for an investigation of just what speech forms are in view at the start of a P[a.bar]ninian derivation and what semantic conditions are required. The pivotal issue arises in the derivation of the upapada-tatpurusa compound kumbhak[a.bar]ra 'potter'.

1. WHAT THE POTTER HAS TO DO WITH SEMANTICS

   1.1 Basic assumptions in linguistics

   The clarification of what speech forms and what semantic conditions are in view at the start of a P[a.bar]ninian derivation requires first a clarification of some basic assumptions about the nature of linguistic science as it was conceived by the ancient Indians. Ancient Indian linguists begin from the conception of speakers and end with speech. While Indian grammatical works presuppose an analysis of speech and early modern Indian semantic works are concerned with cognition from the perspective of a listener, none of the extant Sanskrit grammars begins with actual speech. They all, from the ancient phonetic treatises proper to particular Vedic traditions (Pr[a.bar]tisakhyas) to medieval non-P[a.bar]ninian grammars and early modern reworkings of P[a.bar]ninian grammars, derive actual speech from basic elements previously abstracted in accordance with an assumed prior analysis. The rules produce speech; they themselves, formulated to take the prior analysis into account, do not analyze it. In that sense Indian grammar is generative. It is constructed from the point of view of the speaker, not of the listener. P[a.bar]ninian grammar in particular uniformly instructs which speech forms are to be used under various conditions, including some 735 semantics conditions described in Scharf 2009a (101-9); conversely, the grammar never instructs what meaning is to be understood from a speech form. P[a.bar]ninian grammar is therefore a generative grammar beginning from basic linguistic units and semantics and ending with actual speech forms. While P[a.bar]ninian grammar is generative, it is not fully transformational; that is, it does not transform one actual utterance into another. While it is transformational to the extent that certain morphemes are posited as basic and variations are produced by replacements, it does not give preference, for instance, to the active voice over the passive voice in the basic speech forms posited (as some forms of modern transformational grammar do). Instead, alternate syntactic constructions that express some common meaning are derived from abstract non-phonetic categories. Identical conditions stated in various rules account for the common meaning while variant conditions or unconditioned alternation account for the differences in the alternate speech forms. P[a.bar]ninian grammar therefore does not have a sentence as its starting point. It has as its starting point a conception in the mind of a speaker embodied to a limited extent, before the application of any rules, already in certain basic, phonetic elements, namely roots and underived nominal stems.

   The question of what, if any, speech forms are in view as the starting point for P[a.bar]ninian derivation is determinable from an examination of the set of rules and its supplementary lists. The only speech forms permissible at the start of a derivation are those (roots and stems) listed as basic elements, those inferrable as being of the same kind in lists of exemplary elements ([a.bar]krtigana), and those included by specific semantic criteria. The supplementary lists consist in particular of the Dh[a.bar]tupatha and ganas to which rules of the Ast[a.bar]dhydyi refer. Numerous rules provide operations on some 282 lists (gana) mentioned in those rules, beginning with A. 1.1.27 sarvaclini sarvan[a.bar]m[a.bar]n by which speech forms in the list beginning with sarva 'all' are termed sarvandman 'pronoun'. Roots listed in the Dh[a.bar]tupatha are termed dhatu by 1.3.1 bh[u.bar]v[a.bar]dayo dh[a.bar]tavah. Finally an open class of additional speech forms is included as basic elements under the sole specification that they be meaningful. By A. 1.2.45 arthavad adh[a.bar]tur apratyayall pr[a.bar]tipadikam, meaningful speech forms (arthavat), other than roots, affixes, and speech forms that end with them, are termed pr[a.bar]tipadika 'nominal base'. By A. 1.2.46 krttaddhitasam[a.bar]s[a.bar]s at, complex speech forms derived by the grammar, including derivates from roots, derivates from nominal stems, and compounds, are also termed pratipadika. Other basic elements (affixes and augments) are explicitly introduced by rules. Nominal bases and roots are then generally referred to as preceding contexts in rules that provide affixes after them (e.g., dh[a.bar]toh in 3.1.91 and pr[a.bar]tipadik[a.bar]t in 4.1.1). These are the only speech forms present at the start of P[a.bar]ninian derivation; there are no others. Semantic conditions serve as the remainder of the initial conditions for the operation of rules of the Ast[a.bar]dhy[a.bar]y[i.bar].

   1.2 Reconstitution rather than synthesis?

   Houben accepts that there is a synthetic part to a grammar user's use of P[a.bar]ninian grammar. What he denies is that semantics lie at the foundation of sentence generation. He (2009b: 13) rightly points out that certain basic units of speech are included at the start of a P[a.bar]ninian derivation when he writes, for instance, "the selection of a suitable root is normally the starting point of the synthetic part of his consultation cycle." He indicates (p. 14) the complementary absence of pure semantics while elaborating on the presence of basic units of speech--writing, "the concrete starting point for a derivation in the synthetic phase of the consultation cycle of a user of grammar in PAnini's time will then never be 'pure' meaning or an autonomous level of semantic representations but the selection of a root--for instance, bh[u.bar] 'to be'--or a form from lists of underived stems, pronominal forms, etc. in which form and meaning are inseparably integrated." He reiterates (p. 13) criticism formulated in Houben 1999 of the views of Kiparsky and Staal (1969), Bronkhorst (1979), Joshi and Roodbergen (1975), and Kiparsky (1982) "according to which 'semantics' or 'meanings' form the starting point of the derivation," and directs that criticism against Kiparsky (2009), who postulates a level of semantic information that forms the starting point of the derivation of a complete sentence in which "k[a.bar]rakas are assigned on the basis of 'semantic information'." While accepting "at least two distinct levels of derivation ... a level of morphological representations (where we find roots, stems, suffixes) and a level of phonological representations (with words in their final form after the application of all substitution rules including those of sandhi)" (p. 15), Houben writes, "no additional level of representation is needed to account for Panini's system." He regards syntax and semantics "as domains of consultation, which allow the user of the grammar to label the linguistic forms of his preliminary sentence according to the syntactically relevant categories of meaning or according to semantically relevant generalizations of form (suffixes)" (p. 15), stating, "As I argued extensively in 1999[: 26-27], the view that P[a.bar]ninis grammar is a device 'to encode a given meaning and to produce an expression' is untenable" (p. 13).

   Rather than accepting a semantic foundation for P[a.bar]ninian derivation, Houben asserts instead that the starting point is a preliminary statement. Houben asserts that "the starting point" of a P[a.bar]ninian derivation "is a preliminary sentence that needs to be checked or that needs some little extra refinement" (2009a: 524). He writes (2009b: 14),

   The system of P[a.bar]nini's grammar "clearly requires a user who wants to check and possibly improve a preliminary statement" (Reuben 2003: 161). The system implies the presence of a Knowledgeable user, a preliminary statement, and the application of first analytic and next synthetic procedures to the words in it, with the user keeping in mind the preliminary statement and its purport, and aiming at the best possible, sam-skrta form of his preliminary statement. Houben writes (2009b: 19), "no-one has ever produced a correct form...